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1. Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Overview of the dissertation 
 
1.1.1. The aims 
 
The dissertation starts locally. It starts with my observations on and engagements with 
contemporary artistic performances, a loosely defined category at the intersection of 
theatre/performing arts, performance art and media art. The dissertation explores performance 
as a form of thinking by itself which gives an access to non-representative forms of knowledge 
and reveals an immanent world in its making. The ‘(en)actors,’ as we will see, are as much the 
performers as the materials they choose to work with, embodied in the materiality of language, 
biological materials, machines, weretigers and vampires. Thinking with the performances as 
they unfold with the variant sets of ‘(en)actors,’ I inquire into the social and political contexts 
in which they are situated to launch critical investigations. The aim of the dissertation is to take 
the performances as enactments of different theories of materialism, to provide conceptual tools 
through which both material ‘things’ and socio-political processes could be understood in 
emergent, relational and dynamic ways. Hence, the dissertation rests on two interconnected 
pillars, on the one hand it takes the performances seriously as an immanent mode of thinking, 
and on the other it traces the social-political imaginaries they enact, expounded in a materialist 
philosophical inquiry into bodies, society and history. 
 
1.1.2. The structure and organisation of the dissertation 
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The dissertation is organised in six chapters. Following the introduction chapter that lays the 
theoretical foundation, each of the five chapters that make up the body of the dissertation is 
dedicated to one artist and her or his respective works (with the exception that chapter three 
focuses on one artist and one artist collective). Each of the works, along with the historical, 
social and political contexts it is situated in, creates a constellation that as much demands 
rigorous analysis as it creates transversal connections with other constellations. What they all 
share is a practice of immanent unfolding of events, a focus on tactility and materiality, and 
sharpened sensibilities for the socio-political meanings resulting from the movements and 
conjunctures of the materials. 
 The way the chapters are structured, or more precisely, stacked upon each other, and the 
way they interact with one another is inspired by the ‘plateaus’ of Deleuze and Guattari. Each 
chapter has its own movements and speed, as it tries to untangle different modes of political 
and historical codification and the production of subjects. Yet at the same time, they are 
interconnected by lines of flights that traverse different chapters. Sometimes the theoretical 
lines of flight work tangentially to the artistic works, and by so doing they enlarge the context 
under which the works could be viewed and map out hidden connections among the works. 
Sometimes they work paratactically, creating ‘contrasts’ as Whitehead terms it, and the 
patterned contrasts increase the ‘intensity of feeling’ of the experience (Whitehead 1929, 252). 
Sometimes, concrete figures like Pyotr Kropotkin and Antonin Artaud, or metaphorical figures 
like the schizo/tiger/vampire meander in passages connecting different chapters. 
 
The introduction chapter builds the theoretical foundation of the dissertation. The 
overarching question in all chapters goes: how are bodies imbricated in societies and histories? 
And how do societies and histories mark on the bodies? Even though my working methodology 
is akin to the rhizome or slime mould, that is to say, I start with analysing different artistic 
works locally and then a network of lines of thoughts emerge out of it, I find it useful to set 
forth a few theoretical parameters. As such, the first chapter is conceived as interlocking and 
interwoven threads of theoretical queries that lead to thorough explorations in the chapters to 
come. I will chart a conceptual ground based on the various strands of materialisms, starting 
from what can be generally categorised as new materialisms, by studying the efficacy of matter 
and materialities, emergence, process and self-organisation, and how this can be implicated in 
a critique of reductionism. I will then bring this into interlocution with the classical form of 
materialism, namely historical materialism, with the aim to tease out a materialist philosophy 
on history and politics. With the materialist theoretical foundation, I will outline the account of 
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history and politics through desire and movements following Deleuze and Guattari. As the 
dissertation evolves, I will interject the theoretical frame with references from East Asian 
context – though sometimes also with references from the Middle East, Russia or South 
America, as the world does not simply turn around the East-West axis. Sometimes they provide 
a counterpoint of non-essentialising differences, and sometimes they substantiate what is 
mutually shared between the cultures. The introduction ends with a note on the ways in which 
I bring these theories into the dissertation, and how they do not squarely fit into either 
particularity or universality, but are rather implicated in political ramifications of gazes and 
perspectives.  
Chapter two ‘Taqiyyah and the Materialism of Language: On Lawrence Abu Hamdan’s 
Contra Diction: Speech Against Itself’ examines the politics of language and how the 
materiality of language could transgress political boundaries by focusing on Lawrence Abu 
Hamdan’s performative lecture Contra Diction: Speech Against Itself (2014-ongoing). Aptly 
combining video, installation and performative formats, Lawrence Abu Hamdan has created a 
rich body of works that often reveal the political dimension of language and speech. The chapter 
investigates, in particular, the live performative lecture Contra Diction: Speech Against Itself, 
which draws on taqiyyah, an old esoteric Shi’a Islamic jurisprudence practiced by the Druze 
Islamic minority, whereby a believing individual can deny his faith or commit otherwise illegal 
acts while they are at risk of persecution or in a condition of statelessness. The artist analyses 
various moments involving language and speech act in the Druze community, such as in the 
Islamic conversion and the communication between mother and baby through the lens of 
taqiyyah, which reveals the paradoxical structure of language and language in its pre-semantics 
instance. The application of taqiyyah suggests transformations of rules that challenge the 
structural divide between the form of expression and form of content in language. Furthermore, 
drawing on Massumi’s notion of ‘non-sensuous similarity,’ the alignment of taqiyyah to the 
‘sense-perceived meaning’ highlights the dynamics of the immanence that constantly 
differentiates into language and expression. The case of onomatopoeia, beyond its trivial daily 
usage such as in describing the dog’s bark, is studied in a transcultural context and suggests 
rather that it is another mode for things to exist. This brings the materiality of language to the 
fore and situates it in pre-personal and impersonal expressions. Finally, this leads to a 
conceptual comparison to Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadology, which reveals how taqiyyah 
may be seen to reclaim a consciousness pertinent to the smooth space, hence avidly 
transforming the condition of language and producing political efficacies.   
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Chapter three ‘Codification, Desire, and Transgenetic Technology: On Vanouse and 
Spiess/Strecker’s works’ continues the problematisation of language as a signifier with a 
different set of materials, namely with bioart that deals with DNA technology. Following 
Luciana Parisi, the chapter traces the manifestations of the feminine intensive desire, a desire 
for multiple connections and a desire to become on the micro and macro levels, in physical 
realities and in social realms, as well as in the ancient and the digital-technological forms of 
life. With it, a linear natural history can be recast into a non-linear hypernatural history, which 
in turn challenges notions we take for granted from popular science. The works of Vanouse and 
Spiess/Strecker offer different critical approaches to this hypernature. The DNA fingerprint 
artifice crafted in Paul Vanouse’s Suspect Inversion Center (2011) challenges the process of 
overcodification that imposes in a top-down fashion a signifier function upon the DNA, such 
as in the case of O. J. Simpson. A genealogy of biological sex evinces that the scientific and 
cultural discursive organisation codifies what was indeterminate body-sexes in meiotic 
reproduction into a filiative relation of two-parent sex. The study of linguistics firmly situated 
in a philosophy of immanence sheds light on the mutual relation between the complex state of 
things/content and the discursive construct/expression, which in the case of DNA, translates 
into the mutual deterritorialisation between cytoplasmic realities/chromosomes and 
phenotypes/genotypes. As we move headlong into the age of genetic engineering, we witness 
the overcodification at work again. On the biodigital stratum, it renders everything as 
information, coinciding with the capitalistic machine’s tendency to subsume life itself as labour 
and to reduce energy expenditure in increasingly virtualised productions and reproductions. 
Biopolitics becomes necropolitics, but the definition of organic death is once again challenged 
by the feminine intensive desire on the micro level of mitochondrial reproduction and complex 
chain reactions unforeseeable in transgenetic operations. Klaus Spiess/Lucie Strecker’s Hare’s 
Blood + (2014) taps into the biodigital capture of life coupled with the question of value 
production and market, as the artists enact and animate an organism – an artifice – whose 
inorganic becoming overspills our anthropocentric logic of organic death, exhibiting a feminine 
intensive desire on the biophysical level. By way of multiperspectivism, the critical intervention 
of Hare’s Blood + returns us to the human realm, with all the socio-cultural and techno-
discursive implications, in recognising our own potential of becoming within the hypernature 
we co-inhabit with other forms of beings.  
Chapter four ‘Strange Intimacies Caught between East Asian Feminism and Animism: 
On Geumhyung Jeong’s choreography’ focuses on Korean choreographer Geumhyung Joeng’s 
solo works in which she engages in precisely executed and laborious ways with a wide range 
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of machines, including hydraulic excavators, refitted fitness training machines, dummy figures 
for medical usage and Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation equipment. The repetitive, medical or 
mechanical procedures she performs give way to moments of strange intimacies and with sexual 
connotations. The chapter uses relationality as a critical lens to examine what is assumed in the 
reactions that Jeong’s works often invite – that she is an East Asian feminist or that she works 
with machines in an animistic way. The relational efficacy in my analysis sheds light on the 
differential differences concerning Confucian womanhood and what can be tentatively called 
‘Confucian feminisim’ following Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee. Rosenlee’s historical research 
charts the lived and symbolic realities of East Asian womanhood beyond the divide between 
the biologically ‘natural’ woman and the ‘cultural’ man, and highlights the praxis of reciprocity 
as fundamental in the relational network. In a similar fashion, contra the naïve understanding 
of animism based on a presumed subject-object dichotomy, what is suggested in Jeong’s works 
is an animism favouring the relational co-emergence with the man-machine assemblage, and 
the embodied reality of the body bringing higher-order resonances together. The relationality 
affirms the turn from the epistemological to the ontological, and hence deepens the discussion 
of multiperspectivism. 
Chapter five ‘Immanence, Performance and History: On Ho Tzu Nyen’s Ten Thousand 
Tigers’ examines Singaporean artist Ho Tzu Nyen’s theatre production Ten Thousand Tigers 
(2014), which retells the history of Southeast Asia through the lens of the Malaya tiger, based 
on the transmogrification between tiger and man situated in a world of univocity. Presented as 
a complex installation or theatre machine featuring various machines being animated at times, 
and actors narrating, singing and chanting, Ten Thousand Tigers journeys through history 
without following a linear timeline: while the tiger symbolises a cosmological order deeply 
rooted in traditional Malayan belief systems and eco-philosophy, it also synthesises strong, new 
symbols in the encounter between the British coloniser and the tiger in Southeast Asia in the 
nineteenth century, the nickname of Malaya Tiger given to the Japanese general during World 
War II when Japan occupied Southeast Asia, and the haunting communist history where the 
party leader appeared to bear many names and faces. Ten Thousand Tigers provokes a reading 
of historical figures through the continuum of matters in flux, their synthesis and 
transformations. The multi-layered, ‘anachronistic’ worlds of Southeast Asia presented in the 
work thus enact an intensive perspective of time and history. History so viewed is recast, 
following Deleuze and Guattari, as the organisation of desire, from the free and connective 
desire in the primitive societies, to the taming of desires in the despotic society and further to 
the once again dislodged flows of desire that seek to self-perpetuate in the conjunctive logic of 
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capitalism. It produces the schizo, or the tiger, at the same time as an ancient figuration and as 
a modern/contemporary embodiment of the free flow of desire. The chapter also deals with 
animism and technology. As a continuation to the discussion on animism and 
multiperspectivism, this chapter also shows how univocity is at work in the material sense, 
which is to say, how things are not the same, but the way they exist can be said in the same way.  
The last chapter, chapter six ‘Manchukuo, Capitalism and the East Asian Modern: 
Transhistorical Desire in Kishi the Vampire’ takes this reflection on desire in history further. 
The chapter focuses on Chinese Australian artist Royce Ng’s Kishi the Vampire (2016), a 
lecture performance on the Japanese puppet-state of Manchukuo (1932-1945) and its finance 
minister Nobusuke Kishi (1896–1987). The article investigates the historical question of 
nationalism and Pan-Asianism in Manchukuo accompanied by philosophical reflections from 
the Kyoto School thinkers and their Chinese contemporaries. It traces the role opium played in 
the economy and Kishi’s adoptation of state-guided capitalism, which has far-reaching 
implications for East Asia and Southeast Asia until today, and further helps to unpack trade 
protectionism in the world at large.  At the same time, the chapter follows the materialist account 
of history and highlights the mutation of desire under capitalism. The flow of decoded desire in 
conjunctive capitalism disrupts the man-heaven alignment in a traditional society, manifesting 
itself in the perversion of desire in the hentai, or erotic-grotesque culture, the price of which is 
life itself subsumed in necropolitics. Appropriating this aesthetics of hentai culture and focusing 
on the disenfranchised bodies of the opiated Chinese and Korean coolies, Royce Ng’s 
performance aptly enacts this flow of desire in the figuration of the vampire. 
The last chapter brings the previous chapters in convergence and concludes with a 
personal note on the journey of the dissertation. 
 
The overview of the chapters already evinces their interconnectedness. The aim of the 
dissertation is not to establish one absolute theoretical framework that can explain away the 
questions raised. Rather, it presents an assemblage of interdisciplinary materialist practices that 
serve as interpretative and interventionist frames of socio-political structures. While respecting 
the formalities of academic writing, I intend to craft the dissertation in such a way that the reader 
may start from any chapter and go back and forth, or jump upwards and downwards among the 
plateaus. In line with the academic standard, the style of the writing is concise and analytical. 
At the same time, I also hope they paint a vivid picture of the artistic works I engage with, and 
provide useful resources in larger cultural, political and historical contexts.  
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As the chapters are dedicated to the enactment of material efficacies thwarting the 
political, economic and scientific-discursive capture of life, the introduction of my theoretical 
foundation first plunges into the world of matters. 
 
1.2. New Materialisms and Performance 
 
1.2.1. New materialisms 
 
This part surveys various strands of new materialist theory that are relevant for the dissertation. 
As we will see later in section 1.3, there is no necessary rupture between new materialism and 
the more classical, historical variations of materialism. The history of capitalism and 
schizophrenia, brilliantly analysed by Deleuze and Guattari by way of the organisation of bodies 
and desire, provides a way to mediate the new and classical materialisms, and lays foundation 
to almost all the chapters. Manuel De Landa’s formulation of the new materialism, similarly, 
focuses on the dynamic morphogenesis as a historical process that is constitutive of the material 
world (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 15). I will dedicate them to different subsections to 
keep the theoretical frame compact and clear.    
Pitted against dualisms of matter and mind, body and soul, nature and culture, things 
and language, new materialist thinking is firmly rooted in the philosophy of immanence. 
Whereas the dualist structures establish concepts by playing them against each other in a set of 
predestined, negative relations, new materialist thinking structures them in affirmative relations, 
thereby achieving an immanent way of conceptualising difference (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 
2012, 115-136).  
Nature, in the mind of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinkers, is objectified as 
something exterior to Man and so stands opposite to Culture. The Romanticists’ expressions of 
endearment to Mother Nature, recognising the creative and the unknown aspect of the outer 
world as it does, lapsed into a melancholic self-pity of inadequacy vis-à-vis the very creative 
force. Spinoza’s Natura Naturans, or ‘nature naturing’, posits nature – in his term ‘God’, but 
strictly a non-personified God – as the infinite substance possessed of infinite power that we 
are all part of (Spinoza 1992). This line of thinking has regained currency in the wake of 
poststructuralist thinking and ecological distress. The epidemic of the systematic exclusion and 
othering of nature results not only in an impasse of conceptualising being in its changing 
environment, it also feeds into the incessant capitalist machine with its exploitation of natural 
resources reaching a historical height in the age of the Anthropocene. A similar set of 
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dichotomies is found in the body versus the mind. However, an escape from the Cartesian 
coordinates of mind over body is no strange to Western intellectual tradition. From Spinoza’s 
parallelism taking what body and mind register as respective expressions of the same reality 
under different ‘attributes’ (Spinoza 1992), to Deleuze’s reworking on Spinoza (Deleuze 1988), 
there is a lineage that takes thought as emerging from bodily and affective encounters not by 
matching pre-set ideas but by being exposed to the sensible.  
In trying to conceptualise difference in an affirmative and dynamic light, in other words, 
in accounting for the self-difference of matter, the various strands of new materialism see matter 
not as inert but more elusive, and exhibiting self-organising properties, as well as immanently 
imbued with capacities to act and be acted upon. For Jane Bennett, the ‘vitality’ of matter 
implies the capacity of things – edibles, commodities, storms, metals – not only to impede or 
block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, 
propensities, or tendencies of their own (Bennett 2009). In a short essay called Immanence: A 
Life, Gilles Deleuze proposes the concept of ‘a life,’ with the indefinite article suggesting an 
‘indeterminate vitality’ and a ‘pure a-subjective current’ (Deleuze 2005b). ‘A life’ points to 
what A Thousand Plateaus describes as ‘matter-movement’ or ‘matter-energy,’ a ‘matter in 
variation that enters assemblages and leaves them’ (Bennett 2009, 54). 
Many scholars have pointed out the affinity between materialist thinking and recent 
scientific advancements. Chaos theory, for example, describes how apparently random effects 
may have an extremely complex, nonlinear provenance, and complexity theory examines how 
unpredictable events can catapult systems into novel configurations (Coole 2010, 13). Bringing 
theory and science into fruitful interlocution, Deleuze scholar John Protevi sees emergence 
articulated in Deleuze as producing ‘the ontology of a world able to yield the results 
forthcoming in complexity theory’ (Protevi 2006, 19). Massumi argues that Deleuze, along with 
Bergson and Spinoza, can be profitably read together with recent theories of complexity and 
chaos. It is all a question of emergence, which is precisely the focus of the various science-
derived theories that converge around the notion of self-organisation (the spontaneous 
production of a level of reality having its own rules of formation and order of connection). 
(Massumi 2002b, 32) The immanent self-organisation and dynamism of matter come up in 
various moments in the works I analyse, as a material overspill of the system that tries to oppress 
it, be it scientism, capitalism or colonialism. As Bennett puts it, however ‘cultural’ an 
assemblage (e.g. capitalism, the military-industrial complex, gender) may be, the affect of the 
matter involved still can resist and elude cultural control (Bennett 2009, 61). This critical 
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juncture of materialism of the body/bodies and cultural questions such as history serves as a 
through line in this dissertation.  
Not only is complexity theory applicable to the understanding of dynamic physical 
systems, this approach can, in broader ways, affect the treatment of biological organisms and 
their relationship to other aspects of their material environment. In the life sciences as well as 
in physics, material phenomena are increasingly being conceptualised not as discrete entities or 
closed systems but rather as open, complex systems with porous boundaries (Coole 2010). 
While science may offer material proof to philosophical ideas that are speculative in nature, it 
is important to stress that the popular reception of science may indeed revert to reductionist, 
hence non-complex understanding. For instance, the reductionist tendency of seeing the world 
in terms of information and material manifests in the recent debate around human genome 
cloning and editing, presupposing that the DNA codes are the holy grail of human life, a book 
of life, as it were. I will return to this in the chapter on DNA.  
 
This efficacy of matter can be incorporated into the social field to establish new relations 
and effectuate changes in a social setting. In actor-network theory proposed by Bruno Latour, 
an actant is a source of action that can be either human or nonhuman; it is that which has 
efficacy, can do things, exercise the agency given to them or programmed within them, has 
sufficient coherence to make a difference, produce effects, and alter the course of events (Latour 
2005). It is ‘any entity that modifies another entity in a trial,’ something whose ‘competence is 
deduced from [its] performance’ rather than posited in advance of the action (Bennett 2009, 
viii). At the same time, however, this is not a case of merely imbuing a specific object with 
agency, such would lead to a naïve animism, to be analysed in the following section 1.4.3. 
Importantly, for Latour, things do not suddenly materialise in the world, but are born of 
negotiations between the material world, the social, historical contexts and human beings. This 
lends itself to a cross-reading to the Marx’s analysis of labour process as ‘the universal 
condition for the metabolic interaction…between man and nature’ (Harvey 2010, 118). This 
metabolism is crucial for both the old (Marxist historical) and new materialism, which will be 
expounded on in section 1.3. 
Whether the emergence is material or social, involving human or nonhuman actants, 
taking place under scientific, historical or daily social circumstances, the foundation remains 
firmly material. The emergence takes place relative to the virtual (as in Deleuze) or the potential 
(as in Whitehead). Conversely, the virtual or the potential is the immanent condition of all 
emergences. Importantly, they do not ‘prefigure or predetermine the actualities that emerge 
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from it. Rather, it is the impelling force, or the principle, that allows each actual entity to appear 
(to manifest itself) as something new’ (Shaviro 2009, 34). Creativity is rooted in the virtual and 
potential field becoming transformed, articulated, elaborated, composed, contained and 
dissociated, over and over again.  
 
1.2.2. Performance as immanent, material process 
 
One of the basic premises of the dissertation is that performance acts as an immanent mode of 
thinking (Cull 2013), and an enaction of materialist philosophy that is at the same time situated 
in the body as it is in cultural political discourses. All of the works analysed in this dissertation 
are either presented in performing arts context, or have a predominant live element even when 
they are not presented in a theatre. It’s easier to define what they are not: they are not classic 
dramas or spoken theatre in the sense that they do not simulate reality. Therefore, they fall more 
conveniently into the broad category of performance.  
Performance is a long established academic discipline. Performance scholar Chris Salter 
distinguishes several characteristics of performance from other forms of knowledge making: in 
performance, there is an interest in enaction or doing; it favours real-time, dynamic processes 
over static objects or representation; it is situated in embodiment and materiality and triggers 
an immanent experience; and it is the effect of both human and nonhuman presence through 
transmutation and reconstitution (Salter 2010, xxiii). All of the characteristics show a further 
development of performance from traditional representational theatre, but performance can be 
taken to imply a much broader field than theatre. Defined by performance` scholar Richard 
Schechner, performance renders the moment as an event, an ‘actual,’ in which something 
actualises, and that can take root as much in the secluded spaces of art as in daily life, for 
example in rituals and in playing. It marks a convergence of the social sciences and performing 
arts, introducing anthropology, shamanism, psychotherapy and non-West cultures into the 
discourse of performance (Schechner 2003). The inherent interdisciplinarity of performance 
proves crucial for my dissertation. Hence, in the broader sense of performance, the works I 
analyse are works of performance in themselves, and at the same time, the complex layers in 
some of the performances can be said to enact other forms of performances, namely rituals, the 
ethnographic gaze, or economic activities.  
On an ontological level and meta-level, the presentation of arts, including the audience 
constituting the co-presence, offers a potent site for articulating immanence. Immanence in and 
of performances, is the ontological requisite for thinking, being and performing, both human 
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and otherwise. Thinking with the vibrancy of matter, it follows that patterns, coordination, 
subjects and meanings emerge out of a material constellation, not to meet any predetermined 
set of goals but rather from bottom up. This immanent mode of organisation and creativity 
coming from the processes themselves can offer an optic for understanding the workings of 
artistic processes. For performance scholar Laura Cull, live arts enact such processes: ‘There is 
no leader, director, author or transcendent idea that commands coordination and organization 
from without; rather, coordination arises more spontaneously and in a manner immanent to the ... 
activity. The material bodies involved in the creative process do not obey commands issued 
from a transcendent source, but generate their own rules and forms of creation’ (Cull 2013, 25). 
 For the audience or co-participants, this immanent perspective asks us not to view 
performances as outside of ourselves, but as an emergence differentiated in degree of our own 
experiences and participation in a situation. The emergence of new relations that have never 
existed in the same way before is also pertinent to the immanence of performance. However, 
even when the immanent perspective in performance is ‘inherently participatory’ and suggests 
that ‘participants are produced by processes of participation’ (Cull 2013, 146-147), it requires 
clear analysis on the locations, as well as on the degrees of action and being acted upon. As 
Cull argues, ‘the extent to which we act according to this immanence varies, the degree to which 
we acknowledge our “partness” or partiality can and does differ’ (Cull 2013, 162). In live art 
or performance art, this may mean a heightened level of awareness of the mutual becoming or 
affective unfolding in moments of participation, in tangible or intangible manners. Through the 
exercise of attention, we reconfigure our bodily reality in tune with the immanence, with 
intensive time, and ‘gain a heightened awareness of the complexity or self-difference of our 
body’s perpetual variation in relation to its surroundings’ (Cull 2013, 175).The performance 
situates the ‘parts,’ both as observing audience and as processes in the artwork, in a ‘whole’ 
that is about to emerge from randomness and virtuality. Thus immanence is generative. ‘Our 
powers to act and be acted on, to change and be changed, are themselves the result of our 
immanent participation’ (Cull 2013, 162). 
At the same time, seeing arts through the lens of immanence does not discredit 
discursivity. What new materialism entails for the studies of art is a refocus on the material 
dimensions in tandem with the discursive dimensions. Dolphijn and van der Tuin point out that 
the contemporary scholar influenced by the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ proceeds to deconstruct 
the messages of art. New materialism emphasises on the two dimensions in their entanglement: 
the experience of a piece of art is made up of matter and meaning. The material dimension 
creates and gives form to the discursive, and vice versa (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 91). 
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The way how this entanglement works, and especially how it works to create new discourses 
and new materialities, rings true in all the chapters. The most challenging part for my theoretical 
project is to extrapolate this creative process into cultural-historical contexts spanning over a 
considerable period of time, such as the works of Ho and Ng exemplify. Both artists are 
dedicated to making trans-historical movements tangible. The last two chapters are an attempt 
to bring the artistic and discursive together in works that in themselves spin over various 
plateaus.  
I consciously deploy the term ‘enaction’ to describe the potency of art and performance. 
Enaction can contain legal connotation in the sense of ‘enacting’ a bill, and for the dissertation, 
it encompasses both the aesthetical and ethical practice in putting ideas to life. Following 
neuroscientist and philosopher Francisco Varela, enaction is based on situated, embodied agents, 
whose world of significance emerges along their active living, not as a representation system, 
but as constrained imagination (Cohen and Varela 2000). Felix Guattari’s ethico-aesthetic 
paradigm resonates with the enaction and world-making in performances, for the aesthetics 
‘isn’t something that gives you recipes to make a work of art,’ it is a ‘speculative cartography’ 
which constructs coordinates of existence at the same time as those coordinates are lived 
(Guattari 1993, 240-241). Artistic works hence act as powerful conduits between new 
materialism and history and politics precisely because of the condensed ways in which they 
enact the undercurrents and potential of bringing forth a world – worlding. And this enaction, 
by resonating with the audience/co-participants, further enacts coordinates and processes of 
‘active living’ and supply ethical and socio-political imaginaries.  
 
1.3. Materialist Lens on Politics and History 
 
If, as mentioned above, the material agency of matter seen in a network of actants is one way 
of inserting the materialist dimension into the social, then this section is tasked to illustrate 
another approach – taking the social body as a whole and analysing the internal and external 
forces and movements.  
The works I examine in this dissertation all have various degrees of historical and 
political references and implications as they problematise the modern concepts of language as 
signifier, spatialised time, science and biology, and ideological camps. They do not represent 
any one category of political theory or of approaching politics or historiography through art. 
The common ground is rather that they are dedicated to unearthing the discursive setups behind 
these concepts and challenges the structuralism, reductionism and construction of bifurcation 
by going into the material strata that condition them in their particular localities. Based on this, 
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they aim to enact different imaginaries or materialist overspills that open up to (indeterminate) 
potentials, or deterritorialise set structures in Deleuzian terms.  
 
In the critical engagement of the power of knowledge, the works continue the tradition 
that Michel Foucault sets forth in The Order of Things, which analyses the epistemic condition, 
or how knowledge is constituted, on language, biology and economics that emerged in the 
nineteenth century in the West (Foucault 1971). At the same time, power works by ‘subjection,’ 
or producing the subjects and the condition of the subject to exist as well as to evolve, to desire. 
The operation of subjection is important for Judith Butler, ‘power does not stand outside of the 
subject and is not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong sense, what we depend on for 
our existence and what we harbour and preserve in the beings that we are’ (Butler 1997, 2). In 
this sense, any attempt to unpack power in the context of politics has to go beyond ideological 
judgements. As the proverb goes, ‘power corrupts; and absolute power corrupts absolutely’. 
This discursive line has been carried forth into a more general materialist study of 
knowledge by thinkers like Deleuze and DeLanda. DeLanda’s book, A Thousand Years of 
Nonlinear History, presents his reworking of the production of knowledge in language, 
economics and biology, and its power over bodies following the Foucaultian tradition. The 
historical development of the European society from 1000 to 2000 AD is recast as processes of 
abstract material processes – sedimentation, selection, autocatalytic feedback loops, which 
DeLanda identifies in isomorphic fashion underlying the evolution of languages, the growth of 
cities, the emergence of large-scale industry, in the European context. (DeLanda 1997) Deleuze 
and Guattari’s analysis of historical processes such as different forms of societies and economy 
covers at least another thousand years, where the nomad figures prominantly. 
How to mediate the various strands of thinking that can be characterised as ‘new 
materialism’ and the topics with historical dimensions? How to weave them together on a 
coherent plane of materialist politics? The following section provides a theoretical proposition 
on how to bridge ‘new materialism’ and the classical form of materialism, i.e. historical 
materialism. It will not go into an elaborate comparative study, rather, it focuses on questions 
pertinent to my dissertation, such as biopolitics and necropolitics (Spiess/Strecker), economics 
and colonialism (Ng and Ho). In the chapters that follow, the bridge will hopefully be more 
fleshed out.  
At the intersection of these two forms of materialisms is the man and the body, at once 
material and social. For some questions explored in new materialism, the man has to be 
debunked as an individual subject in favour of relational constellations that give rise to the 
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individual, but even this pre-individual is historically produced. Historical materialism tries to 
analyse the conditions that produce classes of man in particular historical processes and to 
locate the agency of man. The relation is not irreconcilable; rather, the interlocution of the two 
can help bringing the understanding of politics further.   
Marx writes, ‘Labour […] as the creator of use-values, as useful labour, is a condition of 
human existence which is independent of all forms of society; it is an eternal natural 
necessity which mediates the metabolism between man and nature, and therefore human life 
itself’ (Marx 1990, 133). This idea of ‘metabolism,’ with labour as the mediator between human 
existence and nature, is central to Marx’s historical-materialist argument (Harvey 2010, 27). 
The sense of the historical in historical materialism entails a collectively planned relationship 
to the conditions of existence of man, and it is further characterised by the changing nature of 
those conditions. The human is thus both a shaper of nature (as part of its historical agency) and 
shaped by nature. Importantly, ‘we encounter a sense of interaction with nature as constant 
change, or a dynamic metabolism. This metabolic understanding of the relationship between 
humanity and nature, the social and the environmental, is where the critique of political 
economy starts to cross into political ecology’ (Vishmidt 2018a, 41). 
The political ecology can thus work perfectly in tandem with the ecology-minded 
schools of new materialism. The question regarding the collectively planned relationship to the 
conditions of existence of man is admittedly more complex, for here, the classical Marxist view 
that the human society transits from certain tendencies of social or economic organisation 
towards increasing rationalisation is contested. The mutation of capitalism under neoliberalism 
presents a bigger challenge as ever (which Marx perfectly anticipated), which demands clear 
analysis and actions to penetrate the many faces that capitalism deftly takes on, especially as it 
works to assimilate the radical energy originally targeted at it. The institutionalisation and 
bureaucratisation of the feminist or postcolonial movements have proved the adaptability of 
capitalism. This current political-economical totality prompts some to seek answers not outside, 
but from within capitalism, such as in ‘accelerationism,’ or the hope that the destructive energy 
within capitalism can be channelled, and accelerated, to lead to radical changes and to a post-
capitalist future.  
 
1.3.1. Non-material and material entanglement  
 
Theories associated with new materialism, especially those working on the non-material aspects 
of capitalism, offer fruitful counterpoints to classical materialism. Patricia Clough (2008) points 
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out the entanglement of technological advancements and the pre-personal affective capacities 
of the bodies, especially in how technologies grasp and manipulate the imperceptible dynamism 
of affect. She does it by linking it to a materialist analysis of value. In this way, she effectively 
proves the critical resources of Marxist labour theory of value and affect theory can produce 
meaningful pathways in response to late capitalism. Crucially, she argues that what is upheld 
as the core of the body’s indeterminate potential, namely the pre-individual affective capacities, 
have been captured by capitalism which functions on an ‘affect economy,’ that is to say the 
accumulation of capital has shifted to the domain of affect. By the 1970s, there was a shift from 
selling products to manipulating affect, an expansion of the service economy and the 
technological autonomisation of its functioning. She writes, 
  
Social reproduction had become a matter of time, capital invested time realised in 
images to be consumed by the consumer, for example, in watching television, but also 
in doing therapy or going to the gym. The function of the media as a 
socialising/ideological mechanism had become secondary to its continuous modulation, 
variation and intensification of affective response in real time, where bodily affect is 
mined for value. (Clough 2008, 16) 
 
In the society of omnipresent control and biopolitical surveillance, the individual subjects are 
and can no longer be rendered as individual entities but what Deleuze refers to as ‘dividuals’  
(Deleuze 1995, 180). They are ‘statistically configured in populations that surface as profiles 
of bodily capacities, indicating what a body can do now and in the future. The affective capacity 
of bodies, statistically simulated as risk factors, can be apprehended as such without the subject, 
even without the individual subject’s body, bringing forth competing bureaucratic procedures 
of control and political command in terms of securing the life of populations’ (Clough 2008, 
18). This shifts biopolitics, or the control of the population through socialisation of behaviours, 
into necropolitics for it determines the value of the lives of various populations (Mbembe 2003). 
This aspect of necropolitics will be fleshed out in the work of Spiess/Strecker concerning 
organic death in bioengineering, as well as in the work of Ng taking the opium as material lens. 
The bodies of the ‘dividuals’ that make up a social body, or what Deleuze and Guattari 
calls ‘socius’ is crucial for their understanding of history and politics, which I will plunge into 
in the following. With that, it becomes evident why the delineation between the historical and 
new materialisms is not absolute.  
Furthermore, the Marxist theorisation of capital renders capital not as a thing, but a 
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process that exists only in motion. As Harvey points out, what Marx seeks out in Capital is ‘a 
conceptual apparatus, a deep structure, that explains the way in which motion is actually 
instantiated within a capitalist mode of production. Consequently, many of his concepts are 
formulated around relations rather than stand-alone principles; they are about transformative 
activity’ (Harvey 2010, 13). This contradicts the biased view that Marxism is conceived as a 
fixed and immobile structure, and thus provides a fertile ground for the interlocution between 
historical materialism, labour theory of value, and various strands of poststructuralist theories, 
most notably I follow the creative interpretation of Marx in Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking on 
the development of capitalism.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s postulation on the operation of capital in Anti-Oedipus may 
appear familiar and strange at the same time to classical Marxists. Their relation to Marxism is 
a relation of translation and addition, focussing on what classical Marxism ignores, most 
notably the question of madness, which for them should be treated as social, not merely 
individual. Deleuze scholar Lecerle points out the major shifts from classical Marxism in 
Deleuze and Guattari, including replacing the Marxist periodisation of history by a parallel 
series – regimes of signs, flows of libidinal energy, coding, the shift from history to geography, 
from work to desire, from ideology to assemblage, from the party to the group, and a final 
displacement which recapitulates the whole series – from the molar to the molecular (Lecercle 
2005). To replace the molar is to counteract the majority, which is linked to power and 
domination, and to adopt a molecular or minoritarian position, which is not related to absolute 
numbers but is defined ‘by its capacity to become, or in its subjective geography, to draw for 
itself lines of fluctuation that open up a gap and separate it from the axiom constituting a 
redundant majority’ (Conley 2006, 167). Through these replacements, the materialism of 
Deleuze and Guattari highlights the horizontal, serial movements of entities that give rise to 
capitalism, but they also rejoin classical Marxism on the question of the capital’s perpetual 
movement in the ceaseless production of surplus value, both have had the foresight to what 
would later emerge as advanced capitalism and neo-liberalism. The chapters in the dissertation 
all turn around this question of movement and production in different ways. 
In terms of political programs, Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of capital may not 
provide a sketch for concrete political actions, but it offers multiple lines of flight that cut 
through the planes that are ‘the source of a politics of desire, often described as a form of 
anarchism’ (Lecercle 2005, 39). I will return to anarchism in the chapter on Royce Ng. At the 
same time, the political dimension is posited as a critique against totalising, reductionist and 
abstracting systems across diverse fields and disciplines, not just in political power but also its 
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associated fields of knowledge and ‘subjection’ production. Indeed, a key dimension of Deleuze 
and Guattari's work is the investigation of ‘bodies politic,’ material systems or ‘assemblages’ 
whose constitution in widely differing registers - the physical, chemical, biological, neural, and 
social – can be analysed in political terms. (Protevi 2006, 10) This rigorous engagement with a 
broad range of subject matters has inspired me to look through the artistic works I study into 
questions on language, biology, animism, economics and colonisation. And the method of 
accounting for and critiquing on the abstracting mechanism remains thoroughly materialist.  
The artistic works afford a space of reflection precisely because they do not aim to 
represent social discourses or history in a molar sense, but rather present certain undercurrents 
that take us to a meta-level understanding of them. In the image of plateaus, it is thus possible 
to create a narrative that implicates material conditions, material process together with the 
human social and historical processes in the dissertation. Each chapter spins its own universe 
and touches on certain aspects of new and/or historical materialism, without being reducible to 
a historical or geographical point of reference. This undertaking is firmly against any 
teleological and deterministic exposition of history, rather it unveils the materialist 
configurations of social forms, which underlie both the ‘pre-modern’ belief systems like 
animism and the ‘modern’ development of capitalism. Instead of claiming necessities of 
precedence, through the materialist lens, the co-existence of multiple social forms and the 
contingent character of history come to the fore, which will be expounded on in the following 
section on the Deleuzian perspective on history. 
To begin an exposition on history and philosophy underlying the following chapters, I 
will go into the general reflection on history by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus and A 
Thousand Plateaus.  
 
1.3.2. History and desire 
 
History, for Deleuze and Guattari, is messier than the grand narrative told through historical 
events in linear fashion, which could be observed in the Hegelian form of periodisation. For 
them, the organising principle behind events is not so much the succession of modes of 
production, than what they call the ‘regimes of signs,’ which involve coding, decoding and 
recoding. ‘What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived 
experience, but the event in its becoming ... escapes History’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 110). 
They recast history as contingent and examine it through the optics of the movement of desire, 
desiring-production and its implications for social production. Contrary to psychoanalysts who 
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attribute desire to a lack of something, Deleuze and Guattari’s desire does not lack its object. 
Rather it is ‘the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no 
fixed subject unless there is repression’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 26). They stress 
emphatically that ‘desiring-production is one and the same thing as social production,’ and that 
‘there is only desire and the social, and nothing else’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 29-30). The 
body on which history unfolds is the social body, as material and corporeal as the body of the 
earth, subject to animating flows driven by desire and at the same time, delineated and separated 
by codification processes. Importantly, the concept of socius is not identical with the concept 
of the society, for a material body is also a collective body, whereas the term society, at least in 
the liberal version, is a collection of individuals (Lecercle 2005, 42).  
Deleuze and Guattari deploy the primitive, despotic and capitalist orders to describe 
development of the social in relation to desire and desiring-production. In the primitive social 
order, the earth is the body of all collectively owned organs, and hence the primitive, savage 
unity of desire and production. For the earth is not merely the multiple and divided object of 
labour, it is also the unique, indivisible entity, the full body that falls back on the forces of 
production and appropriates them for its own as the natural or divine precondition. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983, 154-155) Contra anthropologists who believe human society is based on 
exchange relations, Deleuze and Guattari hold that it is rather inscription that constitutes all 
social relations and give rise to power relations. Inscription happens already on the primitive 
body of earth: ‘Filiation is the first character of inscription marked on this body. And we know 
the nature of this intensive filiation, this inclusive disjunction where everything divides, but 
into itself, and where the same being is everywhere, on every side, at every level, differing only 
in intensity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 154).  
In the despotic order, the despot challenges the lateral alliances and the intensive 
filiations of the old community. He imposes a new alliance system and places himself in direct 
filiation with the deity: the people must follow (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 210). The despot 
inscribes, though it is ‘not content to inscribe all things, it must act as if it produced them. It is 
necessary that the connections reappear in a form compatible with the inscribed disjunctions, 
even if they react in turn on the form of these disjunctions’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 154). 
Here, an important set of concepts of the dissertation is proposed: the intensive and 
extensive. The former denotes division of everything into itself, while the latter works by 
placing itself in direct filiation to others. The passing from the primitive order to the despotic 
order is one of passing from an intensive energetic order to an extensive system, which entails 
both qualitative alliances and extended filiations: ‘Nothing is changed by the fact that the 
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primary energy of the intensive order – the Numen – is an energy of filiation, for this 
intense filiation is not yet extended, and does not as yet comprise any distinction of persons, 
nor even a distinction of sexes, but only pre-personal variations in intensity, taking on the same 
twinness or bisexuality in differing degrees’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 155-156). Despite 
their seeming opposition, the intensive and extensive do but signal different forms of 
movements that emanate from generic movements, and are hence not absolute binary in nature. 
The intensive and extensive processes also apply to the notion of time and history, as it concerns 
the modes of the coexistence between ‘the genesis of actual, lived or corporeal bodies, alongside 
the incorporeal events that disclose that other time of the virtual which exists and insists to 
disturb clock time or spatialised time’ (Colebrook 2009, 9). Later in the dissertation, these 
concepts will come up in the notions of time, of the self and the other, and of familial relations 
(Jeong and Ho chapters), furthermore, they appear in the question of biological sexes (Vanouse 
and Spiess/Strecker chapter).  
 
Another crucial optic for the dissertation is the role of money, and later capital. In the 
despotic social order, the role of money is decisive, for the despotic machine, like the primitive 
machine, fears the socially corrosive effects of decoded flows, particularly the flows of 
activities its merchants unleashed. The despots thereby try to tie down the flow of desire 
materialised in commercial activities as they introduce money and tax regimes, by means of 
which the state rendered debt infinite.  
Yet this is still not the capitalist order. The selling of work force, exchanging of goods 
and the invention of money do not necessarily give rise to capitalism. In ancient Rome, there 
had been ‘privatisation of property, the decoding of the monetary flows through the formation 
of great fortunes, the decoding of the commercial flows through the development of commodity 
production, the decoding of the producers through expropriation and proletarisation,’ but as we 
know, it didn’t give rise to capitalism. For the despotic regime works by ‘disjunctions of 
inscription’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 223-224), which imposes an order, meaning and 
structure to things that are in their natural state multi-directional and multi-connective. This can 
be the absolutism of kings or spiritual orders. In so doing, it tames desire.  
The decoded flows of desire must encounter and form new conjunctions: flows of 
decoded soil sold as private property, flows of decoded money that circulates as capital, flows 
of workers who are now deterritorialised to be mere labour in the service of work itself or the 
capitalistic machine (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 223-225). From this point on, the sway of life 
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as desire or as differential can be seen in capitalism’s tendency to liberate all flows and relations 
from any single organising body.  
Capital always adds new territories and nodes to its operation, a process Deleuze and 
Guattari term ‘axiomatisation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 250), be it new overseas markets or 
the once solid entities liquidated, decoded like the human body in the service of information 
technology. We witness ever accelerated forms of capitalism in reducing initial expenditure and 
in churning out more profit. In the finance industry or financial capitalism especially, money 
begets money, increasingly bypassing actual production.  
Capitalism’s axiomatising power has not excluded the arts. The circulation of artworks, 
acting increasingly as mere tokens of value, in primary and secondary markets, and new forms 
of financialisation on art, i.e. creating derivatives based on artworks or art markets all 
demonstrate how capitalism seeps into the field we find ourselves in. Curiously, the opposite 
seems to be true too in the sense that art and capitalism shares a structural identification: ‘art is 
mimetic of capital in a very specific way: art mimetically assumes the role of the automatic 
subject of value’ (Stakemeier and Vishmidt 2016, 41). 
 
In this way, capitalism in Marx, as well as in Deleuze and Guattari (and Braudel, who 
they draw on) does not entail a top-down teleological or linear history. Rather, capitalism is a 
‘singular, emergent historical phenomenon which happened to occur at a given time and place 
but could well have arisen elsewhere – or nowhere at all’ (Holland 2006, 184). Hence contra 
the critique of Manuel DeLanda, capitalism works very much in the same way as De Landa 
calls it, borrowing the terminology of nonlinear science, ‘a “probe-head” which blindly 
incorporates whatever fits into its meshwork of axioms and doesn’t disrupt the internal 
consistency of capitalism as a system’ (Holland 2006, 195).       
Under this scheme, it’s neither inevitable nor necessary that the Chinese (or Arab or 
Indian, for that matter) empire would by itself develop exploitative capitalism. What Chinese 
history textbooks define as the infant stage of capitalism starting in southern Song dynasty is 
rather the proliferation in the rate of exchange, but nothing to the extent that decoded flows of 
wealth (capital), land, workers (labour replaceable by machines when necessary to reduce cost, 
and who are involved in a market to buy back the things they produce in order for social 
reproduction) all acted among each other to reinforce the autonomy of the flow of desire itself. 
Ray Huang’s study of Ming dynasty tax stations on the grand canal provides good insights of 
how goods were taxed according to a fixed yearly amount rather than by percentage. Hence 
there were no fluctuation of tax income even in times of surged business, as records had it that 
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sometimes the taxation goal was fulfilled in the first half of the year. (Huang 1964) If the fixed 
percentage in commercial tax demonstrates the general disinterest of the Confucian society in 
the commercial sectors making up a small portion of pre-modern Chinese economy, then the 
case of land transfer policy and agriculture tax in agricultural sector is by and large systematic. 
Taisu Zhang’s insightful study The Laws and Economics of Confucianism: Kinship and 
Property in Preindustrial China and England presents a nuanced comparative analysis of 
economic history and law in the early modern era that attempts to address the Great Divergence, 
i.e. how the West came to replace China and dominate the world in the modern era. Going 
against the orientalist assumption that there is something fundamentally irrational about the 
Chinese society, Zhang demonstrates that the Chinese small holders of land were just as self-
interested as their British counterparts. The most significant difference was, the British system 
of land mortgage (the practice of conveying a piece of land to a creditor as security on a loan) 
stipulated that the small holders had to redeem the land in a year with a high interest, otherwise 
they would default and lose the land. Hence it was favourable to the creditors as the rate of 
defaults was high through which mortgages became permanent transactions, which in turn 
amassed land as primitive accumulation and at the same time political agency for an emerging 
privileged class. In China, however, the small holders didn’t need to pay an interest to buy their 
land back when their financial standing allowed (which sometimes could take decades). 
Furthermore, because of the spread of Confucian ancestral worshipping, seniority, instead of 
wealth, was determinant for political power in villages, making the case favourable to the 
peasants and small holders. (Zhang 2017) Hence capital, land and men did not constitute 
decoded flows in early modern China. This form of social and economic organisation from the 
bottom up was coupled with the top-down taxation policy in early modern China – until 1907, 
shortly before the last Chinese dynasty dissolved, agriculture tax remained at around 1%, while 
the British taxation by 1800s and the Japanese in the industrialisation period was at 20%. 
Taxation was the core of modern state investments to promote key sectors and rapid 
industrialisation, as we will see in detail in the chapter on Royce Ng and Manchukuo. The 
reason for the resistance to change in the case of early modern China is ideological, which 
resonates on a philosophical level with what Deleuze and Guattari describe as desire tied to a 
despotic regime of taxation and not for the production of more surplus value.  
In this light, Deleuze and Guattari ask – and answer – emphatically, 
 
Let us return to this eminently contingent question that modern historians know how to 
ask: why Europe, why not China? Apropos of ocean navigation, Fernand Braudel asks: 
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why not Chinese, Japanese, or even Moslem ships? Why not Sinbad the Sailor? It is not 
the technique, the technical machine, that is lacking. Isn’t it rather that desire remains 
caught in the nets of the despotic State, entirely invested in the despot's machine? 
“Perhaps then the merit of the West, confined as it was on its narrow ‘Cape of Asia,’ 
was to have needed the world, to have needed to venture outside its own front door.” 
The schizophrenic voyage is the only kind there is. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 224) 
 
1.3.3. Schizophrenia 
 
Deleuze and Guattari put forward their definition of ‘the body without organs’ as ‘the ultimate 
residuum of a deterritorialised socius’. Having examined how the socius or social production 
codifies the flows of desire in the primitive and despotic orders, they point out the task of 
capitalism is to decode and deterritorialise the flows. Capitalism does not impose its operation 
from the outside as in the previous orders, but creates an immanence implicating all flows 
labour, capital and goods. It is ‘both its primary determinant and its fundamental raw material, 
its form and its function’. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 33) It draws near to its own limit and 
keep expanding its limit, subjecting new arenas under its field of immanence.  
Importantly for Deleuze and Guattari, schizophrenia is a general way of describing 
capitalist production, beyond a mental illness that’s attributed to individuals: ‘before being a 
mental state of the schizophrenic who has made himself into an artificial person through autism, 
schizophrenia is the process of the production of desire and desiring-machines’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983, 24). It is capitalism that tends to ‘produce the schizo as the subject of the decoded 
flows on the body without organs’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 34). With it, they offer their 
version of psychoanalysis from a materialist point of view. In the face of the capitalistic 
machine, they recognise that schizophrenia does not merely mean that modern life drives people 
mad. It is not a question of a way of life, but of a process of production. The emphasis on 
production processes allows them to situate the schizo where the psychoanalysts fall short, for 
the latter try to reduce him to the image of the daddy-mommy-me triad predicated on the narrow 
ego of the individual.  
This conjunctive operation of capitalism formally reflects the multi-connectivity of 
desire, leading to the deterritorialised socius – schizophrenia. Indebted to Marxist analytical 
frame of capital creation and value relations, what informs the theorisation of desire that is 
obviously different to Marx in Deleuze and Guattari is the recognition of the operation of 
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capitalist machinery on an affective level, and an attempt to ‘autonomise affects within rather 
than from alienation’ (Stakemeier and Vishmidt 2016, 63). 
They portrait the schizo as ‘continually wandering about, migrating here, there, and 
everywhere as best he can, he plunges further and further into the realm of deterritorialisation, 
reaching the furthest limits of the decomposition of the socius on the surface of his own body 
without organs. It may well be that these peregrinations are the schizo’s own particular way of 
rediscovering the earth’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 35). The body without organs of the schizo 
conflates with the immanence of earth itself.  
The account of history above is a generic description of the movement and organisation 
of desire, itself constituted by the assemblage of bodies and materials in flux. The way these 
regimes figure, the primitive, the despotic and the capitalist, does not follow any teleological or 
linear, developmental view of history, and it does not dictate exclusion among the orders, so 
that the ‘earlier’ orders may very well co-exist or live in symbiotic relation to a ‘later’ order. 
As indicated by its title, A Thousand Plateaus ‘refuses to posit any plane or regime that might 
account for the movement and nature of other durations’ (Colebrook 2009, 5). It derives from 
an immanent body of earth, and posits a meta-level historiography that forestalls discussions 
on morality based on liberal individual subjects. This is not to exonerate any individual of 
particular responsibilities, nor to be an appeaser or apologist to political pasts such as socialism. 
Rather, it casts political domination and violence in a new light as counterintuitive movements 
from the perspective of earth philosophy. For bifurcation, or the process of perceiving 
differences is always already the source of something ‘accursed,’ as Deleuze maintains, 
‘thought “makes” difference, but difference is monstrous’ (Deleuze 1994, 37). The twentieth 
century has seen extremely artificial binary logic in politics, not least in countries where 
Marxism was distorted in its application, such as the notion of perpetual revolutions and class 
struggles that resulted in massive atrocities. In this sense, violence is of course imbricated in 
the materialist analysis in the dissertation.  
This non-deterministic, materialistic view of history will be closely examined with the 
artistic works of Klaus Spiess/ Lucie Strecker, Ho Tzu Nyen, and Royce Ng, in which the 
material congregations seen through historical optics are enacted in different ways. Yet all 
chapters share the analysis of the underlying mechanism of inscription as the primary force of 
socialising bodies and relations, as well as the optic of the intensive and extensive. Further, the 
figure of the schizo is embodied in the works of Ng and Ho, offering new annotations to the 
schizo as the product and at the limit of capitalism through artistic imaginaries.  
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1.4. On ‘Asianness’ 
 
1.4.1. Method and content 
 
Before I close the introduction chapter, it is necessary for me to clarify how much ‘Asianness’ 
is in the dissertation, and to justify the theoretical lens which may seem dominated by Deleuze 
and Guattari and various strands from new and historical materialism. 
My attempt of bringing in a number of artistic works and discourses from East Asia 
does not qualify the work as an ‘Asian’ take on performance philosophy, as I am aware of the 
vastness of such an enterprise and the variegated forms in which it can be exercised, from pure 
metaphysics to applied political science. What I will do in the dissertation is to selectively 
examine specific cultural histories in the interest of making sometimes differentiated, and 
sometimes synergetic articulations of critique, and all the while being cautious with culturalism. 
To justify the choices, let me first start with the artists. Obviously, there are pitfalls in 
essentialising the origin of the artist, the subject matter of a work or the thinking behind a work, 
which is to say claiming ‘Asianness’ in some or all of the categories. It is, however, not the 
concern here. As to the origins of the artists, there is no criteria regarding where they are from, 
trained or live and work that inform my choice of them. More important than the origins of the 
artists is the awareness to the local, regional and international conditions of artist production, 
display, dissemination and reception, which demands constantly shifting grounds for critical 
engagements.  
The subject matters I investigate are broad; while some pertain to ‘general’ discussions 
as language or human inheritance, some do take a particular history (Malaya, or Manchukuo) 
as focus. The way the latter is brought up, however, inserts them into a larger frame of 
materialist history of colonial expansion and of economics, of which they are particular 
consequences. I do, at the same time, draw on references that do not squarely fall into either 
East Asia or the West defined in the narrow sense, for example when referencing ethnography 
from South America or artistic movements in Russia, simply because of the methodological or 
topical relevance I identify in them. By taking such liberty, I want to chart the global terrain of 
critical theories that are productive for the dissertation.   
On the theoretical level, readers may rightly raise their hands and ask, why so much 
Deleuze? I would draw on the statement made by a growing community of Deleuzian scholars 
from or concerned with Asia, in that the way of engaging with Deleuzian philosophy is ‘to use 
Deleuze as a generative force of inquiry in Asian contexts, and to use Asian culture and thought 
as a means of probing and testing the viability of Deleuze’s own philosophy’ (Bogue, Chiu, and 
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Lee 2014, x). Several scholars have made invaluable contribution to comparative philosophy 
by bringing Deleuze and Buddhism or Confucian thoughts together. However, my own focus 
here is less systematic than cherry-picking specific topics for a transcultural interlocution. 
Now the other side of the story. The theoretical exposition of ‘Eastern’ theories is neither 
comprehensive, nor systematic. I have not adopted any variant of Confucian, Daoist or Buddhist 
as a structural frame for the entire dissertation, which is to construct a ‘Eastern’ frame of 
language, understanding of time, or performance, for each topic would be far beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. The frame is, as iterated time and again, old and new materialisms enacted 
through performances. Still, there are short detours, more in an ‘acupuncture’ fashion, to 
particular Eastern theories or thinkers. There are, for example, passages on Zen Buddhist koan 
and Daoist ideas on language and perspectivism in the chapters on Lawrence Abu Hamdan’s 
work on language as a dissimulation tool, and on Ho Tzu Nyen’s work on the history of 
Southeast Asia. There are engagements on feminism and man-machine relation in a Confucian 
relational framework when I examine the performances of Geumhyung Jeong. And there are 
political/historical theories of the Kyoto School thinkers in the analysis of Royce Ng’s work on 
the Japanese puppet regime of Manchukuo, alongside ideas of some of their contemporary 
Chinese thinkers – notably, almost all of them were influenced by Western thinkers of their 
time while consciously invigorating their own traditions.  
It already invites widely differential readings when discussing just one of the East Asian 
traditions, Confucianism. Confucianism is often taken to be the moral backbone and ideology 
that justified the rule of China (and influenced East Asia) for almost two thousand years, based 
on a purportedly rigid differential, hierarchical society. Some have attributed the economic 
boom of East Asian states to the Confucian work ethic, whereby the individual worker is 
subordinated to the social hierarchy and collectivity. Yet Confucianism can also be interpreted 
as a dynamic, non-hierarchical social field based on non-transactional reciprocities and social 
mobility, as we will see in the chapter on Jeong. At various positions in the dissertation, I choose 
to work with particular strands of Confucian thinking, and when doing so, I will explain the 
background and critical impasse so as to give a solid ground of transcultural assessment.  
How should the strands of ‘Eastern’ thinking figure in my dissertation vis-à-vis the 
European canons? In short, I am cautious both with eurocentrism, and with the all-too-quick 
affirmation of ‘other’ thinking systems. I place equal weight on combing through theories of 
differences and locating the culturally different situatedness (from gender to animism as 
differently conceived and lived realities), and at the same time on differential differences (i.e. 
how East Asian feminism may look different historically than the first wave feminism in the 
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West). All the while, I try not to lose sight of issues that remain true to different contexts (against 
the background of capitalism, for example), and to affirm commonalities with the ‘Western’ 
strands of materialism which function as powerful tools to debunk them. Hence, there should 
be no automatism in resorting to ‘Eastern’ thinking, for just by drawing on thinkers originating 
from the West does not equate the theoretical project to eurocentrism, and conversely, resorting 
to non-West thinkers does not qualify its anti-eurocentrism potential. Instead, caution and rigour 
should always be exercised, because the essentialisation of ‘Eastern’ or non-West thinking can 
come from both sides. One area that invites such multiplicity of gazes concerns animism. 
 
1.4.2. Animism 
 
I have mentioned that one way of approaching materialism and the socio-political is through 
the material agency of matter seen in a network of actants, and the other is taking the social 
body as a whole – the socius in Deleuze and Guattari, and understanding historical processes in 
terms of inscription and organisation of desire and movements. Related with the former but 
associated with a somewhat mystical undertone is what can be categorically called ‘animism’, 
which is concerned with how matter ‘acts’. Performance is a pertinent site for such 
thoroughgoing exploration, for in performance studies, it is set forth that rituals requiring 
heightened attention, trance-inducing acts, or simple daily repetitive acts, are all performances. 
Approached in this nuanced way, the question of animism is paramount to the discourse around 
the conditions and configurations of emergence, ontogenesis, and the demarcation or scion from 
the undifferentiated.  
Animism, or the perception that everything, human and nonhuman, organic and 
inorganic, is alive and possesses a sprit, comes from the Latin word anima, soul. However, the 
attribution of life to seemingly inanimate things makes up the naïve understanding of animism. 
For it assumes the extensive mode of existence rather than intensive dynamics of things, or 
what Anselm Franke calls the ‘segmentations of life’ (Franke 2010). 
How to address life beyond the scientific capture of it, given the problematisation of 
‘objectivity’? This is when the pendulum swings to the other extremity, and when we realise 
that the spiritual, the animistic and the occult do have a place in the society today, if not all too 
categorical. They often take the form of a pristine spiritual highland. How this comes up in 
moments like robots with spirits, photography stealing the soul, shamanic healings and so forth 
will come back time and again in the dissertation. 
The swing of the pendulum comes with its own political ramifications. The good 
intention of overcoming eurocentrism sometimes operationalises and instrumentalises the 
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thinking in the interest of decentralising Western, purportedly universalised forms of thinking. 
Such movements in thinking may seem to warrant a different epistemology or ontology, but at 
the same time they can lead to embracing anti-Enlightenment, anti-universal particularism 
which has no reality beyond the culturalist or intellectual debates at best, and helps certain 
political agents to justify blatant political violence at worst. (One example of such a discursive 
movement could be seen in how the Communist Party of China uses its own Confucianism-
backed political ideology to justify China Exceptionalism today.) 
Franke analyses the institutionalisation of these ‘trends’ in the name of art, and further 
examines the historical predecessors with animistic underpinnings. He writes,  
 
The regression to ‘earlier states’ (historically or subjectively) and the conflation of 
differences between fiction and reality, the self and the world; all this becomes possible 
as long as it is institutionally framed and cannot make claims to objective reality, in 
which case it would likely be rendered pathological, but at least cease to be ‘art’ in the 
modern sense of the word – the form of art that, according to Adorno, was made possible 
by the secularisation of the Enlightenment. […] Insofar as aesthetic resistance to social 
rationalisation (cultural modernity versus social modernity) takes the form of a 
dialectics, its attack on the latter remains bound to its own myths. This can be confirmed 
by a most schematic survey of the role animism plays in the modernist imaginary: a 
reconciliatory and transformative force in the face of alienation, a phantastic horizon for 
a better, utopian, animated modernity. From the Romantics to the Russian Avant-Garde, 
from Primitivist Modernism via the Surrealist to Psychedelia, animism frequently 
appears on a (troubled) quasi-mystical horizon in which it was inscribed by the 
modernist myths, variously as a displaced key or a transgressive phantasy, an engine 
that fuels the imaginary of a liberation, of an ‘outside’ to modern enclosures and 
identifies. But the animism in question remains the phantasy of otherness, a romantic 
antidote. (Franke 2010, 35-36) 
 
Franke’s scathing critique on some of the artistic movements may be too categorical, 
yet the problematisation of the ‘other’ and the ‘outside’ is spot on. The conceptual complex 
with the heritage from the Enlightenment on the one hand, and institutionalisation of pre-
Enlightenment thinking systems on the other hand leads Franke to make the plea to focus on, 
instead of ‘subjectivity of perception (leading to ever-new mirror-games)’ but on ‘perception 
of the subjectivity of the so-called object’. For him, ‘these subjectivities are not to be conceived 
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in anthropomorphic forms, but rather in relation to the available and possible forms and 
dispositifs of recognition’ (Franke 2010, 49). This marks a paradigmatic shift from the 
epistemology to ontology, or variably expressed in Viveiros de Castro’s multiperspectivism 
(Viveiros de Castro 2004), explored in the chapters on DNA with a shamanic ritual featuring a 
bio-chimera, and by way of the Daoist butterfly dream in the chapter on Royce Ng. The chapters 
on Geumhyung Jeong’s choreography and Ho Tzu Nyen’s theatre also respond pointedly to the 
question of animism, including a critique on naïve animism and a proposition unearthing the 
relational aspects of animism.  
 
When such multiple gazes and pushbacks emerge, it is in good order to turn back to the 
materialist strata of things. Vivek Chibber succinctly points out the culturalist tendencies of the 
Subaltern studies thinkers. Though Subaltern studies theory tries to challenge universalism 
inherently conditioned by eurocentrism by highlighting the experience of the colonised and 
racialised, they fail to recognise the underlying universalising mechanism of capitalism in the 
postmodern global world and the struggles of the underprivileged class for concrete material 
subsistence. The universalising tendency of capitalism allows it to assimilate differences instead 
of homogenising them. Indeed, there is a fine slippage from the good intention of 
provincialising Europe to the actual project of orientalising and exoticising the non-West. 
Chibber astutely comments on Dipesh Chakrabarty’s social ontology modelled on the Indian 
society: 
 
Because capitalism is wrongly taken to require complete homogenisation, any departure 
from the homogenising drive is seen as resistance to the abstract logic of capital: any 
practice not reduced to the abstract logic of capital is thereby a resistance to capital. The 
minute examination of such practices can then be linked to emancipatory theory, and 
so, offsets the intrepid area specialist in search of the myriad ‘particularities and 
incommensurabilities’ of his region, whether India, or Bolivia, or Turkmenistan. The 
more marginal, and the more mysterious, the better. The various practices are all 
construed as ways of being, or better yet, ways of knowing, that have escaped the 
totalizing grasp of capital, and hence presented as potential escape routes from it. 
Traditional Orientalism is thereby repackaged as resistance to capital. (Chibber 2013, 
289) 
    
  Chibber’s tone may be unfriendly critical, yet what he points out as the phenomenon of 
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‘the more mysterious, the better’ has vastly gained currency in academic and artistic spheres. 
As a meta-condition, the assimilation of critical energy, and more recently from non-West 
artists especially, into the global art market is inevitable, and has been slowly unfolding in 
tandem with the expansion of neo-liberal capitalism as we will see later.  
  This complexity urges me to always practice self-reflexivity. This is the method of 
speculation and immanent critique that takes both the motion of deconstruction (in a negative-
productive way) and dynamitic transformation. As Marina Vishmidt outlines in her book 
Speculation as a Mode of Production (Vishmidt 2018b), speculation figure variably in the work 
of Hegel and Marx, which performs a recursive process of regress. The example given in Marx, 
who preserves the dynamism of the regress without the Hegelian idealism, is how to move from 
a simple abstraction – a population, an industry, to the concrete components of it – the 
stratification of this population through class, and further breaking down to the concrete 
components that determine the practice in reproducing that society – wage, education, etc. This 
is similar to Whitehead’s concept of speculative reason with the three phases of discovery – 
observation, generalisation and renewed observation, crucial as an ‘adventure of ideas’ for 
novelty and experimentation, which will be discussed in the chapter on Royce Ng, capitalism 
and Confucianism.  
  In this light, even though my dissertation does not overtly deal with post-colonialism or 
Subaltern studies, there are chapters where I tread a fine line between voicing a nuanced subject 
position in facing questions of animism and historicity/time on the one hand, and the potential 
risk of exoticising and essentialising these particularities. The questions I deal with pertain more 
to philosophical debates, and as such are less liable to the logical fallacies as a social critique 
that are pitted against the Subalternist theorists. I do see the merits for a cross-cultural dialogue 
taking in consideration of all these subject positions with their non-essentialised differences, 
and not conveniently restraining oneself to either track of the discussion thereby foreclosing the 
possibility of a constructive framework. On top of that, I am aware that no theory can explain 
away the questions I investigate, whether ‘Western’ or ‘Asian’. Therefore, I try to elaborate on 
the context in each critical argument I make in the dissertation, and my position is carefully 
weighed in between these tendencies. On the one hand, one should recognise the differences 
and nuances when dealing with particular issues (language or the question of women for 
example), and at the same time, one should be careful not to exercise such differently situated 
thinking as a weapon or refuge, so to not fall into the trap of essentialisation.  
When philosopher Peter Osborne claims that European philosophical tradition as a 
resource for art-critical discourse has failed, it seems that ‘the end of the end of the history’ 
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paralysis by the name of contemporaneity bears hard on the West (Osborne 2013). To conclude 
this introduction, my approach to the questions of body, society and history exemplified in 
contemporary performance works embraces fissures and messiness, differences and 
commonalities in a way that articulates an immanent, and transcultural, criticality. As critical 
theorist Paul Gladston puts it, contemporaneity’s multiply grounded perspectivism faces in two 
directions at once: ‘as ineluctably negative of any commonly held ground for reflexivity or 
critical distancing […] and as a (presently identified) location of the (continuing) transcultural 
productivity of critical meanings’ (Gladston 2019). In the following chapters, I will practice a 
kind of ‘witnessing of the immanence of deconstruction’ (Gladston 2019), which means a 
transcultural materialist approach to questions both within and across assumed cultural 
boundaries as well as against itself as a singular basis for criticism.  
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2. Chapter Two 
Taqiyyah and the Materiality of Language 
On Lawrence Abu Hamdan’s Contra Diction: Speech Against Itself 
 
 
The world was so recent that many things lacked names,  
and in order to indicate them it was necessary to point. 
Gabriel García Márquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude (1967) 
 
 
2.1. Lawrence Abu Hamdan’s Works 
 
In the sound installation (or ‘audio documentary’ as the artist calls it) The Freedom of Speech 
Itself (2012) Abu Hamdan draws our attention to accent-tests deployed by governmental organs 
to determine the origin of asylum seekers through interviews of experts. The video and sound 
installation (or ‘sound documentary’) The Whole Truth (2012) introduces the audience to 
automated lie-detection technique, which measures bodily stress levels through sound. This 
technology is used in politicised contexts, such as in by European, Russian and Israeli 
governments as well as by border agencies and insurance companies. The video (or ‘audio 
essay’) Language Gulf in the Shouting Valley (2013) investigates the concrete instance when 
the Druze Islamic community members gathered on each side of the border in a valley between 
Syria and Israel to shout at each other whereby language became a border-transgressing 
medium.  
The different iterations of Contra Diction: Speech Against Itself (2014-ongoing) 
constitute the artist’s most profound engagement with the politics of speech and language so 
far and explore the inherent contradictions of speech through the Druze Islamic jurisprudence 
of taqiyyah. The installation version at the features a teleprompter – a glass sheet mounted on 
	 35	
a microphone stand mirroring the prompted text – in front of a flat screen, also mounted at eye-
level. The installation invites the audience to face the teleprompter as if assuming the position 
of a speaker (in some of the live performative lecture iterations, Abu Hamdan appears in front 
of such a teleprompter himself). Narrative and commentary texts appear on the teleprompter, 
and seem to float above the video running on the flat screen. The presentation relates to 
language and speech on different levels: the video depicts the algorithmic capture of the speech 
such as in the lie-detection program, it also enlists speech through subtitling and other mediated 
and remediated forms. The teleprompter further complicates the presentation of texts in that its 
functional suggestion puts the viewer already in the position of the speaker. While this is a 
media-savvy set-up that depicts the algorithmic capture and modulation of speech through 
enacting speech acts and enlisting speech in subtitled, mediated and remediated forms, the rest 
of this chapter will focus on the performative lecture (‘live audio essay’) Abu Hamdan has 
developed under the same rubric.  
In the performative lecture Contra Diction: Speech Against Itself, Abu Hamdan usually 
appears on an empty spare stage, speaking from his script on the teleprompter screen or on a 
music note stand, with video projection substantiating his lecture in the background. (Fig. 2.1 
and 2.2) He carries a portable multiple-effects unit for sound modulation, making him appear 
strangely in between a hip musician and a nerdy scientist at the same time. The voice-distorting 
instrument, in both the musical and the scientific sense of the word, is indispensable to the 
performance as it opens, in the performer’s own words, a ‘multitude of statements that all 
emanate simultaneously from one voice’ (Abu Hamdan 2014). 
 
2.2. Language, truth and contradiction 
 
2.2.1. The Sense of Contradiction  
 
Drawing from the genealogy of his earlier works, Abu Hamdan opens with the distressing 
situation of surveillance in voice communications such as accent tests and lie detection 
software, and stresses that the freedom to remain silent is not enough to oppose this omnipresent 
form of surveillance. He then turns to an esoteric Shia Islamic jurisprudence called taqiyyah, in 
which ‘a believing individual can deny his faith or commit otherwise illegal acts while they are 
at risk of persecution or in a condition of statelessness’ (Abu Hamdan 2014). Practised by 
Islamic minorities, especially the Druze minority living in the Levantine countries, taqiyyah is 
often described as ‘dissimulation or a divine permission to lie’. Yet Abu Hamdan explains, 
paradoxically, ‘taqiyyah is not lying but it is not not lying either’ (Abu Hamdan 2014). 
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What does ‘not lying and not not lying’ imply? On a formal and philosophical level, it 
approximates such paradoxical structures as the Zen-Buddhist koans, although this chapter by 
no means wishes to compare the two belief systems. A koan is a short story or statement that 
represents an unsolved problem, which, while paradoxical or puzzling in nature, aims to help 
one to achieve enlightenment. Some famous examples are, ‘If you meet the Buddha, kill him’ 
(Linji), and, ‘Two hands clap and there is a sound, what is the sound of one hand?’ (Hakuin). 
Such statements appear, on the surface, downright anti-intellectual and anti-logocentric. 
This is, of course, all intended as a vehicle for direct perception and attainment of insight. By 
essentially not acting in line with or contradicting what is asked or expected, there arises a new 
form of meta knowledge, one concerning the interpretation of all things and conducts. The 
negation of direct answers or paradoxical actions all charts the limitation of language ‘which 
allows the break-through to an alternative mode of experience to occur’ (Goodchild 1993, 3). 
There is an excess that cannot be addressed in language. Commenting on this form of Zen 
writing Deleuze observes, ‘The famous problems-tests, the questions-answers, the koans, 
demonstrate the absurdity of significations and show the nonsense of denotation’ (Deleuze 
1990, 134). 
In a similar way, taqiyyah is embedded in such a paradoxical structure of belief qua non-
belief and shares a deep distrust of signification. Its wilful dispensation to lie complicates the 
relation of speech to reality and shows that speech is insufficient as a determinant proposition 
of logical problems. In the construction of logic, a statement like ‘lying and not lying’ would 
seem blatantly impossible, unless we recognise that language has an indeterminate sense. That 
is not to say that the ‘lying and not lying’ must be replaced by ‘lying or not lying’ to make 
logical sense, but that the sense of ‘lying and not lying’ exceeds the linguistic context of ‘lying’ 
and ‘truth’. We should also note that negation in the form of illogicality is not inherently 
negative, rather, ‘“nonsense” is not merely the subversion of order: it is, on the contrary, a 
process of imposition of order over chaos’ (Lecercle 2002, 102). In other words, precisely 
because of the indeterminate sense of any language, paradox functions as a ‘distribution’ of 
thought and common sense so that sense can emerge from nonsense (Lecercle 2002, 103). 
Further, it dethrones the notion of truth as confirmed by language and points toward the ‘denial 
of the power of any doctrine to articulate the truth’ (Goodchild 1993, 3).  
 
2.2.2. Truth and Dissimulation  
 
It is the common belief of truth reflected in language and speech that Abu Hamdan takes issue 
with in the next part of his performance. 
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Traditionally, the Druze believers don’t go to mosques and instead pray in private. Abu 
Hamdan plays a video that shows the alleged conversation of a Druze community to Wahhabi 
Islam, under the forceful command of the Saudi Sheikh Saad Said Al-Ghamidi in December 
2013. In this video of Al-Ghamidi’s crusade widely spread on the Internet, a Druze community 
member is seen assuming the role of a Muezzin, who sings the Azan, the call to prayer. The 
Druze community was also allegedly ordered to speak the truth claim ‘there is no god but God’. 
This instrumentalisation of the voice announces the break with the Druze community’s 
traditional way of praying and their subjugation to a new jurisdiction. 
Parodying the ‘universalist’ outcry of international media that interpret this matter as a 
threat to free will and individualism, Abu Hamdan offers an alternative claim: 
 
 [T]he act here was not the conversion of the Druze to Wahhabi Islam, but in fact an act 
of taqiyyah.  What sounded to the ears of al-Ghamidi exactly like the required speech 
act of Islamic conversion or the sound of the Azan sung by the Druze was in fact nothing 
more than the sound of taqiyyah. (Abu Hamdan 2014) 
 
Let’s take a closer look at this very moment by resorting to the discussion of linguistics. 
In structuralist linguistics formulated by Ferdinand de Saussure, language is composed of as a 
system of signs, each consisting of a signifier (sound pattern) and a signified (concept), which 
are purely cultural constructs for they do not relate to an outside world, but only to each other 
(de Saussure 2011). Saussurian structuralist linguistics cast a lasting influence on structuralist 
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, who will come up later in Deleuze and Guattari’s studies. 
Indebted to Saussurian, post-structuralist thinking takes its departure point away from the 
structuralist frame that attempts to explain the underlying operation of the world in structures. 
Deleuze, equally influenced by structuralist linguistics and approaches it in a different way, 
once puts it dismissively when he describes the linguist as someone who ‘only finds in language 
what is already there: the arborescent system of hierarchy and command. The I, the YOU, the 
HE, is very much a part of language’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007, 34). The structural 
institutionalisation of language which fixate the spoken and written language onto the two poles 
of the signified and the signifier is but a patent symptom of dualism: word and thing, form and 
material. For the signifier enthusiasts, ‘from the word they extract the signifier, and from the 
thing a signified in conformity with the word, and therefore subjugated to the signifier. They 
operate in a sphere interior to and homogeneous with language’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
66).  
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The goal of rethinking language amounts to rethinking this fundamental dualistic 
pattern, as Deleuze formulates it,  
 
We must pass through [passer par] dualisms because they are in language, it's not a 
question of getting rid of them, but we must fight against language, invent stammering, 
not in order to get back to a prelinguistic pseudo-reality, but to trace a vocal or written 
line which will make language flow between these dualisms, and which will define a 
minority usage of language, an inherent variation as Labov says. (Deleuze and Parnet 
2007, 34) 
 
In an attempt to replace the dichotomy of the ‘signifier’ and the ‘signified,’ linguist 
Louis Hjelmslev uses the terms ‘expression’ and ‘content,’ and draws a larger picture that 
defines both terms as well as ‘form’ and ‘substance’. In Hjelmslev’s view, ‘form’ is nothing but 
the shadow of a grid work cast upon a surface of unformed, undifferentiated matter, and 
‘substance’ the elements of matter contained in the now delineated grids on the surface. 
Similarly, what could be called ‘expression’ is but the shadow of a grid imposed upon ‘an 
amorphous “thought” matter’ (Bogue 1989, 126). This separates what could be called ‘content’ 
elements from the surface of thought matter. Their designation is ‘quite arbitrary. Their 
functional definition provides no justification for calling one, and not the other, of these entities 
expression, or one, and not the other, content’ (Bogue 1989, 126).  
The question is not what a given sign signifies, or to which other signs it refers. It is the 
amorphous continuum that for the moment plays the role of the ‘signified,’ but it continually 
glides beneath the signifier, for which it serves only as a medium or wall: the specific forms of 
all contents dissolve in it. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 112) Hence expression or content, form 
or substance are not fundamentally different in kind, but are only different designations of levels 
or degrees. 
Hjelmslev’s proposition is important for Deleuze and Guattari because it positions 
expression and content on a plane of immanence, and identifies ‘a material substrate which 
precedes the formation of the planes of expression and content’ (Bogue 1989, 127). Or as Brian 
Massumi interprets it, ‘there are any number of forms of content and forms of expression, each 
with their own substance or specific materiality’ (Massumi 2002a, xviii). What is crucial, at this 
point, is the movement and process that constitutes our experience of things on a material level. 
Specifically, between a form of content and a form of expression ‘there is only the process 
of their passing into each other: in other words, an immanence. In the gap between content and 
	 39	
expression is the immanence of their mutual “deterritorialisation”’ (Massumi 2002a, xviii). 
Looking at language as a form of expression and content in reciprocal relation affords a 
theoretical lens to examine the alleged Druze conversion. J. L. Austin’s ‘speech act theory’ 
analyses how language not only presents information but also ‘does things,’ or, how the 
meaning of an expression and its proposed social reality coincide, such as when naming 
properties, giving promises and pronouncing verdicts. In line with Austin, Deleuze and Guattari 
discern the performative aspect of language, yet they inject more dynamism into the formation 
process of the performative. Their account of the performativity in language is situated at the 
blurred boundary, or in the mutual ‘deterritorialisation’ of the form of content and the form of 
expression.  
Massumi underscores the connection between Foucault’s study of discipline and 
punishment, and the content and expression in Deleuze: 
 
In Foucault’s analysis in Discipline and Punish (1977), as read by Deleuze and Guattari, 
the form of expression for which the prison is the form of content is ‘delinquency’. The 
actions in the social field leading to the emergence of the modern prison system were 
most effectively expressed in a varied and widespread discourse on delinquency, not 
through philosophical or semantic reflections on the meaning of ‘prison’. There was no 
essential connection between delinquency as form of expression and the prison as form 
of content. There is no logical or teleological reason why that particular articulation had 
to be. Its power was the cumulative result of a thousand tiny performative struggles 
peppered throughout the social field. The connection was made, and it was made 
collectively, under the control of no individual subject. (Massumi 2002a, xix) 
 
In the moment that Abu Hamdan highlights, Islam is the form of content while the 
initiated bodies are its form of substance. The Druze community members’ utterance of ‘there 
is no god but God,’ then, contributes a substance to the form of content. There is no other 
relation between the form of content (Islam) and the form of expression (the utterance) than a 
performative one – this is when they pass into and ‘deterritorialise’ each other in creating a non-
representational relation. Furthermore, this performative relation, or speech act, is capable of 
‘transform[ing] the attributes and physical conditions of a body or state of things simply by 
being said’ (Massumi 2002a, xviii). Such transformation is not passive, nor does it merely exist 
in the interpretative realm, it also ‘modifies the target body’s own potential for action: it is an 
action on an action’ (Massumi 2002a, xix).  
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But what does taqiyyah do to this potential for action, itself being not a truthful action 
but rather a dissimulated or camouflaged action on an action, and contributing not a real 
substance but a mal-substance to the form of content? If Austin’s performative utterances can 
only be judged as ‘felicitous’ and ‘infelicitous’, depending on, for example, if the speech act in 
the case of a promise is fulfilled or not, then the Druze speech act further complicates the 
situation. More than misfiring the intended performative speech act and consequently realising 
the intended potential for action, its elusiveness may be able to enact, modify and magnify other 
sources of potentials less than intended and welcomed, and all this happens in a substratum 
escaping accountability. Hence the moment of the Druze conversion is charged with political 
subversiveness seen through the principle of taqiyyah.  
When applied outside of such emergency situations as the forced conversion, taqiyyah 
may imply a continuous shift or rewriting of the rules and codes. Indeed, it adds an evolving 
element that accounts for the transformation of game, in which taqiyyah could be seen as a 
framework ‘for an opening up of subject positions, a liberation of what it means to make rules, 
share them, and play’ (Flanagan 2009, 148). 
Abu Hamdan continues: 
 
Taqiyyah is a speech act! Yet unlike other speech acts such as the oath to tell the whole 
truth or the maritally consummating ‘I do,’ taqiyyah can take many different forms of 
vocal articulation and become performative in a multitude of spaces. (Abu Hamdan 
2014) 
 
2.2.3. Subjectless subjectivity  
 
The paradoxical problems-tests, questions-answers and koans, or what Deleuze and Guattari 
elsewhere call ‘atypical expressions,’ all demonstrate the absurdity of significations and the 
nonsense of denotation, which are not to be taken literally as they are, but instead point to 
another mode of expression. Deleuze and Guattari write, 
 
The atypical expression constitutes a cutting edge of deterritorialisation of language, it 
plays the role of tensor; in other words, it causes language to tend toward the limit of its 
elements, forms, or notions, toward a near side or beyond of language. The tensor effects 
a kind of transitivisation of the phrase, causing the last term to react upon the preceding 
term, back through the entire chain. It assures an intensive and chromatic treatment of 
language. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 99) 
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Historically, Dadaists have experimented with the production of atypical expressions. 
From sound poetry, simultaneous poetry to cut-up method in composition, they characterise 
language as artistic materials, and not just the means for communication. The material aspect 
of language, the sound of words, is redeemed, and the syntax and grammar broken in return for 
an experience beyond logical meaning. In this way, the Dadaists join a tradition of thinkers who 
see the world as a continuum as opposed to fragmented slots cognised by our mind. Nietzsche, 
for his part, sees the world as a continuum, ‘from which we isolate a pair of fragments, just in 
the same way as we perceive a movement as isolated points and therefore do not properly see 
but infer it … there is an infinite set of processes in that abrupt second which evades us’ 
(Nietzsche 1974, 173). The way we perceive movement can be likened to chronophotography, 
which frames movement into photography sequences. Though mechanical in nature, the 
framing for Benjamin can make a certain ‘optical unconscious’ manifest, by revealing 
phenomena that appear strange to the eyes. The Dadaists offered a way ‘to discover what 
Nietzsche calls “an infinite set of processes” occurring in the present moment,’ suggesting ‘a 
nihilism that opened onto bright horizons, not the pessimistic frame of mind in which the world 
is senseless and all hope is futile’ (Lushetich 2016, 28).  
The bright horizon of senselessness is furthered in Guattari and Massumi. For them, 
there is an autonomy of self-creation, or ‘autopoiesis’ of atypical expressions (Massumi 2002a, 
xxviii ). Instead of considering language as emanating from a cognisant subject, we are to 
conceive the subject of expression as thrown in the world:  
 
It is because the subject of a singular expression continues under formation, still yet-to-
come, that its autopoiesis must be considered a ‘subjectless’ subjectivity. Shy of its 
definitive capture at the reproductive end of its stream, it is a process without a fully 
determinate agent or product (an open-ended subjectification). The singular’s conditions 
of anomaly are counter-conditions of absurdity, but in an entirely different way than the 
postmodern. They are absurd not because they produce an excess of signification, but 
because what they produce is, as potential, in excess of it. (Massumi 2002a, xxviii) 
 
We may infer, from the example of the Dadaists, that the production of sound and words 
– beyond semantic functions and hence as sheer materials is a way of achieving this excess. On 
a political level, the production of subjectless subjectivity reconfigures the subject analysed in 
Foucault and Deleuze earlier in that it complicates the production of political subjectivities. 
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Here, the weaponisation of taqiyya, beyond moral judgment and by mere fact of its being 
possible, suggests the thrust of hypertrophy within a deeply inscribed and increasingly 
ubiquitous political power matrix. 
In the performance of Lawrence Abu Hamdan, the practice of taqiyya enacts a moment 
of autonomy of the atypical expression in the case of conversion to Wahhabi Islam. Precisely 
because it contradicts the Druze doctrine, the expression made by following the orthodox 
Wahhabite way of praying constitutes a yet-to-come subject, not in a determined relation with 
the Druze subjects. Yet in the ears of the Wahhabi war lord, this expression meets the projection 
of a determined subjectivity, hence renders the task of conversion complete.  
If taqiyyah practiced here is a tool for the self-protection of a vulnerable community, it 
does not mean that it cannot be co-opted by other parties. Indeed, in the hands of jihadists, the 
interpretation of taqiyyah can amount to a powerful dissimulation strategy too. In concrete 
terms, it means ‘hypercamouflage’ and dissolution into the enemy, i.e. the infidels, and 
participation in all the worldly activities that a Muslim is typically not allowed to do, including 
taking drugs. It suspends the determinate rules of a ‘Muslim subjectivity’ such as taboo on 
drinking and drugs. Such expressions, as much practice-based as linguistically performative, 
only terminate as a definitive subject (non-Muslim), thereby creating a fracture in the typical 
Muslim subject identity. The result is to make it all the more difficult to identify a terrorist from 
a civilian, which arguably has already taken effect in parts of the world today. This weaponised 
reinterpretation of taqiyyah is ‘a silent and fluid military infiltration, a course of action which 
forms one of the elemental components of fetishised Jihadism’ (Negarestani 2007, 58). The 
subjects in this weaponised reinterpretation of taqiyyah undergo transformation in a practical, 
daily manner; their speech and conduct can no longer be measured by the logical construction 
of rules that differentiate an infiltrator from a civilian.  
 
The Muslim subject is a cultural and historical construct in the West. Time and 
objectivity appear as important vectors underlying the discussions on religiosity and secularity. 
Whether the conflation of human and divine experience together or the carving out of ordinary 
time against higher time, time becomes a dimension through which worlds are played out. In 
this teleological view of time, non-West cultures were or still are relegated to an earlier stage 
of development (the Muslim world as a case), or on the ‘benevolent’ side of the same coin, they 
are romanticised and often categorically depicted as frozen in a pristine past (new age practices 
inspired by non-West spirituality such as Tibetan Buddhism). ‘Secular’ comes from ‘saeculum’, 
a century or age or a shared world of human experience. ‘Death of God’ theologian Gabriel 
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Vahanian holds that saeculum does not mean the opposite to sacred in the primary sense and 
instead underlies the secondary opposition between sacred and profane for ‘a saeculum is a 
theological notion which implies that we live in a world of immanence which functions as the 
location of human and divine meaning and value’ (Crockett 2001, 1). Charles Taylor 
emphasises the disenchantment of time: ‘People who are in the saeculum, are embedded in 
ordinary time, they are living the life of ordinary time; as against those who have turned away 
from this in order to live closer to eternity. The word is thus used for ordinary as against higher 
time’ (Taylor 2007, 55). Yet how secular is this secularity? 
Not only does this disguise under secular time and objectivity affects science, but it has 
concrete political consequences: there are always groups with power whose interests are best 
served under the condition of history as telos. In the recent century, the West has experienced 
categorical reactions to Muslims as the Other. In his eloquent study Islam in Liberalism, Joseph 
Massad traces how liberalism has systematically established dualistic oppositions between 
Islam and Europe and Protestant Christianity, Western democracy and Oriental despotism, 
European/Christian women’s freedom and Muslim women’s slavery, European/Euro-American 
sexual freedom and ‘Islamic’ repressiveness and oppressiveness of sexual desires and practices, 
the tolerance of modern Europe and the intolerance of Islam and Muslims (Massad 2015). In 
the everyday, we are confronted with practices that seemingly pertain to a religious order, such 
as scarf-wearing in societies of moderate Islam, is our reaction not pray to the normative 
function of secularism? Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis, Ian Buchanan sees the 
French Muslim schoolgirls’ voluntary wearing of foulard (head scarf) as an act of 
‘neoterritoriality’ (without passing moral judgements), an archaism with a perfectly modern 
function (Buchanan 2008, 115).  
The hegemony and normativity of liberalism is based on the moral superiority co-
extensive to the conceptual structure of difference of the same, hence the universalisation of 
secularity becomes a weaponised ideal against the Muslim community. And behind these 
ideological debates is often a blatant political and economic game, leading to wars in the name 
of rescue and aid. Talal Asad rightly argues, ‘Violence is embedded in the very concept of 
liberty that lies at the heart of liberal doctrine. That concept presupposes that the morally 
independent individual’s natural right to violent self-defence is yielded to the state and that the 
state becomes the sole protector of individual liberties’ (Asad 2007, 59). In the West now, the 
normativity of secularity serves concrete domestic power leverage, such as those propagated by 
rightist movements in the very heart of Western societies (e.g. banning the Burkini). In all of 
these public outcries, the fundamental idea of the self versus the other, the difference to the 
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same can be discerned, which in turn validates the position taken on secularity versus religiosity, 
when the seeming differences merely affirm differences of the same. 
Hence, the practice of taqiyya inserts dissimulated subjects, or subjectless subjects into 
the dualist social and conceptual structures. It occupies the liminal zone of ‘subjectless 
subjectivity,’ in both the case of Druze conversion, and in what Reza Negarestani calls the 
‘weaponised reinterpretation’ of taqiyya.  
 
2.3. Language, materiality and relationality 
 
2.3.1.  Non-sensuous Similarity and Sense-perceived Meaning 
 
In order to discuss and enact the different forms of vocal articulation that taqiyyah may take on, 
Abu Hamdan introduces a Druze scholar, Wissam Abu Dargham, whom he impersonates as he 
reads the statements and simultaneously distorts his voice through manipulating the multi-effect 
unit.  
Abu Dargham/Abu Hamdan explains the phenomenon common in their part of the 
world that mothers communicating with their new-born babies with two sounds: 
 
It is just two sounds – INGHH and APOO – used to communicate with the new-born 
child. The new-born baby perhaps does not understand; it doesn’t have any way of 
processing this information in its brain to really understand any meaning other than just 
an abstract sound of the mother’s voice. So what does the INGHH APOO communicate? 
What is flowing through these two syllables? It is love and care. So the child receives 
these two sounds that don’t make any linguistic sense but transmit the mother’s love. 
(Abu Hamdan 2014) 
 
In a low-pitched voice, Abu Hamdan (as Abu Dargham) gives a vivid demonstration of 
the raspy sound of ‘INGHH’ and the throbbing sound of ‘APOO’ to the extent that they almost 
exert forces – a combined affective resonance of the Arabic language and the electronic 
modulation.  
This performative enactment of sounds brings us deeper into the matter of language. 
Here we will expand on the set of mutually inclusive notions of expression, content and 
substance to highlight the process of coming into language.  
Massumi considers Benjamin’s idea that, in the old times, ‘people danced a storm’ and 
relates the connection between dance and storm to what he terms ‘non-sensuous similarity’ 
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(Massumi 2011, 105). It is a similarity that does not situate in comparable correspondence 
between the senses of the body and the sky, rather, it is a similarity ‘tied to the senses but lacking 
sense content’ (Massumi 2011, 105), yet is nevertheless felt. To account for this relation, 
Massumi first plunges into felt-perception of movement in the experiment of Albert Michotte 
where a ball disappearing behind an object feels as if it continues its trajectory of travel. Daniel 
Stern’s ‘activation contour’ serves as a conceptual tool to explain this continuing in sense 
perception: ‘a continuous rhythm of seamlessly linked accelerations and decelerations, 
increases and decreases in intensity, starts and stops’ (Stern 1985, 57). To push this further, 
non-sensuous similarities can bring extremely diverse events or non-local linkages involving 
different sense perceptions together, in a qualitative way, ‘according to the quality of movement 
-- the activation contour or shape of change – they nonsensuously share’ (Massumi 2011, 108).  
Two participants entering a relationship share the same activation contour, which 
essentially entails ‘differential involvement in the same event’ (Massumi 2011, 112). This 
dynamic relationship comes before the separation of forms and their supposed content but is 
often renegaded when we have learnt so, as we will see later. In the case of the mother and the 
new-born baby, the INGHH and APOO sounds the mother makes and her soothing actions 
happening at the same time would make up an activation contour by virtue of their shared 
intensities. The child would feel the love and care in both modes of soothing beyond their 
sensory specificity, that is, the shared relation is constant from hearing to touching. This is why 
the sounds don’t have to make any linguistic sense but suffices as materially and rhythmically 
determined on an activation contour to cast a sense-felt affect to the baby being soothed. This 
enactive force of sound reestablishes the materiality of language and extends the implication of 
meaning from semantics to including the ‘pre-meaning,’ and at the same time ‘sense-perceived 
meaning’. 
At this point, Abu Hamdan turns off the morphing effect and comments in his own 
voice:  
 
Through his description of taqiyyah as a vocal practice Abu Dargham reminds us of the 
fact that voice precedes language. That the baby listens to pure sound and the voice 
itself, not language, is the essence of communication.  A reminder that in any context 
of speech the vocal form that the speech takes remains significant as a mode of 
communication in and of itself. (Abu Hamdan 2014) 
 
The self-referentiality of voice here also points to the fact that through voice morphing, 
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Abu Hamdan’s own voice material is iterated, serialised, and appropriated. It is left to the 
speculation of the audience if Abu Dargham is a real or fictive person; nevertheless, the 
presentation of a counterpart to Abu Hamdan on stage seems not without importance in a 
performative context. The sound morphing effect itself performs and makes us confront ‘ the 
reality of illusion (the live) with the illusion of reality (the mediatised)’ (Kattenbelt 2010, 35). 
This ‘intermediality’ in the performance affords a new sensibility by shifting the identity of the 
performer between his presented self and his other serialised identities, between being himself 
and make-believe. And the appropriation of Abu Dargham by Abu Hamdan (or vice versa) 
exposes ‘the self-difference that was always already there, the always “more than” and “other 
than”’(Cull 2013, 48). 
 
2.3.2. Politics of Pronunciation: Form of Being and Sound  
 
Without explicit announcement of transition, Abu Hamdan goes into another form that taqiyyah 
may assume in the pronunciation of Arabic phonemes. It is noted that the Druze pronounce all 
Arabic phonemes faithfully, whereas other Arabic-speaking peoples drop certain letters for 
convenience, such as changing the ‘qaf’ sound of Arabic letter ق (most equivalent to English q) 
to a glottal ‘af’ sound. So the word taqiyyah would be pronounced distinctively by the Druze 
as ‘taqiyyah’, and by others as ‘ta’iya’. The different pronunciations are articulated by Abu 
Hamdan and the audio bite put on loop, creating a little symphony of sound variations. 
This seemingly arbitrary drop of the ‘qaf’ pronunciation makes a significant difference 
in the contemplation of language and politics. Abu Hamdan introduces that according to certain 
Druze believers, ‘speaking the truth is not about what you said but in the way of saying it, in 
the pronunciation of the letters themselves’ (Abu Hamdan 2014). Switching to impersonate Abu 
Dargham, Abu Hamdan expounds on this further:  
 
Speaking the truth is to enunciate the word as it is originally intended in the Arabic 
language and the theological context for this is that the Arabic language is the divine 
word of God. Unlike English, which is not the original language of the Bible, the Quran 
retains its original language.  And because the Arabic language is the language of God 
it is the language of He who created all things. The Arabic language is not a 
representation of things in the world, but actually language is another mode for that 
thing to exist. The sound of the spoken word in Arabic is therefore inherently 
onomatopoeic, whereby the form of the thing and its sound are one and the same. (Abu 
Hamdan 2014) 
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This is a statement charged with theological and linguistic muddles. Indeed, some 
commentators of Abu Hamdan’s work seem to have fallen prey to it. Curator Anders Kreuger 
refutes the idea that Arabic could be considered a medium through which things exist as they 
are, he especially opposes the temporal determination with regards to Qur’an, claiming, ‘There 
was Arabic before the Qur’an and there was, and is, Arabic after it’ (Kreuger 2015, 71). 
Theological discussion aside, let us consider what it means, and how it feels like, to conflate 
the form of being and the sound.   
In the earlier case with the mother and the new-born baby, the shared action contour of 
soothing unifies the mother and the baby in a mutual relation and nowhere but in that relation, 
that is, it does not belong solely to the child or the mother. In this relation the form of being 
(action) and the participating language/sound is inseparable. And yet, the child will eventually 
‘learn to separate out what it actually hears, touches, and sees from what it perceptually feels 
amodally in the relational in-between of bodies’ (Massumi 2011, 113). The relational in-
between will part and the participant on each end will create separated forms of sense perception, 
so for the child, sound becomes audible and later language, tactile becomes touching.  
It seems that when Abu Hamdan/Abu Dargham refers to language as another mode for 
things to exist, it would be more appropriate to understand language in the stage prior to the 
separation of form from which point the audible is to be experienced as inherent to language 
and the things as objects – a higher form of onomatopoeia. In contrast, the refutation for mutual 
relation of being and sound from a linguistics point of view is based on the (indeed unattainable) 
interaction between language and beings as separated forms and experienced as such.  
Benjamin also sees language in the expanded sense as aligning in a relation with the 
divine, though without any theological overtone, ‘God rested when he had left his creative 
power to itself in man. This creativity, relieved of its divine actuality, became knowledge. Man 
is the knower in the same language in which God is creator’ (Benjamin 1986, 323). 
 
2.3.3. Another form of existence: more on onomatopoeia  
 
As analysed above, the mutual relation and the shared action contour of the form of being 
(action) and the participating language/sound is, before the cognitive registration of language, 
inseparable. This leads to Abu Hamdan’s argument that language is another mode for things to 
exist. Indeed, we could trace the same inseparability in earlier developments of language, or in 
words maintaining more ‘primary’ roots in the process of development. This is imperative for 
a materialist understanding of language. In order to further this thinking, two aspects of the 
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Chinese language will be examined – in the case of onomatopoeia and of ideogram. 
The case of onomatopoeia exists in a wide range of languages. Here we examine a case 
of onomatopoeia in words that are found in early Chinese sources, which sinologist and 
translator Jean François Billeter has carefully studied: 
 
This [word] ‘PR’ (máng wù) has the same or similar meaning as in the words ‘7’ 
(hùn dùn), ‘E9’ (hú tu), ‘TQ’ (hú lu), etc. Hun dun refers to a kind of chaos, […] hu 
tu refers to muddled mind, and hu lu is calabash. These are very special words. They 
are binomials, each made of two consecutive parts with same or similar sounds, which 
is rare in classical Chinese. The two sounds are distinctive from each other yet only 
slightly, and they respond to each other, […] similar to ‘borborygme’ (rumbling sound) 
in French, and of course, we can easily associate it to “tohu-bohu” (chaos and confusion 
in Old Hebrew). These binomials […] maintain not yet completely separated phonemes 
[…]. This connection can be symbolised in the image of cabbalas, which boasts two 
rounded parts, being neither one nor separated. In all, everything comes from the 
unseparated realm of chaos, their lives arise from chaos. (Billeter 2011, 78) (my 
translation) 
 
Billeter points out the similarity in phonetic quality in both constituent parts of a single-
meaning binomial word and suggest that they represent a state when the meaning of the word 
formed (such as chaos, ‘hun dun’), yet the phonetic sound of the word remained in a state of 
lesser degree separation. What furnishes the discussion of onomatopoeia here is that certain 
sounds carry traces of the affective quality of the word, such as the ‘hun’ and ‘dun’ sounds – 
both nasal sounds produced by occluding air from going through the month but through the 
nose, which matches the image of internal and invisible movements that ‘chaos’ duly evokes.  
There is a deeper level of onomatopoeia at play here, distinctive to the Chinese 
language. The words examined here, hun dun, hu tu and hu lu are, just like most of commonly 
used Chinese words, binomials. A binomial is a word consisting of two grammatically and 
semantically independent syllables (and clearly expressed in the different Chinese characters in 
writing), yet as a word has one specific meaning. Here, hun and dun, hu and tu, as well as hu 
and lu, as syllable/Chinese character, each has its own set of meanings, yet two 
syllables/Chinese characters conjugate to form words with one specific meaning. The fact that 
the two syllables – the ‘un’ and ‘u’ sounds – in a binomial are replicas of each other affords the 
speculation that the two syllables are not yet separated enough in the process of conjugating 
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bionomials. In other words, not only do the ‘hun’ and ‘dun’ sounds pertain phonetically to the 
image of chaos, but that ‘hun’ and ‘dun’ arise from a less articulated, and indeed more chaotic, 
state marked by their shared heritage of the ‘un’ sound.  
Here, to use the analytical framework of Massumi, one could regard the sound of nasal 
‘un’ and the (mental) image of chaos and confusion as sharing nonsensuous similarity, yet the 
linkage was there despite their different sense-inputs, only to be separated when the word for 
chaos (as sound) was formed from the lived and imagined reality. The exceptional aspect, as 
suggested in the case of hun dun, is that the delinking does not seem to be, or sound as if it were 
complete. Indeed, through the process of culture, it is ‘the separation of forms that is learned – 
not their dynamic relations’ (Massumi 2011, 113). 
The materiality of language was further developed into a rigid and rhyming form of 
poetry or prose in Chinese literature. Without going deeper into specialist knowledge, suffice it 
to say that the tonal nature of the Chinese language has shaped these literary expressions in that 
it creates a balance and counter-balance between the characters and a point and counterpoint 
between the high-pitch (ping) and low-pitch (ze) tones of the characters. This sing-song effect 
is derived to enhance the harmonious balance of the piece. 
 
Chinese characters are ideograms, symbolising the meaning without indicating the 
sound used to utter it. The construction of Chinese characters being an assemblage of radicals 
and basic components, each radical or component presents an abstracted form of life (such as 
the stand-alone characters – but also components in other characters – 0, sun, and 5, moon, 
were rendered in the earliest script as  and ), and the assemblage gives a meaning beyond 
the immediate appearance of things (such as 1 , brightness, is constructed with sun and 
moon put on each other’s side on the same level). 
Japanese Studio Otoro designed an algorithm that ‘dreams up’ Kanji/Chinese characters 
that look completely plausible yet unreadable – and even following the right stroke order (Otoro 
2015). The algorithm trains on stroke-order database of of Kanji, and comes up with probability 
distribution of the next characters based on a random sampling of an input character. The stroke-
by-stroke writing is simulated by the probability distribution of the position of the pen and 
whether the pen is up or down. In this way, the algorithm generates self-made Kanji/Chinese 
characters that are, for a Kanji/Chinese reader, at once familiar and strange. Due to the inherent 
meaning in each component, even the fake Kanji could harbour potential meanings. 
Writers of Chinese may be reminded of the rote process of repeating each character, and 
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mistakes – or fake characters – arise when one forgets one component and tries out possible 
variations. This also evokes Chinese artist Xu Bing’s A Book from the Sky (1987-91), featuring 
around 4000 pseudo Chinese characters, finely carved on wood, typeset, printed and bound in 
traditional fashion. Some careful readers have found real characters – too rare to be identified 
as real – and have used them to challenge the artist. For me, even such ‘mistakes’ precisely 
highlight the possibility of emergent relationality in the Chinese characters – that it is an 
abstraction of life, including its visible forms and invisible operative forces. Though fake, the 
characters do point to a virtual relationship that may as well exist and indeed bring something 
new to the world, hence putting the language into a conundrum: at which point can the set of 
Chinese characters be said to have exhausted itself? 
The relational world suggested by the ‘fake’ Chinese characters arises from a process 
of prehension. For Whitehead, prehension is a ‘uncognitive apprehension,’ an uncognitive 
‘grasping’, or a pre-epistemic, not necessarily knowledge-based operation of relating to things 
and environments. This is a non-intentionality process (or not necessarily intentional process) 
of interaction, and suggests that indeed the ‘feeling’ can be located as much between a human 
subject and an apple as object, as between the apple and the ground; as much in physical 
prehension, apple and ground, as in conceptual prehension, or the realm of ‘thinking’. 
(Whitehead 1929) Conceptual prehension does not bear ‘reference to particular actualities’, 
hence for Luciana Parisi, computational processing of data is a form of pure conceptual 
prehension (Parisi 2014). I will return to the concept of prehension in the context of animism 
in the chapter on Geumhyung Jeong’s work. 
Here, in prehending input Kanji data, the possible events whereby strokes and forms 
correspond to the representation of data get reorganized in indeterministic ways and henceforth 
contributes to the emergence of something new. Yet this newness in algorithmic terms, or 
‘machinic vision,’ is only relevant for us when we have an embodied cognition of it (indeed we 
may have too much of it, for example in Google DeepDream, which satisfies the very human 
desire of seeing for himself how the computer ‘hallucinates’ in visual terms). Because of the 
assemblage of Kanji components, the conceptual prehension or the decoding of Kanji returns 
the viewer to an embodied experience of life that pertains to the creativity and relationality of 
matters. 
 
2.3.4. Expression, sense perception and language  
 
The discussion on onomatopoeia in the previous section leads to a renewed examination of 
expression. Does expression predate language?  
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If we draw a larger plane of immanence on which language arises, expression can be 
seen as not yet detached from the smooth space, and happens not from within the boundaries of 
the subject but from outside in. This is not to discredit language as a faculty of the individual 
subject, but to locate expression as something pre-personal or impersonal. Massumi puts it 
succinctly: 
 
More radically, Deleuze and Guattari are suggesting that there is an impersonal 
expressive agency that is not only not restricted to language, but whose process takes 
precedence over its operations. Expression is not in a language-using mind, or in a 
speaking subject vis à vis its objects. Nor is it rooted in an individual body. It is not even 
in a particular institution, because it is precisely the institutional system that is in flux. 
Expression is abroad in the world – where the potential is for what may become. 
(Massumi 2002a, xxi) 
 
Massumi relates this impersonal expressive agency to the body, through the working of 
which the generative potential gets felt and articulate. He thereby affirms a theory of 
embodiment: “Artaud was right: expression ‘says too much to be born, and says too much in 
being born’” (Massumi 2002a, xxxii). 
Antonin Artaud’s concept of Theatre of Cruelty is a primitive ceremonial experience 
that acts as a savage exorcism of the darkest latent forces inhabiting human experience. As such, 
it acts as an ‘emotional and moral surgery on consciousness’ (Artaud 1976). Artaud holds that 
theatre should mirror but not mimic life, and it should recall those moments when we wake up 
from dreams unsure whether the dream’s content, or the bed we are lying in, is our reality. (The 
state between dream and reality will be further discussed in the Butterfly Dream story in the 
last chapter on Royce Ng.) Important for a study on expression is the inspiration Artaud took 
from Cambodian dance and Balinese dance. The dance replaces words with ‘embodied states 
of consciousness as a series of gestures in flux. A metaphysics of gesture transformed the 
dancer’s bodies into pure signs and moving hieroglyphs’ (Salter 2010, 46). In this sense, dance, 
sign and the state of mind coincide to channel the expressive energy in a synthesis that 
articulates a mode of existence.  
Similar operations are at play in rituals. Ritual is a way of performing thought via the 
performative use of language – language as gesture. Ritual works as ‘a technique of existence 
for bringing forth virtual events through techniques involving bodily performance, in mutual 
inclusion with events of the other kinds’ (Massumi 2011, 124). Massumi continues: 
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Its expressive momentum carries a charge of potential too great to be absorbed in any 
particular thing or event: too much to be born(e). It is for this very reason that it has to 
take body: so as to continue, generating a more to reality to absorb the excess. What 
absorbs the excess of potential are the determinate functionings of the host body. These 
actualise the potential in determinate forms of content and expression. That actual 
definition says too much in being born: it annuls the potential, bringing a current of 
expression to the end of the stream. So the movement must rebegin. Its determinate 
products must pass again into an intermediate state where they are repotentialised. 
Expression regains momentum, cascading through the body’s many levels, like a 
contagion. If the result is an exemplary expression convoking of a collectivity, the 
contagion will spread. Expression will take another body. Across an indefinite series of 
such incarnations, it will not only have taken bodies, it will have taken on a life of its 
own. What each host body receives in return for its service to expression is a quantum 
of that vivacity: a quantum of potential to feed into its own growth and functioning. 
What expression spreads when it says too much are forces of existence. It disseminates 
life. It comes to be determined, and exceeds its determinations to become. (Massumi 
2002a, xxxii) 
 
Only when expression and content/substance are differentiated, detached from the felt-
relation of the activation contour yet still retaining the qualitative affect open to enter into new 
relations, does language as we know it come about. Language ‘makes it possible to share felt 
relations at any distance from the identifiable sensuous forms they yoke’ (Massumi 2011, 116). 
Able to skip the intermediate steps (the physical condition in the relation between the mother 
and the child for example) and thereby detaching non-sensuous perception from local 
participants, language thus increases ‘the range of its potential yoking between extremely 
diverse events’ (Massumi 2011, 116). Such is the potential of smooth spaces, which gives rise 
to the variable features that are reflected – as we perceive them – in striated spaces. 
Bergson holds similar views on language and words. For him, the word, ‘made to pass 
from one thing to another, is, in fact, by nature transferable and free. It can therefore be 
extended, not only from one perceived thing to another, but even from a perceived thing to a 
recollection of that thing, from the precise recollection to a more fleeting image, and finally 
from an image fleeting, though still pictured, to the picturing of the act by which the image is 
pictured, that is to say, to the idea’ (Bergson 1998, 172). Bergson describes this process as an 
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internal operation that catches the external world and at the same time penetrates into its own 
internal world through the layers of recollections (Bergson 1998, 172). 
 If Massumi highlights the ‘abroad in the world’ aspect of the expression, and Bergson 
calibrates it to the internal working of intelligence through language, then Whitehead’s view on 
perception and language brings more nuance into the interlocking moment of the immanent 
‘sense-perception’ and the intelligence-processed linguistic rendering, or the intersection 
between the smooth and striated spaces. Whitehead differentiates ‘sense-perception’ from what 
is captured in thought. In sense-perception, ‘we are aware of something which is not thought 
and which is self-contained for thought’ (Whitehead 1920, 3). The example he gives is ‘red’: 
something is lost in the transition of the ‘red’ of awareness to the ‘red’ of thought (Whitehead 
1920, 3). Hence in the abstract and autonomous realm of language, ‘nonsensuous perceptions 
may detach so thoroughly from objects that the “sense-perceived meanings” are entirely 
lost’(Massumi 2011, 117). This is when language entirely disconnects from the smooth space 
and operates on the level of self-referentiality and homogeneity, which falls under the capture 
of the structuralist view of language. I will reflect more on this Whiteheadian concept of non-
cognitive feeling and perception in chapter four on animism.   
 
In line with the complex operation between sense-perception and language, there is an 
ambiguous passage concerning ‘C’ (knowing or perceiving) in Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi’s 
writing that begs a critical re-reading. He writes, 
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What we hear are words and sounds. Unfortunately, people believe that these (…) words 
and sounds could help one capture the true situation of things. This is wrong. (…) (my 
translation) 
 
And the last sentence is usually interpreted as ‘those who know, do not speak; those 
who do not know, speak’. Again, this common interpretation depicts a worldly situation of 
one’s reservation and moderation in expressing thoughts. Billeter considers this almost too 
trivial for a philosopher; he takes this rendering of ‘C’ as ‘knowledge’ to issue and interprets 
it as ‘perceive’ (so “percevoir” instead of “savoir”): ‘They do not realise that, when one 
perceives, one does not speak; when one speaks, one cannot perceive’ (Billeter 2011, 13). 
Billeter further explains:  
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This passage from Zhuangzi describes a relation that we ourselves could observe. When 
we devote our attention on a subjective (+&) reality either exterior or interior to 
us, language disappears from the centre of our cognition. Conversely, when we 
use language, even though we do not necessarily stop our cognitive activities, our 
cognition still retreats to the periphery, where we do not focus our attention on. […] 
Zhuangzi holds that precisely it is because our mental activities encompass this relation 
that language is illusory. When we speak, we do not cognise, hence we cannot see the 
gap between language and reality and mistakes language as the accurate expression of 
reality. And when we focus our attention on a subjective (+&) reality (for example, on 
a gesture we attempt to accomplish), we forget language and similarly do not perceive 
the gap between language and reality. (Billeter 2011, 14) 
 
Billeter’s translation of ‘zhi’ as ‘percevoir’ and not ‘savoir’ at this spot is plausible. 
Much more than being merely invested in humbleness and suppressing outspokenness, the 
saying provides an ontological stage for highlighting the process through which language comes 
about. Hence the constituency of language is never able to capture what is in the perception and 
cognition in the full. 
How does the perception in the full seem like? Zhuangzi wittingly offers a parable of a 
mythical monster named Hundun, literally chaos (as mentioned above in the example of 
onomatopoeia): There were two emperors who frequently entered the territory of [emperor] 
Hundun, and Hundun treated them very generously. They discussed how they could repay his 
kindness. ‘All men,’ they said, ‘have seven openings so they can see, hear, eat, and breathe. But 
Hundun alone doesn’t have any. Let’s try boring him some.’ Every day they bored another hole, 
and on the seventh day Hundun died. (Watson 1968)(with minor changes) 
When we conceive things, including our bodies, not as unitary, complete wholes but as 
an endlessly creative, mattering continuum evolving in time, then they are in a state like 
Hundun’s. Intelligence is assigned the task of contemplating this endlessly creative matter, 
organising the unorganised, speaking the unspeakable, trying to capture the continuity which is 
nothing but the evolution of life. This is the moment when the opening of the holes (rationale, 
intelligence) causes an irreversible differentiation. Zhuangzi pronounces the tragic death of 
Hundun, leaving the readers in their own journey of finding the Hundun moment in life. It may 
dawn on us, if our attention is attuned to it, when something exceeds the limit of structuralism, 
when it reaches us with the tactility and materiality encapsulated in language itself, or when we 
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are connected with the sheer emergence of relation between ourselves and language. 
 
2.4. Inscription, language and politics 
 
2.4.1. Inscription and overcodification 
 
We have seen the potential of the expression ‘abroad in the world’ and its mediation through 
the body, and hinted at how autonomous expressions can be poetically explored in the arts. The 
reminder that there is an ‘outside’ of language, however, does not mean that this outside cannot 
be or has not been appropriated by or subjugated to overcoding structures.  
To understand how overcodification works is important not only for this chapter on 
language and for the next chapter on DNA as codes, it further provides a foundation of engaging 
with language politically. This political lens will be put to use in the chapters on Ho and Ng 
focusing on their works with outspoken historical dimensions that imply a study of the socius, 
the collective body of the society. As mentioned in the introduction, I primarily draw on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s figuration of plateaus (of different speeds) to understand historical 
stages from the primitive, to the despotic and to the capitalistic. The processes of coding and 
decoding is crucial as they determine the composition, motion and modes of operation of the 
elements on the plateaus. It is hence no coincidence that Deleuze and Guattari speak at length 
about language.  
 Regarding the place of language in the primitive society, Deleuze and Guattari hold that 
‘primitive societies are oral not because they lack a graphic system but because, on the contrary, 
the graphic system in these societies is independent of the voice; it marks signs on the body that 
respond to the voice, react to the voice, but that are autonomous and do not align themselves on 
it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 202). At this stage, things divide but they divide into themselves, 
changing in intensity yet remaining on the same plane of immanence. This corresponds with 
the state before the separation of the form and content of expression analysed above, and indeed 
at that stage, expressions can be multiple, seen most clearly in the case of ‘hundun’ or ‘hulu’, 
where not only is the sound ‘un’ or ‘u’ onomatopoeic, but also the single sound is not yet 
separated into binomials.  
 In the next stage, the barbarian despotic order, inscription and overcodification takes 
place on the undifferentiated mass of things/meanings and writing comes about. This is ‘not 
because the voice has been lost, but because the graphic system has lost its independence and 
its particular dimensions, has aligned itself on the voice and has become subordinated to the 
voice, enabling it to extract from the voice a deterritorialised abstract flux that it retains and 
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makes reverberate in the linear code of writing. In short, graphism in one and the same 
movement begins to depend on the voice, and induces a mute voice from on high or from the 
beyond, a voice that begins to depend on graphism. It is by subordinating itself to the voice that 
writing supplants it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 202). This fictitious, mute voice from above 
dictates the one absolute connection between the voice itself and graphism, at the cost of 
defacing the multiple voices once loosely organised around graphism. This is a process of 
inscription and codification on what used to be the full body of earth. In this way, writing as a 
‘direct filiation’ is institutionalised. The consequence: ‘Then there occurs a crushing of the 
magic triangle: the voice no longer sings but dictates, decrees; the graphy no longer dances, it 
ceases to animate bodies, but is set into writing on tablets, stones, and books; the eye sets itself 
to reading’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 205). Similar to the deterritorialisation – to make way 
for codification – we have seen with Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy, the conceptual 
thinking as the Greeks established it no longer operates on the earth itself but stretches out ‘a 
plane of immanence that absorbs the earth (or rather, “adsorbs” it),’ hence making an absolute 
deterritorialisation, irrevocable from the relative deterritorialisation of previous orders (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994, 88).  
 This exposition on Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of language in relation to history 
reveals the political implication – however implicit – of differentiation itself, as it delimits the 
plane of immanence.  
 
2.4.2. Writing 
 
From another kind of materialist perspective, media theorist Friedrich Kittler also traces how 
the ‘outside’ of language is mediated through writing. It is important to reproduce it here as it 
relates to the politics of language. Kittler proposes a ‘information-theoretical materialism’, or a 
media materialism, through which he aims to examine the physical, material components of the 
communication system, and by extension, the human-machine complex with increasingly 
blurred boundaries. For him, information is ‘transformed into matter and matter into 
information’ (Kittler 1997, 126). 
Kittler shares Hayles’s problematisation of information theories that assume there is an 
underlying information layer beneath material things that can be extracted or abstracted. While 
Hayles emphasises embodiment, and resituates information in the bodily practices, for Kittler, 
there is no attempt to prioritise embodiment because the boundaries between bodies and 
machines are no longer clear: ‘The age of media… renders indistinguishable what is human and 
what is machine…’ (Kittler 1999, 146).  
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 While I share more with the embodiment theory of Hayles, it’s important to configure 
our investigation with technological components and systems. A fundamental idea that Kittler 
puts forward in his media materialism concerns language and the medial and technical 
conditions of it. He analyses how the formal languages of programming distort the human 
programmers who use them, and thereby introduce a feedback loop from the machine to the 
programmer rather than the other way round, this marks for him a differentiation from the 
human-tool relation and that the computers cannot be classified as tools (Kittler 2016). 
 While one may argue here that the feedback loop is taken in the narrow, first-wave 
cybernetics sense, and that man-programming language-operating computer program should be 
studied as one assemblage instead of segregated entities, the media materialism of Kittler does 
shed lights on the relation between philosophy and language. Kittler writes, 
 
I start from the assumption that philosophy (or, in Heidegger’s term, European 
metaphysics) has been necessarily unable to conceive of media as media. This neglect 
begins with Aristotle: first, because his ontology deals only with things, their matter and 
form, but not with relations between things in time and space. Second, because the 
Greeks did not distinguish between articulated speech elements and articulated 
alphabetic letters, the very concept of writing as philosophy’s own (technical) medium 
is missing from Aristotle onwards. (Kittler and Yoshimi 2017, 23-24) 
 
 Writing as a medium is indeed indispensable for the undertaking of philosophy. In this 
context, the Greek vowel alphabet figures for Kittler as an early, pre-mechanical instantiation 
of the computer’s universal sign system, incorporating letter, number and tone; and it too 
evolved in constant feedback with a magical thing that connects mathematics to the domain of 
the senses, the lyre (Winthrop-Young and Gane 2006, 12). For now, I will not pursue a 
comparison of music and mathematics/signs, but it is important to note here that the ‘toolness’ 
of the signs are affirmed as connecting to a magical instrument that pleases the senses.  
To extend the reflection on the medium of writing, which then conditions philosophy 
politically, a passage from Latour is equally enlightening. In ‘Visualisation and Cognition: 
Drawing Things Together’ (Latour 1986), Latour highlights the condition for the 
persuasiveness of science by recounting a moment of writing on a scientific expedition as 
follows, 
La Pérouse traveled through the Pacific under the auspices of Louis XVI to bring back 
maps for the French court. He encountered the native Chinese inhabitants on the island of 
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Sakhalin in Northeast Asia and wanted to learn from them whether Sakhalin was an island or a 
peninsula. ‘To his great surprise the Chinese understand geography quite well. An older man 
stands up and draws a map of his island on the sand with the scale and the details needed by La 
Pérouse. Another, who is younger, sees that the rising tide will soon erase the map and picks 
up one of La Pérouse’s notebooks to draw the map again with a pencil’ (Latour 1986, 5). The 
crucial difference is not that the Chinese cannot think abstractly or produce maps – they were 
perfectly capable of that, but rather the drawing was of no importance to them, indeed 
disposable by the tides, while the map on the paper amounts to the single most important object 
of study for La Pérouse. He was able to bring back the map to Europe, reproduce it and 
disseminate it for future expeditions carried out by others. This gives rise to scientific objects 
that have the properties of being ‘mobile but also immutable, presentable, readable and 
combinable with one another’ (Latour 1986, 7). By virtue of being mobile and immutable, the 
map enters into the shrine of science just as language did before it, disembodied from the 
context which it originates from, detached from the bodies that produce, and carrying on a life 
as an abstract entity in a system of communications. 
In a larger context, this process is implicated in colonialism and the subjugation of other 
cultures and earth. I will return to the problematic of scientificity in the next chapter on DNA 
and art, and to the anthropological gaze and colonialism in the chapter on Ho Tzu Nyen’s Ten 
Thousand Tigers.  
 
2.4.3. Taqiyyah and nomadic distribution  
 
As we have seen, the codification process and making language immutable is by nature political. 
What taqiyyah amounts to is a powerful strategy to subvert the political capture of language. If 
in the earlier instances, the application of taqiyyah suggests transformation of the rules imposed 
on actors inherent in a given structure, here taqiyyah as an instance of pre-language amounts to 
rethinking the relation of actor and structure all together. Here a comparison of chess and the 
game of Go reveals the fundamental difference between logos and nomos, which condition 
thinking differently. 
Deleuze and Guattari consider the difference between chess and Go as exemplary for 
two reasons: the pieces’ status and the relation between the pieces and the space they move 
through or occupy. Chess involves coded pieces, each overladen with a certain given identity 
and corresponding function. Chess pieces move across an equally coded and gridded space, and 
enter into gain – or loss-determining relations with other pieces following prescribed structures. 
Go pieces are anonymous, collective and make moves to form situations of bordering and 
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shattering. Gain or loss is not a result of confrontation of certain pieces but is measured by the 
connectivity of a collective of pieces in relation to the space they are distributed in, so that one 
Go piece can destroy a whole constellation of enemy pieces. Deleuze and Guattari define the 
space of the chess as a striated space and the space of Go a smooth space. In Go, ‘the movement 
is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without 
departure or arrival’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 353). 
It is therefore not surprising that Deleuze and Guattari hold that ‘chess is a semiology’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 353). Its predetermined structure and the constituent elements 
within a striated space are reminiscent of the operation interior to linguistics consisting of the 
signifier and the signified. Here, however, what is relevant for a discussion of language is not 
that language as a whole belongs to the striated space or smooth space, or is structurally similar 
to the game of chess or Go, but that the view of what informs its emergence and thereby the 
experience of language gravitates toward one or the other. Shackled to semantic structures that 
govern our thinking, there are nevertheless overspills, as shown in the case of paradox or 
onomatopoeia, that challenges the structuralism in language.  
 In contrast to the logos of chess, the Go is more akin to the nomadic nomos, which is 
without property, enclosure or measure: ‘there is no longer a division of that which is distributed 
but rather a division among those who distribute themselves in an open space – a space which 
is unlimited, or at least without precise limits’ (Deleuze 1994, 6).  
 The nomadic distribution, based on distributing themselves to cover the largest possible 
space, has a sense of play: ‘it is more like a space of play, or a rule of play, by contrast with 
sedentary space and nomos’. Extrapolating this element of play back to the games, it is not to 
suggest that Go has more elements of play than the chess, but that the way the two games 
distribute the pieces vary in their sense of play, or delirium: the latter ‘is an errant and even 
“delirious” distribution, in which things are deployed across the entire extensity of a univocal 
and undistributed Being. It is not a matter of being which is distributed according to the 
requirements of representation, but of all things being divided up within being in the univocity 
of simple presence (the One - All)’ (Deleuze 1994, 36-37). This univocity in the nomadic 
distribution can be also described as ‘everything divides, but into itself’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 154). 
In the game of Go, just as in language before the sound/utterance becomes detached 
from an activation contour, there is no single object – game piece, or the object as ‘signified,’ 
but the object is in an event of ‘continuous variation’ (Deleuze 1993, 19). The continuous 
variation allows for continuous transformation of the plane, its actors and their movements 
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enfolded, thereby avoiding falling into a dualistic representational mode. A nomad evades 
accountability in the all-eyes, all-ears control society, as Agamben notes, ‘A being radically 
devoid of any representable identity would be absolutely irrelevant to the State’ (Agamben 1993, 
86). In this sense, to defy the decentralized network of control, one has to stay within and 
become in excess of it, or in the word of Galloway and Thacker, to become ‘hypertrophy’: 
‘resistance implies a desire for stasis or retrograde motion, but hypertrophy is the desire for 
pushing beyond’ (Galloway and Thacker 2007, 98). We could view taqiyyah as a tactic of 
reclaiming the smooth space, reconnecting with the exterior of language that informs its very 
emergence and hence avidly transforming its own condition of being. Therefore, we could 
understand why taqiyyah takes various forms in the Druze belief.  
It is important to note that the operations of striation and smoothing are always in flux 
and undergoing ‘passages or combinations’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 500). The question is, 
of course, when does the striated become smooth, and when does the smooth become striated? 
In the case of the mother and the child, language and its content, yoked as part of an activation 
contour, rest on the surface of the smooth space. The points (sound, action) as articulation of 
the relation are subject to the trajectory (activation contour), as opposed to the trajectory 
(language) merely linking the points (‘signifier’ and ‘signified’) in the linguistic model. And 
yet, this is only a momentary stasis before the smooth becomes striated again and the senses de-
yoke to form other sense relations.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter turns around the junction of the two-way movements that taqiyyah operates with. 
Earlier in this chapter, the reading of taqiyyah as koan-like or paradoxical dissimulation 
attempts to recast the relation of form of expression and form of content, only to reveal their 
mutual ingression and to open language to its exterior. The alignment of taqiyyah to the ‘sense-
perceived meaning’ native to the smooth space and before the reduction to linguistic semantics, 
subsequently, highlights the dynamics of the immanence that constantly ‘de-yokes’ and 
differentiates into language and expression. A survey into onomatopoeia and the cultural history 
of the Chinese language further evinces the pre-personal quality of expression. These two 
movements from different sides both end in the place of language in the form that is experienced 
on a daily basis. Hence by partially enacting and partially demonstrating, Abu Hamdan shows 
how taqiyyah may help us conceptually transform and expand the spaces on both sides of 
language, and once again – however momentarily – reclaim the smooth space.  
In the very last part of his performance, Abu Hamdan returns to the political implication 
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of taqiyyah, with which he starts the performative lecture and with which he has dealt in his 
earlier works.  
In our time of technological intervention in lie detecting and accent tests, it is not what 
one speaks but rather how one speaks that is subject to examination. We have seen that to apply 
taqiyyah in this doomed situation means the freedom to remain silent. We have also seen, in 
cases of coercion such as the forced conversion, taqiyyah could be adopted as camouflage. The 
practice of taqiyyah always looks away from the interiority of language to enact a consciousness 
pertinent to the smooth space – transitory, resistant, subject to the exterior and looking for 
‘transversal interconnections’ in the politics they find themselves in (Braidotti 2011, 186). In 
closing, Abu Hamdan emphatically concludes: 
 
Taqiyyah is the infra-politics that plays out in the minutia of human utterance. … 
Taqiyyah is not a minorities’ claim to an identity and State of one’s own, but rather a 
claim to Statelessness; it is not the right to rule the land, but a command over the border 
itself. A simultaneously subservient and subversive form of political agency. A contra-
dictionary concoction of simultaneously speaking freely and remaining silent. (Abu 
Hamdan 2014) 
 
 
  
	 62	
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Chapter Three 
Codification, Desire, and Transgenetic Technology: 
On Vanouse and Spiess/Strecker’s works 
 
 
It was when I said  
‘Words are not forms of a single word.  
In the sum of the parts, there are only the parts.  
The world must be measured by eye’ 
Wallace Stevens, ‘On the Road Home’ (2009) 
 
 
This chapter continues the queries into the materiality and codification of language, albeit 
‘language’ of a different kind, namely that of the human genome. Or following the new 
materialist method proposed, we shall start not from negative bifurcation but rather from the 
creative undifferentiated state before processes of bifurcation, codification and reduction under 
the scientific capture, which in this case implies the materiality and efficacy of life matters. 
Why is the context of science, and the artistic probing into science interesting for the analysis? 
It shows the underlying interlocking relation between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’. For the mechanism 
of reductionism is operative as much in the cultural realm and social sciences, including 
language, social norms like family, and social constructions like gender and race, as it is in 
science. For this, this chapter draws on DNA profiling and DNA as a book of life in the popular 
imagination, as well as more recent debates in transgenetic engineering. This chapter aims to 
achieve a cultural perspective on these developments. As Dolphijn and van der Tuin point out, 
new materialism is firmly engaged in the rewriting of events that are usually only of interest to 
natural scientists, because a new materialist perspective on ‘nature’ is transposable to the study 
of ‘culture’ and vice versa, notwithstanding the fact that these transpositions are not unilinear 
(Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 91).  
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A darkly humorous opening teaser to this chapter, borrowed from the novel and film 
The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy: having taken 7.5 million years to ponder ‘the ultimate 
answer to life, the universe, and everything,’ the super computer announces its final calculation 
to a large, impatient audience: ‘42’. Naturally, everyone is dazed, confused and disappointed. 
Upon registering this, the super computer explains that the question isn’t clear enough, and that 
in order to provide an answer to the ultimate question, a computer infinitely more complex is 
needed, one that would comprise organic life, and that, incidentally, this computer should be 
called: ‘Earth’. (Adams 1979) In other words, the ultimate computer is the bio-chemico-
physical sphere of the Earth itself. This is, of course, an ironic take on computation: if a super 
computer were capable of simulating absolutely everything, it would have to be absolutely 
everything itself. The underlying cultural problematic here is our deep, posthuman belief that 
everything is information and that, as Katherine Hayles has pointed out, information circulates 
unchanged between the different material substrates (Hayles 1999, 1), instead of the substrates 
both changing and being changed by the circulating information.  
With this in mind, in this chapter I set out to examine the politics of the DNA codes and 
the transgenetic engineering technology as related to notions of life and death, the organic and 
the inorganic, the temporal and the material strata of sex and reproduction. I do so through the 
prism of two artistic positions: Paul Vanouse’s Suspect Inversion Center (2011) and Klaus 
Spiess and Lucie Strecker’s Hare’s Blood + (2014). Vanouse’s work challenges the veracity of 
the DNA as evidence in crime investigation thereby revealing how biopolitical power 
overcodifies the material strata of the DNA to take control of life. Spiess/Strecker, for their part, 
stage an auction of transgenetic chimera whose organic ‘death’ critiques the virtualisation of 
value in affect economy, and the real subsumption of ‘life itself’ under biotechnology. Life is 
rendered informational and measured by its energy expenditure and cost of reproduction, 
heralding a desire of self-reproduction: parthenogenesis. Yet exactly the capitalistic desire of 
desire points to a possible double-folding to the feminine intensive desire in the primitive sex 
before two-parent sex, suggesting that the inorganic becoming of the chimera harbours 
subversive potential to undermine the necropolitics of genetic engineering technology. 
 
3.1. Overcodification and DNA as Signifier 
 
3.1.1. Paul Vanouse’s works 
 
Paul Vanouse’s installations and live performances often turn around biopolitics and the 
epistemological limit of biotechnologies. In his 2002 installation Relative Velocity Inscription 
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Device, Vanouse used the DNA imaging technology including gel electrophoresis to render 
visible the DNA segments of his partially Jamaican family members. Each of the samples 
passing through the gel electrophoresis made a moving banding pattern in which light and dark 
transversed fluorescent-coloured bands visible to the naked eye, while simultaneously 
producing a racing effect. The artist intervened in the visualisation of the DNA by coupling his 
family members with their respective moving banding patterns, effectively creating a racing 
game to test the ‘fitness’ of his family members, thus alluding not only to the cultural myth of 
the ‘fitter’ (Jamaican) race, but also acting as a poignant reminder that DNA studies harken 
back to racial studies. In his 2007-2010 installation Latent Figure Protocol, Vanouse 
purposefully subverted the DNA imaging process by adding enzymes to manipulate the 
outcome of the banding pattern and crafting them into cultural symbols such as a ☺or ©. This 
strange synthesis of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ raised questions about the expressivity of the DNA 
itself, while, at the same time, taking the authenticity of the DNA imaging technology to issue.   
In similar vein, Suspect Inversion Center (2011) is a staged, fully functional laboratory 
and a live performance where the audience witness the laboratory processes of constructing 
historical DNA fragments of the alleged murderer O. J. Simpson with the aid of the artist’s own 
DNA. (Fig. 3.1) In front of the audience, the artist and his assistant complete each step of the 
process including injection, separation, and imaging using wet lab tools, which amounts to a 
performative moment based on precision and procedurality. The macro-level blends into the 
micro, where the operation of the two ‘scientists’ is augmented by their physical relation to the 
‘set’ – the tubes, liquids and gels, mediated by the subtlety and precision of touch. (The next 
chapter on Geumhyung Jeong will continue this discussion on man-machine dynamism in a 
relational and desiring network.) Though this may be the most basic routinely operation in a 
real laboratory, here the scientific instruments and materials are so tangible that they exert a 
kind of immediacy in the performative moment, especially when one thinks of the state-of-the-
art laboratories today where biological experiments are increasingly computerised and 
automated. (Electrophoresis remains one of the common methods of separation and detecting 
for DNA profiling today.) Even the treatment of the biological waste cannot be taken for granted 
in an art context as in a science laboratory. The audience may rightfully ask, when and where 
does the performance end? Where do the remainders of the performance go? The laboratory 
process obviously involves different processes, goals, temporality and modes of representation, 
while being implicated in larger cultural contexts that co-determine scientificity. Putting this on 
display affords a performative reading of the actants, both human and non-human, both material 
and conditional. All actants ‘take their form and acquire their attributes as a result of their 
	 65	
relations to other entities’ (Law 1993, 3) and establish a relational materiality through which 
performativity in the expanded sense (as put forward in the introduction chapter) comes about. 
The other ‘performance’ takes place in the scientific process itself: the behavior of the 
DNA segments. The constructed DNA is made visible through the imaging process based on 
the above-mentioned gel electrophoresis technique, where long chains of DNA are cut into 
smaller pieces using restriction enzymes. These DNA pieces contain sequences that vary greatly 
among unrelated individuals, making them the perfect base for DNA profiling. The obtained 
fragments are subsequently separated as they are run through the electrically charged agarose 
gel field, with shorter sequences moving further away from the original spot and longer 
sequences moving closer to the original, thus marking up the DNA profile used in forensic 
studies or for parental clarification. Playing with the acronym of CSI (crime scene 
investigation), Suspect Inversion Center, or SIC, situates itself at the intersection of laboratory 
sciences and crime investigation. Using various probes and enzymes to modify the 
fragmentation of his own DNA material, Vanouse succeeded in creating a banding pattern 
identical to that of O. J. Simpson’s, the notorious acquitted murderer. Described as ‘the most 
publicised trial in history’ by the USA Today, Simpson’s trial was also one of the first trials in 
which DNA profiling played a prominent role.   
Discussing the motivation behind his practice, Vanouse draws on a statement made by 
a FBI science spokesman who equated DNA profiling with the use of fingerprints, so that during 
the trial, the jury may use the available evidence to identify ‘one individual to the exclusion of 
all others’ (Vanouse 2011, 61). As Vanouse rightly points out, the FBI spokesperson did not 
care about the politics of DNA analysis, rather, the ‘jury’s belief was their main concern’ 
(Vanouse 2011, 61). DNA profiling is a widely used tool in criminal investigation since the 
1980s. However, despite its seeming reliability in the popular view, the accuracy of DNA 
profiling depends on many factors, including how the DNA samples get to the crime scene, so 
the labs normally demand a large quality of crime scene samples with the suspect’s DNA. It is 
the seeming authenticity of DNA profiling that Vanouse undermines through the meticulously 
staged, detailed enactment of the laboratory process and the fabrication of a fake signifier. The 
understanding of the DNA as a signifier of a particular reality, be it identity or disease, stands, 
in popular imagination, in contrast to notions of content and expression, which I will use in 
conjunction with Luciana Parisi’s three-tiered construction of biophysical, biocultural and 
biodigital, also known as ‘abstract sex’ to undermine the reductionist tendency of reading genes 
as signs and to trace the discursive movements at multiple sites and on multiple levels around 
DNA and life. 
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3.1.2. Abstract Sex and Meta-Stable Bodies 
 
In investigating abstract sex, Parisi draws on the feminist politics of desire, or the micropolitics 
of becoming-woman. She situates the politics of desire in the biophysical, biocultural and 
biodigital strata through a careful reading of the history of biology and genetic technology. Her 
alternative conceptual frame of abstract sex radically redefines sex and body based on a 
continuum between three levels of sex: the cellular level or biophysical sex (bacterial sex), 
human or biocultural sex (heterosexual mating), and bio-technological or biodigital sex 
(cloning). (Parisi 2004, 12) These three levels are linked through the manifestation of a non-
discharge-based desire for becoming, in other words, by the proliferation of information 
exchanged via the (unnatural) mixtures of bodies and sexes. Different bodies-sexes co-exist and 
enfold to make up the human body – the bacterial body, the nucleic cell’s bodies, the multi-cell 
organisms’ bodies, some of which replicate by themselves while others participate in genetic 
trading and mixtures. A body is thus defined by ‘metastable relations between microcellular 
and multicellular bodies, the bodies of animals and humans, the bodies of society’ as well as by 
the ‘technological bodies merging and unleashing new mutating compositions’ (Parisi 2004, 
27). On each level, this meta-stable state, that defines the composition and organisation of 
bodies, depicts the body as non-holistic, as noted by Gilles Deleuze:  
 
The logos is a huge Animal whose parts unite in a whole and are unified under a 
principle or a leading idea; but the pathos is a vegetal realm consisting of cellular 
elements that communicate only indirectly, only marginally, so that no totalisation, no 
unification, can unite this world of ultimate fragments. (Deleuze 1972, 174–175)  
 
The logos informs the common understanding of the human body. Descartes, for 
example, sees living organisms as assemblages of machines. Such a machinic and reductionist 
understanding of the human body feeds into popular imagination and contributes to the 
misleading view that with the Human Genome Project which completed in 2003, we can piece 
together the secret of our existence as in a puzzle. Many media portrayed the sequencing of the 
genome as deciphering the ‘book of life’. The ‘book of life’ reference is not unfounded. There 
has been a structural linguistic view that likens DNA to language, pairing nucleotides and 
letters, and codons and words (Jakobson 1973). I do not wish to say that this is not without 
merit, but as the previous chapter has shown in regard to linguistics, it is a cultural construction 
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that rather disregards the materiality of language. And here too, it does not account for the 
complexity and materiality of DNA.  
The public discourses have evolved much further to date, and more and more attention 
is turned toward other non-genetic or non-nucleic factors. So this part of the dissertation is a 
cultural observation based on a historical frame of understanding DNA and heredity. As a 
cultural reflection, the scientific relevance of it may be constantly updated, but the methodology 
and rigour can be applied to new contexts. In this sense, we will see that the non-genetic factors 
in heredity are not without problems. And with the rise of transgenetic engineering, a new tide 
of reductionism is on the rise.  
The figuration of the vegetal realm reminds us that the human body cannot be reduced 
to a unified organisation, to a sum of discrete parts, and certainly not a sum that can be explained 
through our genes, as poignantly noted by the super computer in The Hitchhiker's Guide to the 
Galaxy. New materialist scholar Diana Coole identifies that these emerging fields of genetic 
studies oblige new materialists to recognise the interactions of different orders of matter: The 
unexpectedly small number of genes that geneticists actually found compelled them to abandon 
the explanatory framework of simple genetic determinism and to acknowledge that an 
organism’s particular properties and susceptibilities are produced through complex interactions 
between genes and a host of other factors such as hormones, neurochemical stimuli, dietary 
intake, and environmental conditions. This has in turn prompted a reappraisal of organisms as 
discrete, autonomous units with relatively tidy, bounded causal patterns. (Coole 2010, 17)  
At the same time, new materialists should to be alert that materialities are always already 
material-cultural constellations, and there is constant need to reassess the cultural discourses 
constructed around them. For example, the field of epigenetics, where ‘epi’ stands for being ‘on 
top of’ has shown that many tangible and intangible factors co-determine inheritable 
characteristics that are beyond the changes in the DNA sequence. It should be noted, however, 
that the potential of epigenetics to rescue life from DNA determinism is subject to a new kind 
of determinism, that of social and behavioural circumstances. For example, one campaign called 
‘Begin Before Birth’ from the Imperial College London portrays how stress and anxiety during 
pregnancy are correlated to troublesome behaviours in the kids later, implying a new correlation 
and determinism between social class and social behaviours and the wellbeing of one’s 
offspring. 
Despite the complexity of inheritance, virtual DNA codes still occupy a privileged 
position in popular imagination. Behind this view is the scientific rendering of the world in 
terms of telos and linearity, which Parisi interrogates by placing the emphasis on non-linear 
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developments across three strata, thereby challenging the supposedly linear evolution or 
progression from bacterial DNA trading, to genetic recombination processes of animal and 
human reproduction, and, finally, to transgenetic operations such as cloning.  
How could the symbiotic relations, the continuum between the different levels of order 
(biophysical, biocultural and biodigital) look like? We may find some hints from geneticist 
Albert Jacquard in his expanded notion of ‘life’ as, in the words of performance scholar 
Schneider, ‘the basic propensity of all matter to mime’ (Schneider 2015, 11). Jacquard writes, 
‘What appeared 3 billion years ago was not “life,” but a molecule that happened to be endowed 
with the capacity to make a copy of itself – to reproduce. This capacity is due to its double-
helix structure and the process is not particularly mysterious; it is the result of the same 
interactions between atoms as those which are at work in all other molecules’ (Jacquard 1998, 
33–34). In this sense, an isomorphism in an expanded sense can be found: the fashion in which 
actions on different levels are addressed may be a similar way. 
This scientific fact affirms the primary force of interaction at play on the nucleus level 
and on the atom level. This cloning of the cell of bacteria, in the very early moment of ‘life’ on 
earth, constitutes for Parisi a ‘bacterial sex’ and expresses a non-anthropocentric form of desire. 
At the same time, it resonates with Spinoza’s conatus as the perseverance of a thing in being 
(Spinoza 1992), and Whitehead’s ‘conceptual initiative’ or ‘the origination of conceptual 
novelty’ (Whitehead 1929, 102), which highlights the active self-transformation of entities. 
From this moment on, ‘life’ goes on, but not necessarily in a linear fashion. In an effort 
to account for a non-linear development of abstract sex, Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan’s 
theorisation of endosymbiosis offers an important insight: symbiotic and parasitic relations 
precede the appearance of nucleic DNA and sexual reproduction but co-exist with the latter as 
a form of continuing the life of a cell. In other words, bacterial and cellular beings, though 
seemingly belonging to different stages in the linear progression of evolution, have a mutual 
interest in each other’s continued existence (Margulis and Sagan 1986). Based on Margulis and 
Sagan’s study, Parisi identifies the connection between the two states of cell separation – 
mitosis and meiosis – as ‘an intensive extension of microbial sex and reproduction’ (Parisi 2004, 
79). Mitosis, through which most human cells and animal cells are produced, is the cell division 
by which the chromosomes self-replicate in the parent cell so that each of the two daughter cells 
gets the same set of chromosomes. Meiosis is the process of cell division where the 
chromosomes in the parent cell self-replicate once while the cell divides twice, resulting in four 
daughter cells, or haploid cells, each containing half the number of the parent cell chromosomes. 
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Meiosis enables genetic variation in sexual reproduction when two haploid cells – sperm and 
eggs – mix the genetic materials from two parents.  
Through the lens of mitosis and meiosis, we can trace a non-linear history of biophysical 
sex and biocultural life. According to Margulis and Sagan’s study, the ancient protists 
(eukaryotic cells) ate each other under harsh circumstances, incorporating each other’s genetic 
material in a process like mitosis (biophysical sex). A new (re)balance is achieved only by a 
reduction of chromosomal duplicity in the process of meiosis, heralding later developments in 
sexed haploids (biocultural sex). (Margulis and Sagan 1986, 152) Importantly, studies show 
that when meiotic sex first spread in protists, sexual patterns appeared nearly identical, 
suggesting that the way genetic materials duplicate and transmit through meiosis leads to the 
formation of sexed organisms in animals and plants, rather than the other way around. Hence 
Parisi claims that meiosis as a cell operation gives rise to sexed forms of organism in plants and 
animals (Parisi 2004, 80). This instance of meiotic sex sheds light on the parallel yet connected 
modes of sex, or exchange and differentiation of genetic materials on both the biophysical and 
the biocultural strata. The implication of the cross-strata continuum of meiotic sex and the 
cultural notions of sex in relation to feminist desire will be explained later. For the moment, I 
will resort to the already mentioned content and expression to examine the linguistic structure 
used in the scientific organisation of sex that simplifies and reduces the aforementioned strata 
(in)to codes. 
 
3.1.3. Content and Expression, or How DNA Becomes Overcodified 
 
As analysed in the last chapter on Lawrence Abu Hamdan’s work, linguist Louis Hjelmslev’s 
proposition positions expression and content on a plane of immanence, which has in turn 
inspired Deleuze and Guattari. In an attempt to replace the dichotomy of the ‘signifier’ and the 
‘signified’, Hjelmslev uses the terms ‘expression’ and ‘content,’ and further clarifies that both 
terms have the intrinsic properties of ‘form’ and ‘substance’. Content refers to the visible states 
of things formed by complex power relations. Expression is the set of articulate statements and 
discourses arising from the field of social interactions. In Hjelmslev’s view, ‘form’ is nothing 
but the shadow of a grid work cast upon a surface of unformed, undifferentiated matter.  
‘Substance’ is matter contained in the now delineated surface grids. Similarly, ‘expression’ is 
but the shadow of a grid imposed upon ‘an amorphous ‘thought’ matter,’ which separates what 
could be called ‘content’ elements from the surface of thought matter. Their designation is 
‘quite arbitrary. Their functional definition provides no justification for calling one, and not the 
other, of these entities expression, or one, and not the other, content’. (Hjelmslev 1969, 126) 
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This means that expression or content, their form or substance are not fundamentally different 
in kind, but are only different designations of levels or degrees. Brian Massumi interprets 
Hjelmslev in the following way: ‘there are any number of forms of content and forms of 
expression, each with their own substance or specific materiality’; further, between a form of 
content and a form of expression ‘there is only the process of their passing into each other: in 
other words, an immanence. In the gap between content and expression is the immanence of 
their mutual “deterritorialisation”’ (Massumi 2002a, xviii). 
To understand the dynamic relation between expression and content in the social field, 
Deleuze and Guattari draw on Foucault’s analysis on the production of delinquency, which 
points to the penal law as the form of expression and delinquency as the substance of expression, 
and the prison as the form of content and the prisoners as the substance of content (Young 2013, 
140). The performativity in and of the social field, in this case, pronouncing the sentence, is 
what binds the content and expression through their mutual deterritorialisation. This 
performativity underlies the operation of biopolitics in Foucault’s study of how human beings 
are socialised into subject positions through the institutionalisation of discourses, and how life 
is managed and governed through the operation of power. Extrapolating the notion of 
expression and content, Parisi suggests that a similar dynamism is present on the immanent 
plane of genetic materials. She locates the form of expression in genotypes, the substance of 
expression in phenotypes, the form of content in chromosomes, and substance of content in 
cytoplasmic and mitotic processes (Parisi 2004, 88). The expression, or the ‘decoded’ 
genotypes, characterise an organism’s identity, which is in a perpetual process of 
deterritorialisation with regard to content, in other words, the chromosomes that carry them. 
Here, genotypes refer to the genetic composition, or the DNA codes of eukaryotic cells of 
humans, animals and plants, commonly held as the sole key to the secret of our (human) being. 
Yet there are other, non-nucleus-based forms of heredity, for instance through mitochondria in 
the cytoplasm, which also possess genomes passing through the maternal lineage, whose 
molecular mechanism has remained elusive to scientific studies. However, studies have 
suggested that the human mitochondria might have come from bacteria with an ancient history, 
and were only later incorporated into the eukaryotic cells. In this sense, mitochondria are a very 
ancient form of being preceding many other forms of life yet living in endosymbiosis with us. 
This means the distinction between nucleus/chromosome (form of content) and 
cytoplasm/mitochondria (substance of content) is ‘not a boundary but a threshold between 
parallel networks of sex and reproduction (nucleic and mitochondrial)’ (Parisi 2004, 78). 
What overcodifies the multicellular forms of content and expression (the chromosomes 
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and the genotype) is a ‘regime of signs,’ through which biophysical processes become linguistic 
signs on the biocultural stratum. Parisi puts it thus: 
 
Overcoding implies that the ‘[f]orm of expression becomes linguistic rather than 
genetic’. On this new level of organisation, expression no longer operates through 
genetic connections, but entails the emergence of a new order above the layers of the 
genotype. This new order of expression is constituted by comprehensible and 
transmittable symbols that convey a superlinearity: the capacity to synthesise all codes-
milieus’ relations into a sufficiently deterritorialised system of signs. In particular, this 
order defines the capacity of the scientific world to translate all particles, codes and 
territorialities of the organic strata into a new order of signs. […] It involves an 
abstraction (virtualisation or potentialisation) of particle-signs on a new level of 
relations, producing a new organisation (decodification and deterritorialisation) of 
forms and substances of content and expression. (Parisi 2004, 89) 
 
This overcodification imposes a linguistic character on genotype and all its associated 
material processes, disregarding the mutual deterritorialisation between the content and 
expression and enforcing each to form its own organisation. It further transforms these 
immanent intensities into extendible entities – signifiers, so that on this new level of 
organisation, the abstracted entity of DNA sequences or genotypes is taken conceptually as a 
signifier for phenotypes, be it identity or a particular illness. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, the 
imperialism of the signifier ‘challenges exegesis in the name of recitation, pure textuality, and 
superior ‘scientificity (scientificité)’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 208). Furthermore, the 
consequence of overcodification is an extension of Western intellectual history – a certain 
bifurcational thinking, using genotype to access the realm beyond (phenotype) without seeing 
the difference between the two as form and substance of the same expression.  
 
A number of scholars have contested the seeming indisputability of science through 
anthropological reflections and philosophy of science.  Scientist and Nobel prize laureate 
François Jacob has made the following observations on the life sciences, ‘like the other natural 
sciences, contemporary biology has had to discard numerous illusions. It no longer searches for 
truth; instead, it constructs its own truth’ (Jacob 1997). In Laboratory Life: The Construction 
of Scientific Facts (1979), Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar shows that the practice of science, 
which is ‘a body of practices widely regarded by outsiders as well as organised, logical and 
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coherent, in fact consists of a disordered array of observations with which scientists struggle to 
produce order’ (Latour and Woolgar 1979, 36). Scientificity is therefore constituted as an order 
imposed on material setups to the extent that they can be reproduced.  
In his study on Pasteur in The Pasteurization of France (1988), Latour extends his 
critical examination into the institutions around science that codetermine scientificity. Latour’s 
study of Louis Pasteur shows how his genius lies not just in the discovery of the microbial 
transmission of disease in the mid-nineteenth century, but also in taking advantage of the 
different interests of ‘farmers, army doctors, hygienists, the press, France nationalism, cows, 
industrialists, popular journals, transport experts and the French Academy, as well as the 
microbes themselves’ (Lushetich 2016, 237). Science never occupies the objective space 
outside of the world, from where it critically examines the world, but it is also implicated in the 
networks and connections of the society. Science is therefore successful for it can be assessed 
through ‘the number of points linked, the strength and length of the linkage’ (Latour 1988, 201). 
Vanouse’s SIC critically taps into the network around the DNA, the variety of players 
include those involved in the Simpson trial, the prosecutor, detective, jury members, the judge, 
and also popular media, the public sentiment, as well as class difference and racialism at large. 
All of which have contributed to the infrastructure of (dis)belief and the construction of 
scientificity. 
Another example here is from the cultural-philosophical perspective pertaining to 
matter. It demonstrates how scientific overcodification operates to carve out stem cells as an 
entity from a whole set of material processes pertaining to élan vital, the vital force of life, an 
‘impulse which thrust life into the world, which made it divide into vegetables and animals, 
which shunted the animal on to suppleness of form’ (Bergson 1998, 132). Drawing on the élan 
vital, Jane Bennett writes that she had a revelation from reading the National Institutes of Health 
2001 Report on Stem Cells and that she was surprised by two claims. The first is that no one 
yet knows whether ‘embryonic stem cells’ exist as such in human embryos in the womb, that 
is, whether they have a presence before they are extracted from blastocysts and placed in a new, 
laboratory-generated milieu. The second is that it is also uncertain whether even the embryonic 
stem cells produced in the lab are in fact ‘homogeneous and undifferentiated.’ Bennett casts 
this questioning of the actual existence of embryonic stem cells in the light of materiality in 
Bergson, where ‘a flow, an indivisible continuum of becomings whose protean elements are not 
only exquisitely imbricated in a flowing environment but also are that very flow.’ (Bennett 
2009, 78) Importantly, she examines her own natural inclination to conceive stem cells as 
discrete entities existing in a body that, again, is usually unquestionably conceived as 
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physiological mechanism. She asks, ‘If it turns out that there are no ‘embryonic stem cells’ in 
vivo, this may be because an embryo is not a collection of discrete parts, perhaps not even of 
protoparts or preformed possibilities, and that it is only in the closed system of the lab that what 
Bergson called the “indivisible continuity” of life allows itself to be sliced and diced into 
“embryonic stem cells”’ (Bennett 2009, 92). Here too, we see how the predisposition by way 
of framing the question lies fundamentally in the way science interacts with the world. As 
analysed by Latour in Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through 
Society, this is exactly when scientific experiments ‘produce the nature whose existence they 
predicate as their condition of possibility’ (Hayles 1999, 8-9). 
Even though the precise laboratory procedure is beyond the focus of this article, and 
that DNA imaging entails a different set of procedures than stem cell isolation, it is important 
to draw a cultural philosophical reading inspired by Bennett. In a way, this ‘slicing’ and ‘dicing’ 
of the indivisible continuity of life is one perspective on growth and evolution, a string of light 
cast upon and delineating an amorphous flow of material, inseparable content and expression, 
as it were. The laboratory sciences foreground discrete, identifiable entities in order for 
intervention, modification and experimentation, even when or precisely because this process 
artificially allows a certain perspective on things. This is not to discredit science, but to chart 
its epistemological limits in relation to what conditions life.  
 
Inspired by Vanouse’s works, this chapter observes the discourses around science by 
thinking through images and artistic production. It does not aim to tell the ‘truth’ about science, 
rather, it looks at the overcodifying cultural constructions around ‘truth’ by unveiling the 
reductionist tendency regarding DNA as language or book of life. It is on this level of scientific 
overcodification that Vanouse’s work critically intervenes. His aptly enacted 
performance/scientific process de-codifies the overcodified view of DNA through the 
performativity of scientific processes and through a conceptual questioning of the linguistic 
view of genetics. In the performance, the laboratory settings group the organisation of bodies 
(technical and epistemic, organic and non-organic) into new relations deterritorialised from the 
plane of immanence, which Hans-Jörg Rheinberger critiques as the scientists’ tendency of 
effacing the means and media necessary to bring the phenomena of their scientific interest into 
being (Rheinberger 2011, 95-99). Vanouse performs exactly this new organisation of bodies 
that generate new sets of abstracted meanings by following meticulous laboratory procedures. 
The twist is that he produces a fake artefact – a manipulated result of the DNA imaging that 
shows exactly the same patterns as that of O. J. Simpson’s. The artist has thus produced a 
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misleading signifier, a misnomer for a misnomer, effectively de-codifying the regime of 
signifiers from within. The temporary suspension of the epistemology of science in the case of 
DNA as signifier allows the mutual relation between the discursive multiplicities of expression 
and the non-discursive multiplicities of content to reemerge, the mutual deterritorialisation of 
both taking on renewed rigour in the negotiation of a truthful identity.  
The work of Vanouse thus not only criticises the reliability of DNA profiling caught in 
the signifier-signified identification, but also taps into the cultural network around the 
technology with co-determinants such as popular media and the trial by jury system. This 
critical intervention opens up to a larger debate around the relation between nucleic DNA and 
heredity, again rendered in a reductionist frame of the signifier and signified.  
If the DNA as a signifier points to the particularity of identity or pathology, human 
genetics as a discipline after The Human Genome Project has shifted to another level of 
engaging with ‘life itself’ and renders the capture of life in the regime of necropolitics, which, 
following Mbembe, refers to the contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of 
death (Mbembe 2003). For example, research into normalcy informs the decision about which 
lives are worthy of living, and further heralds a whole new era of biodesign, genetic 
engineering, and with that, a new synthesis between power and the capitalisation of life and 
death. 
 
3.2. Inorganic Becoming against Death: Spiess/Strecker’s Hare’s Blood + 
 
3.2.1. Hare’s Blood + Beuys, and ritual  
 
In their 2014 Hare’s Blood +, artists Klaus Spiess and Lucie Strecker perform a ‘ritual’ in the 
form of an auction, in which they introduce a genetically modified organism made with the 
DNA segments of hare’s blood that Joseph Beuys used in his 1974-1977 mixed media work 
Hare’s Blood. (Fig. 3.2) The performance starts with a video documentation showing molecular 
scientists preparing scraps of the dried hare’s blood shrink-wrapped in Beuys’s original mixed-
media work. The video documentation also features an art historian discussing the symbolism 
in Beuys’s works. This is followed by the artists inserting the acquired DNA into a genetically 
modified organism with a standardised genetic sequence – or biobrick – creating a living 
organism encased in a triangular container (that resembles the plastic envelope used by Beuys). 
(Fig. 3.3) The audience is invited to participate in the auction by placing bids to which the living 
organism responds. As the bids raise the amount of injected enzyme, which protects the 
organism from ageing, decreases, thus allowing the organism to decompose.  
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Beuys’s original Hare’s Blood is loaded with symbolic meanings; the hare features 
prominently his other works, such as his 1965 performance How to Explain Pictures to a Dead 
Hare, in which Beuys walked around the gallery explaining his drawings to a dead hare which 
he held in his arm. For Beuys, the hare ‘has a strong affinity to women, to birth and to 
menstruation, and generally to chemical transformation of blood; in carving out from earth a 
habitat to fit its own body shape, the hare demonstrates ‘the movement of incarnation’; as such, 
it is radically different from human’s rationalising tendency and present a thinking that is 
‘sharpened, then transformed, and [that] becomes revolutionary’ (Phaidon 2014). Further, 
Beuys denies biological death as an end, and claims that death is a passage of energy through 
matter that liberates new powers and that a higher level exists for thinking through the liberation 
of death, which the hare embodies as it circulates freely from one level of existence to another 
(Lushetich 2016, 120).  
Beuys was interested in anthropology, shamanism and myth. This was part of a general 
tendency in the works of German-speaking countries between the 1970s and 1980s, when the 
high Conceptualism and Actionism of the time were structured around the referenes of 
anthropology, psychoanalysis, linguistics and various forms of esoteric literature (Deliss 2017, 
93). Beuys claimed, ‘the concept of anthropology must also be extended. There is a basic 
element in this concept: Anthropos, man. It’s very simple: man is in the centre. Today, Levi-
Strauss and others have a different way of looking at anthropology. They turn their attention to 
the past, to myth, not in order to immerse themselves in mythology, but in order to examine it: 
in order to say, for instance, this is how man visualised the world as a whole at a given time. 
Our present-day concept of science is divided up into sectors and needs to be extended. In the 
future, the concept of science must be redefined in holistic terms, in terms of materialism and 
polytheism’ (Deliss 2017, 93). This perfectly anticipated the critique articulated by Latour in 
We Have Never Been Modern (1993). For Latour pre-modern people mixed myth, superstitions, 
the social and the natural indiscriminately while modern science separates these spheres: 
‘Modernisation consists in continually exiting from an obscure age that mingled the needs of 
society with scientific truth in order to enter into a new age that will finally distinguish clearly 
what belongs to atemporal nature and what comes from humans’ (Latour 1993, 71). 
This position on science could be labelled anti-modern or alternative to the modern 
paradigm. However, it does not foreclose us from engaging with it in the context of technology. 
Indeed, the transgressive perspective on non-death in Beuys resonates with a kind of inorganic 
becoming that the analysis of Spiess/Strecker’s work will take us to, in a context of genetic 
engineering and biotechnology. 
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3.2.2. Desire, Death and Capitalism 
 
In contrast to the overcodification of meiotic reproduction in systems of signs critiqued in 
Vanouse’s work, Spiess/Strecker’s work offers a critical perspective on the double fold of 
genetic engineering/biophysical sex under the condition of capitalism. Their work engages the 
three strata described by Parisi: the biophysical bodies that present an ancient form of bacterial 
reproduction preceding two-parent sex; the gendered/racialised body and its reproduction on 
the biocultural level, which is itself a site of biopolitical and sociosymbolic interplay; the body 
in the biodigital age, which is constantly reshaped by biotechnologies begging a critical 
engagement with their political and ethical implications. Simondon calls this relation 
‘transduction,’ an activity of individuation of a physical, biological, mental or social process 
emerging from the metastable relations between two disparate realities (the pre-individual state 
of being and the individuated state of becoming) (Simondon 1992, 313). Parisi stresses the non-
linear nature of the relation between the three strata as they define the meta-stable states of 
bodies and organise sex and reproduction. (Parisi 2004, 11) This non-linear continuum (from 
the variation of bacterial bodies to bio-engineered bodies) sets in motion on each stratum ‘a 
micro level of difference proliferating through the symbiotic engineering of information 
crossing not only species and sexes, but also humans and machines’ (Parisi 2004, 17). Out of 
the meta-stable states of the bodies on all levels the individual individuates and actualises from 
a previous metastable state, Deleuze speaks of this process of disparateness in Simondon as 
follows: ‘the existence of a “disparateness” such as at least two orders of magnitude or two 
scales of heterogeneous reality between which potentials are distributed. Such a pre-individual 
state nevertheless does not lack singularities: the distinctive or singular points are defined by 
the existence and distribution of potentials. An “objective” problematic field thus appears, 
determined by the distance between two heterogeneous orders. Individuation emerges like the 
act of solving such a problem, or – what amounts to the same thing – like the actualisation of a 
potential and establishing of communication between disparates’ (Deleuze 1994, 246). 
 
As shown above, the organic level of meiotic sex is overcodified by the socio-cultural 
organisation of sex. Similarly, the biodigital stratum of the organisation of sex involves 
overcodification of other strata. Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of desire and the three stages of 
history is particularly useful in charting these relations. 
 
In Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of history, the precapitalistic societies code desire 
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through inscription, and the capitalistic machine frees the decoded flow of desire (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983). Inscription entails marking bodies (human, non-human bodies as well as 
abstract bodies) so to create representations of things and to attribute meanings to them, which, 
in turn, represses the flux of desire. This process lies underneath the development of social 
formations, in other words, desire is socialised by coding. Deleuze and Guattari write: ‘[t]he 
primitive territorial sign is self-validating; it is a position of desire in a state of multiple 
connections. It is not a sign of a sign nor a desire of a desire. It knows nothing of linear 
subordination and its reciprocity: neither pictogram nor ideogram, it is rhythm and not form, 
zigzag and not line, artefact and not idea, production and not expression’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983, 203). This position of desire meets a new destiny under the despotic regime in the next 
stage of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of history. The despot appears and imposes a new 
alliance system placing himself in direct filiation with the deity. This can be observed in the 
rise of new spiritual empires, or in cases where a new empire comes to replace an old one. With 
this new system of alliance comes an absolute structure of hierarchy, ‘In the first place, 
graphism aligns itself on the voice, falls back on the voice, and becomes writing. At the same 
time it induces the voice no longer as the voice of alliance, but as that of the new alliance, a 
fictitious voice from beyond that expresses itself in the flow of writing as direct filiation’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 205).  
The biochemical complexity beyond the nucleic DNA can be likened to the primitive 
territorial sign – a ‘position of desire,’ where the coexisting cytoplasmic (somaline) and nucleic 
(germline) reproductions, exchanges of matter, communication, information, and the 
proliferation of differences all pertain to the activity of desire in a state of multiple connections. 
What disrupts this primary position of desire is the process of inscription, analogous to the 
overcodification of the meiotic reproduction and the making of the two-parent sex, which is 
then turned into a disciplinary norm informing sex in the context of social production. 
Furthermore, the direct filiation in the new alliance system implies the cultural image of two-
parent sex and the organic preservation of the germline, in tandem with the ‘death’ of the half 
chromosomes – the haploids not recombined in the two-parent sex and henceforth not preserved 
in the next generation, figuring as organic death. In contrast, reproduction in cytoplasm and 
mitochondria does not involve sexed chromosomes; it presents an order beyond the question of 
organic life and death. In this way, the two-parent sex introduces ‘the constancy of pleasure, 
stopping the dissipation towards the inorganic, [which] deploys the disciplinary link between 
sex and death of the organic composition of capital and human body’ (Parisi 2004, 111). Sex 
and death are brought together in a despotic disciplinary state, which dreads the flow of 
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production and of exchange from the primitive position of desire.  
What decodes biocultural sex is the stratum of biodigital sex, which, in a strange motion, 
folds back to the earlier order of biophysical sex, and detaches ‘from organic death through an 
autonomous assemblage of desire-power of reproduction’ (Parisi 2004, 99). Taking the model 
of cytoplasm and mitochondria reproduction, this parthenogenesis is a decoded desire to desire, 
a power to self-reproduce, devoid of two-parent sex. In a similar conceptual movement in the 
Deleuzian philosophy of history, what overcomes the despot state is the capitalist machine 
which captures flows of desire by making them into a structural element of its own operation 
through the appropriation of production, and by conjuring the decoded flow of desire. Capital 
begets capital, bypassing the production of commodities. The capitalist machine works by 
conjunction to decoded flow of desire and to deterritorialised labour, and ‘engenders for its own 
part an enormous machinic surplus value by mobilising the resources of knowledge and 
information capital, and finally because it absorbs the greater part of the surplus value produced’ 
(Parisi 2004, 120). The most prominent example of decoded flow of desire and deterritorialised 
labour in the capital market is the creation of derivatives as a financial product, which Randy 
Martin sees as no more an instantiation of ‘the disassembly of some whole into parts and the 
bundling together of those attributes into something that moves away from or independently of 
its source’ than the social logic of derivatives itself (Martin 2015, 7). Parisi suggests: 
‘[e]scaping the law of filiation, the commodity interrupts energy-forces from being channelled 
towards genital reproduction, intensifying reproducibility without discharge: feminine 
parthenogenesis (cytoplasmic sex)’ (Parisi 2004, 120).  
Reflected in the contemporary technological advancements as a means and an end of 
production, this parthenogenesis desire can be traced in cloning, transgenetic and other genetic 
engineering experiments. As exemplified by Dolly the sheep, the only higher organism 
reproduced without reproduction to date, cloning entails inserting the nucleus of an adult 
organism with all its genes into an empty egg, in order to reproduce a perfectly functioning 
offspring with the same set of genes. In theory, this process could be repeated ad infinitum: 
clones made from clones from clones —reproductions without reproduction (Mukherjee 2016). 
Recent inventions in genetic engineering technology manifest this parthenogenesis 
desire ever more clearly. In 2012, Doudna and Charpentier deployed a decoy technique called 
CRISPR/Cas9 to effectively cut the DNA at targeted positions on genes within organisms, 
which makes is possible to add a new genetic code to the genome. This could combat genetically 
governed diseases or even cure them. At the same time, the wish for ‘enhancement surgeries’ 
surges, such as changing the eye colour or alcohol tolerance of one’s offspring (Cyranoski 
	 79	
2015). As more DNA sequences are found to correlate to particular characteristics, we are closer 
to targeted evolution. There are technological huddles and ethical barricades around genetic 
engineering technology that would alter genes in reproductive cells, producing transgenetic 
organisms with permanently modified genomes. Yet some scientists are optimistic that the 
technological challenges such as establishing a reliable human embryonic stem cell, perfecting 
the precision of the genomic editing, or finding ways to achieve the intentional permanent 
modification of the genome in human organisms are on the verge of being solved. Backed by 
technological advancement, genetics research crosses the threshold of pathological research, 
stepping into normalcy research – the genetics of race, gender, sexuality, intelligence, 
temperament, and personality. Yet as Sidharta Mukherjee emphatically puts it in the closing 
statement in his book The Gene ‘[m]utants would be eliminated but so would human variation. 
Infirmities might disappear, but so might vulnerability. Chance would become mitigated, but 
so, inevitably, would choice’ (Mukherjee 2016).  
Not only scholars of science and technology studies have invariably taken caution on 
such technological developments, but also scholars of cultural studies, gender and racial studies, 
have articulated their concern for the hegemonic powers at play and the ever growing groups 
of subjugated minorities it produces. What has once harboured subversive potentials – 
minoritarian politics – is now incorporated into the operation of biocapitalism, so that power 
structures today increasingly take on minoritarian and decentralised characters. Body is the very 
location where fragmentation and decentralisation takes place. Not just the liberal subject that 
is held accountable on social and economic levels, it is now the fragmentation of the body and 
affects that are mined for value. Rosi Braidotti uncovers the far-reaching implications of 
biopolitics in the increasing fragmentation of life itself, characterised by the distribution of 
power and control exerted onto entities that are subcategorical to the woman subject. This is 
achieved by a range of means, including new forms of reproduction challenging the traditional 
notion of motherhood such as surrogate mothering, and the promise of cloning technology that 
seems to do away with generational difference. She observes, ‘We seem to have slipped from 
the naturalistic paradigm, which is in itself a welcome relief from earlier metaphysical dualism, 
into the ever-receding fragmentation and exploitative traffic in organic parts’ (Braidotti 2011, 
184). 
The outburst in popular science and mass media on ethical issues surround cloning and 
gene editing technologies overshadows other sets of more differentiated problems they are 
embedded in, most notably for the gendered and racialised subjects. On the one hand, it 
downplays the hard-won agency of female feminists as Braidotti rightly suggests; on the other 
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hand, it paints a determinist picture of the world in which genetic codes are equalled with 
specific biological traits, an assumption that is as reductionist as the structuralist and linguistic 
view of the world.  
The assimilation of power and control from the macro to the micro parallels the 
transformation from the disciplinary society to the control society, which Deleuze has since 
long anticipated (Deleuze 1992). No longer based on institutional discipline, the society of 
control exercises control through continuous modulations from within. Galloway and Thacker 
analyse the characteristic of control as both within and without, as they put it, ‘The quandary is 
this: no one controls networks, but networks are controlled’ (Galloway and Thacker 2007, 39). 
Though not of the same scale, one could perhaps see the ever more fragmented body parts in 
an abstract kind of network of biopolitics and technology, involving both material, fleshy body 
parts and also technological components of visible and invisible kinds, extracting information 
and determining the worthiness of one person or sub-personal parts. Here, what Braidotti 
alarmingly voices against is coming true: the disembodiment on the level of organs, especially 
in light of reproduction. Or ‘from the interchangeability of organs to the symmetry - and 
therefore the complementarity – of the sexes, we witness the rehabilitation of one of patriarchy’s 
most persistent fantasies’ (Braidotti 2011, 185). This iteration of the patriarchal order takes 
place in the microscopic operation and in the technology-aided, deterministic vision of the bio 
matters devoid of its own vital materiality. It echoes once again Bergson’s warning of the 
extensive projection of the world, in which the parts make up wholes may be held accountable 
and therefore manipulate.  
Now, is there a feminist alternative to biopolitics which captures the body on its many 
different levels? Braidotti gives a hint of an alternative paradigm for conceptualising the loss 
of unity of the body. This version of conceptualising the body is based on Spinozist notion of 
‘bodies as collective assemblages of forces or intensities stabilised or bound for a limited period 
in space and time’, and as such frees the body from the form-content mould constructed by 
culture for much of history (Braidotti 2011, 186). Braidotti writes, ‘The notion of relation 
emerges as the organising principle to rethink the unity of the body in terms of the specificity 
of certain organic actualisations and the framing of levels of intensity such an entity is capable 
of sustaining’ (Braidotti 2011, 186). Relation is key here, as an indicator of the assemblage of 
organs and their social-symbolic meanings, it should be able to point us to other potential 
actualisations.  
For example, it is possible to point to the problematic of technological determinism by 
examining the matter in relations, a (new) materialist method that runs throughout my analysis. 
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Relations can be ill-natured. The specific changes made possible by gene-editing technology 
may cause other unforeseeable changes elsewhere as the expression in biological features is 
determined by much more factors, for the microscopic relations between the organs concerned 
and unrelated may form unhealthy relations, as yet unforeseen in science.  
Even though it may appear at odds with Braidotti’s feminist agenda against the reduction 
and exchangeability of body parts, the notion of ‘abstract sex’ aptly identifies the critical 
impasse between embodiment and disembodiment theory as seen in the feminist project of 
speaking from embodied subject positions and the outcry of the removal of such embodied 
subject positions in the face of technological intervention on the biological bodies. Hence, it is 
important to view the continuity of feminist desire in the current stage of biotechnology. 
Abstract sex is a third way out of the impasse between embodiment and disembodiment, 
mapping ‘the emergence of a new (but ancient) kind of sex and reproduction, linking these 
mutations to microcellular processes of information transmission that involve the unnatural 
mixtures of bodies and sexes. The speeding up of information trading, not only across sexes, 
but also across species and between humans and machines, exposes the traits of a non-climactic 
(non-discharging) desire spreading through a matrix of connections that feed off each other 
without an ultimate apex of satisfaction’ (Parisi 2004, 4). 
The multiplicity of the body to include the politics and desires of bodies at different 
scales paint a dramatically different image of the body as per first waves of feminists. It is not 
a matter, however, of which school of thinking is right or wrong, rather, it exposes different 
priority arrangements conditioned by different times. While the post-war era feminists fought 
for recognition and female femininity through embodied politics, and later feminists created 
intersectional politics with the racially othered people, we could see that bodies nowadays are 
implicated into networks of technology and of power and desire that may be masculine or 
feminine without it being attributed to male or female social constructions. 
The desire for desire manifested in transgenetic engineering emerges out of a masochist 
assemblage. Following Deleuze, masochism is an intensity of desire that marks the autonomy 
of desire from the libido of sexual genitality, sexual reproduction and pleasure, and can be 
witnessed in other forms of reproduction, for example, capitalist reproduction and technical 
reproduction (Deleuze 1971). As such, it conveys, paradoxically at first sight, ‘a feminine 
intensive desire’ that Parisi speaks about. Death figures differently in the masochist assemblage 
of intensive reproduction and sex: ‘death exposes the potential of a body to become rather than 
the finitude of the organism’ (Parisi 2004, 98-99). Therefore, the proliferation of cytoplasmic 
reproduction, characterised by the autonomy from two-parent sex and nucleic reproduction, 
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passes through the threshold of organic death and exposes the potential of the inorganic 
becoming – that is, becoming no longer overcodified in the anthropocentric image and ruled by 
the coupling of sex/pleasure and death. 
We have seen the nonlinear continuum and the organisation of sex through the flow of 
desire in the three strata. It should be noted that this model of abstract desire does not necessarily 
pass moral judgement on the feminine intensive desire. Since ‘artifice is fully a part of Nature’ 
(Deleuze 1988, 124), the task is not to go back to a pre-transgenetic-engineering past, but to 
pose questions such as: how can feminine intensive desire challenge or subvert the existing and 
future technologies? In the inorganic becoming – the ‘ancient’ and biodigital form of 
reproduction, we will see potential for a new, non-human life. 
 
3.2.3. Biodigital Hypernature 
 
This grand return to the inorganic becoming by way of genetic engineering takes us back to 
Hare’s Blood +, a chimera not in the image of the hare itself, but something minoritarian, akin 
to the inorganic becoming of an indeterminate body. The resurrection of advanced living forms 
through DNA engineering is not only technically impossible in complex organisms like the 
humans, due, perhaps, to histones, a protein wrapped around the DNA that etches permanent 
marks on genes so that an aged gene cannot revert to an earlier, pluripotent developmental stage 
as if governed by ‘molecular memory’ (Mukherjee 2016). The reviving of a full body would 
also fall into the biopolitical and late capitalist capture of life on the biodigital stratum.  
Indeed, the capitalist desire for desire is already infused in biotechnology. A history of 
patenting and privatising the gene points to the way in which capitalism passes from the formal 
subsumption of labour to the real subsumption of life. The former is defined by the implication 
of human labour in capitalist machines of production, while the latter is indicated by the internal 
rearrangement and reorganisation of labour processes to meet the demand of capital, hence 
moving beyond human labour to include machinic labour, and ultimately turning the body itself 
into a site of production. The complex interlocking of capitalism, biotechnology and 
necropolitical power takes full control of the body. The patenting of genetic data is one among 
many forms of capitalising on life, as seen in synthetically produced DNA for medical use, or 
in genetically modified crops. Not only are ‘pathological bodies’ subject to medical research, 
and gene therapy, ‘healthy bodies,’ too, are increasingly monitored with the purpose of creating 
an expansive pool of genetic information. The Cohen-Boyer patents on recombinant DNA 
techniques filed in 1974 has accumulated a fortune from licensing the technique to other 
companies and research institutions. Later, the BRCA1 sequence became one of the first 
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sequences to be patented on a human gene sequence in 1998. The patent was invalidated in 
2013 by a US Supreme Court ruling, on the account that naturally occurring DNA segment is 
not eligible for patent merely because it has been isolated. The same ruling however makes 
synthetically-produced complementary DNAs eligible for patenting. More ubiquitously, 
Monsanto has reaped an immense profit from genetically modified crops and biotechnology 
products that affect the general populace in many areas of the world.  
Another form of privatising the gene takes place on our very ‘private’ genes. The 
pharmaceutical companies have vested interests in the pool of patient genetic data for their 
research, and eventually for selling the medicine or genetic engineering technology developed 
back to them to churn out sustained profits. Alarmingly, a Goldman Sachs analysis for their 
biotech clients from April 2018 reads, ‘The potential to deliver “one shot cures” is one of the 
most attractive aspects of gene therapy, genetically engineered cell therapy, and gene editing. 
However, such treatments offer a very different outlook with regard to recurring revenue versus 
chronic therapies. While this proposition carries tremendous value for patients and society, it 
could represent a challenge for genome medicine developers looking for sustained cash flow’ 
(Tae 2018).  While appalling, this statement runs perfectly in line with the neoliberal logic. At 
the same time, accompanying genetic-specific medication is the large-scale adoption of 
diagnostic genetic testing, which creates a loop that returns ‘the recirculation of products (pills, 
testing technologies) back into information (databases, test results, marketing and media 
campaign’ (Thacker 2005, 85). If knowledge is a kind of credit, a promise of what is to come, 
and the unknown circulates as a type of debt, a way in which we are implicated in the works 
and lives of one another (Martin 2015, 4), the informatic capture of life – life understood in 
informatic ways (Clough 2008, 14) – taps exactly into the tension of knowledge and the 
unknown, the empirical and the virtual, the scientific and the creativity of life. This highlights 
the operation of capitalism reflected in exchange value, which holds true for both formal 
(human labour) and real subsumption (life itself).  
In classical Marxian labour theory of value, capital becomes the ‘fully developed’ form 
of exchange-value when it subordinates or subsumes production and reproduction into its 
process of self-expansion, which signals the moment at which ‘the commodity-form of the 
products of labour becomes universal’ and capitalism becomes systemic (Holland 2006, 189). 
Marx insists that labour produces surplus-value, which is not to be understood as cost-
differentials between inputs and outputs of a single production cycle that is decided by the 
capitalists. Surplus value is created because the exchange value of the goods labour produces 
exceeds the exchange value paid for the labour power itself – that is, what it costs to produce 
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(or ‘reproduce’) that labour power. In this way, value is produced in the extended context of the 
system of capitalist production/circulation – and under capitalism, circulation can and must be 
considered ‘an act of production,’ and it arises not from any single cycle of production, but 
from differences between the values of labour power itself over two or more cycles. (Holland 
2006, 191-192)  
This pattern of surplus value creation applies to real subsumption as well. The Goldman 
Sachs report on biotechnology shows exactly how genetic data from the prosumers are mined 
for value and then sold back to the consumers themselves, the surplus value is created through 
genetic and pharmaceutical research, who have an interest of offset the costs and accumulate 
profits in the long run. To push this to the extreme, in real subsumption, capital achieves an 
abstraction of life into ‘life itself;’ ‘an abstraction which reduces life to a new unit for 
negotiating an equivalency between the cost of energy expenditure and its reproduction or 
replacement’ (Clough 2008, 14). Capitalism seeks a reduction of energy resources in the 
informational substrate of the human body and ‘life itself’. Patricia T. Clough puts it succinctly: 
‘With information providing the unit, capital accumulation in the domain of affect is an 
accumulation and an investment in information as the dynamic immanent to matter, its capacity 
for self-organisation, emergent mutation and creation. In this passage from formal to real 
subsumption, the tendencies of capitalism are moved by the techno-ontological postbiological 
threshold.’ (Clough 2008, 17) If Mbembe traces necropolitical domination in the racialised, 
economically and politically disenfranchised bodies that are kept in a form of death-in-life 
(Mbembe 2003, 21), then the dematerialisation of human bodies offers an updated image of 
necropolitics: decoded, depersonalised and exchangeable organs, or ‘organs without bodies’ as 
Rosi Braidotti calls it (Braidotti 2011). (The term is borrowed from the title of a book by Slavoj 
Zizek, by which he critiques Deleuze’s inconsistency in locating the Virtual and Becoming.) 
Imbricated in capitalism, human bodies are subsumed into the production and consumption of 
genetic data in order to reproduce (to be disease-free), ruled by fear and always in debt to the 
self-realising loop of capital circulation. Organs, subjectivity and sex are dislodged and diffused 
in this scheme of necropolitics. Paul Preciado traces that our global biocapitalism – which he 
succinctly calls ‘pharmacopornographic biocapitalism’ – depends on the global diffusion of 
synthetic steroids and technically transformed organs, fluids, cells, pornographic images and 
synthetic psychotropic drugs (Preciado 2013, 33). He hence pronounces that, ‘There is nothing 
to discover in sex or in sexual identity; there is no inside. The truth about sex is not a disclosure; 
it is sexdesign’ (Preciado 2013, 35). The subject is left nowhere to be defined other than the 
hollow ‘no inside’ flooded by ideas, symbols and chemical reactions. As a general movement, 
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abstract sex de-signifies the gendered subjects and specifies other levels on which non-
discharged based sexual desire may float. 
 
In light of this necropolitics and biocapitalism, Spiess/Strecker have created a scenario 
whereby the hare becomes subject to subsumption as both a means and an end of (value) 
production, as opposed to being only the means of (artistic) production in Beuys’s original 
Hare’s Blood. Precisely at this point of real subsumption, the physical, full-bodied reality of 
the hare is effaced by the logic of self-perpetuating production of value, attaching itself to 
virtualised value creation processes through energy-information. In coupling the organism’s 
decomposition with the art prosumer’s confidence in it, the artists reveal how confidence, as an 
essential part of affect economy, configures the organism on the informatic level thereby 
making a deft illustration of the commodification and virtualisation of life itself and the 
underlying mechanism that sustains it. Typically, an auction renders tangible the importance of 
confidence as a form of affect in the capitalist economy: more confidence, more value, which 
is decoupled from the real use value of the commodity. We are reminded of the powerful 
synergy between the virtualisation of capital accumulation in the financial market on the one 
hand, and the proliferation of the biotechnological capture of the body on the other, which marks 
an era where life itself is at stake. At first sight, the design of Spiess/Strecker’s auction subverts 
the virtualisation of value creation/capital accumulation by inserting the correlation of bid value 
and the decomposition of the bid item. As the prosumer confidence rises, the decomposition of 
the organism leads to its organic death. Or does it? Isn’t the organic death of the organism 
always already based on our anthropocentric projection of organic life and death? 
 
Deleuze and Guattari hold that the ultimate destination of the conjunctive desire of late 
capitalism is death itself: ‘death is felt rising from within and desire itself becomes the death 
instinct, latency, but it also passes over into these flows that carry the seeds of a new life’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 223). What could the new life look like? And more importantly, 
who is the new life for? Would we experiment to see, as Claire Colebrook urges, ‘what “we” 
might be like if we diminished our consumptions and productions, if we reduced – perhaps to 
the point of non-being – all those forces that we have, until now, taken to be human? (Colebrook 
2009, 10) What life does Hare’s Blood + hint at, if not at the anthropomorphised and 
overcodified organic death? 
From a multiperspectivist point of view, the artists write, ‘the subsequent rhizomatic 
burst of the GMO yeast may be experienced by the spectators as bodily decomposition, but by 
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the GMO as a satisfying reproduction’ (Spiess and Strecker 2017, 120). Based on his 
anthropological research of Amazonian cultures, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s multispectivism 
proposes that non-human beings such as animals and spirits are humans and continue to be 
humans ‘behind their everyday appearance’ (Viveiros de Castro 2004, 466). Non-human agents 
and humans both perceive the world in the same way; what varies is the world which they see, 
effectively redeeming relationality rather than substantiality as the primary way of relating to 
the world (Viveiros de Castro 2004, 471-472). Based on this principle of ‘one culture, many 
natures’ the artists explore performance as ritual, where the GMO functions as a sacrificial 
element going through organic death, not to invite audience identification, but to make the 
audience realise that they are indeed in the same culture as the GMO (Spiess and Strecker 2017, 
119). Here I’d like to expand on the notion of shared ‘culture,’ which not only implies organic 
death, but also channels an other-than-human desire, in other word, the desire of 
multiplication/decomposition, or inorganic becoming.  
As mentioned above, nucleic DNA is relatively inert, archival, while non-nucleic 
recombination such as mitochondrial recombination makes up the forces of inorganic 
becoming. The latter doesn’t pass through the two-parent regime of chromosomal sex and death, 
hence preceding and eexceeding the chromosomal hierarchies of genetic filiation. (Parisi 2004, 
155) In a strange way corresponding to the forces of inorganic becoming on the biophysical 
stratum, the capitalisation of life itself via the bio-informatic technology proliferates the rate of 
variation, mutation and emergence of new biological organisms. Hence the biodigital sex 
machines’ ‘double fold’ the biophysical machines of unpredictable differentiations. (Parisi 
2004, 159) Yet as promising as the future may seem to those who can afford it, or as dire as it 
might be for the rest, under the threat pf biotechnical capture, this double fold does not come 
without cost. In the projected scenario of mammal cloning, or gene therapy, it is important to 
note that the technique does not just intervene at the nucleic level but necessarily involves 
mitochondria and cytoplasm in the cell as the organism grows, giving rise to possible 
intensifications of mitochondrial recombination, and, potentially, triggering mutations hitherto 
unknown and unimaginable elsewhere in the organism. The risk rises exponentially as we deal 
with the complexity of genetics, given that most phenomes are co-determined by many genes. 
There have been various conservative stances on genetic engineering such as the ‘culture of 
life’ movement, which Bennett has done a careful study on. She points out how the people 
behind ‘culture of life’ are against mechanistic metaphysics like the vitalists, but how they differ 
from the vitalists as they draw on a divine spirit that supposedly animate the matter of the 
embryo, thereby appealing to conservative Christians (Bennett 2009). In contrast to the ‘culture 
	 87	
of life movement,’ this scenario of inorganic becoming is firmly placed on the planes of abstract 
sex, of which humans are made yet do not fully control. Indeed, it entails ‘a symbiotic 
association of bodies of all sorts unleashing the potential of a body to mutate on a hypernature 
of contagious encounters’ (Parisi 2004, 201). As such, it offers the possibility of a non-linear 
overflow of the biopolitical and necropolitcal machines, which, for Parisi, is ‘a reversible 
relation between absolute control or virtual subsumption (the capture of the interval between 
states) and absolute deterritorialisation or molecular recombination of all machines of sex and 
reproduction (biophysical, biocultural and bio-technical machines)’ (Parisi 2004, 159).   
This may offer a fully technologically situated way for the artists to pay tribute to Beuys, 
whose idea of energy and life transgressing organic death distilled in the image of the hare now 
gains a new dimension. Rather than returning to the full-body hare, Hare’s Blood + addresses 
the micro-level desire to become. It is also precisely on this level that the work as a marriage of 
shamanic belief and technology opens up to new ways of conceptualising and relating to matter 
and life. This will have repercussions in the following chapters, as they in variegated ways 
tackle the question of animism and animality, and the desire and violence associated with it.  
 
3.3. Conclusion: Hypernatural Future 
 
If the artifice is fully part of Nature, then we have seen how the endosymbiotic relation 
manifests ‘a hypernatural capacities of a body to become’ (Parisi 2004, 196). The works of 
Vanouse and Spiess/Strecker offer different critical approaches to this hypernature.  
The scientific and cultural discursive organisation re-codes what were indeterminate 
body-sexes in meiotic reproduction into a filiative relation of two-parent sex. The study of 
language, firmly situated in a philosophy of immanence, sheds light on the mutual relation 
between the complex state of things/content and the discursive construct/expression, which in 
the case of DNA, translates into the mutual deterritorialisation between cytoplasmic 
realities/chromosomes and phenotypes/genotypes. In this light, the DNA fingerprint artifice 
crafted in Vanouse’s Suspect Inversion Center, challenges the process of overcodification that 
imposes on the DNA a top-down signifier function ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in the juridical 
context, as evident from the above-mentioned FBI spokesperson’s statement.  
On the biodigital stratum, overcodification renders everything as information, 
coinciding with the capitalist machine’s tendency to subsume life itself as labour and to reduce 
energy expenditure in increasingly virtualised production and reproduction. Biopolitics thus 
becomes necropolitics. However, the definition of organic death is once again challenged by 
the intensive feminine desire at the micro level of mitochondrial reproduction and in complex 
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chain reactions that are unforeseeable in transgenetic operations. Spiess/Strecker’s organism 
does not go through organic death, rather, its life is manifested through its indeterminate 
biodigital/biophysical becoming exhibiting a feminine intensive desire at the biophysical level, 
a desire that harbours the hypernatural potential to escape the capitalist desire of auto-
reproduction and of the total capture of life through information. It is a manmade artifact that 
nevertheless reminds us of our own potential of becoming within the hypernature we co-inhabit 
with other beings.  
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4. Chapter Four 
Strange Intimacies Caught between East Asian Feminism and Animism: 
On Geumhyung Jeong’s choreography 
 
Happiness [... is] a suspended condition,  
to be lived holding your breath. 
Italo Calvino, Difficult Loves (1970) 
 
The last chapter maps abstract sex, a feminine intensive desire of becoming, at work on the 
biophysical, biocultural and biodigital strata, to reinsert indeterminate potentials of materiality 
into both sets of power asymmetry – the social inscription onto bodies (bacterial bodies, human 
bodies) taking the form of overcodification of sexed production, and the capitalisation of 
decoded flows of bodies, or rather, organs without bodies. This chapter continues the line of 
feminine intensive desire and contemplates on its relational efficacy in interpersonal and man-
machine assemblages, at once indeterminate and intimate.  
 
4.1. Geumhyung Jeong’s works 
 
Geumhyung Jeong is a South Korean choreographer and performance artist. She has built an 
oeuvre of works exploring the relation between human bodies and machinic objects. Her works 
are presented widely in East Asia, Europe and the States, with each of the contexts offering 
different anchour points for analysing the gazes toward her works.  
One consitent line in all her works is the meticulously and laboriously executed, but 
very repetitive, medical or mechanical procedures. For the sake of precision, Jeong always takes 
time to get herself professionally trained in programmes such as excavator driving, 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation and rehabilitation techniques, or fire evacuation procedures. In 
	 90	
her works, the performance of mechanical and medical procedures, as well as the performance 
as an artist, blend perfectly into each other. 
In CPR Practice (2013-2015), Jeong performs a 40-min long intensive and precise 
medical procedure of cardiopulmonary resuscitation on a rubber male figure, as it were, to 
revive him.  (Fig. 4.1) In a long, thin room, often a non-theatre space such as an indoor 
basketball court, Jeong enters from one end of the space and walks quietly and slowly toward 
a rubber dummy figure lying in the other end. The dummy, dressed in pants, exposes his pale 
skin lit by dim light. His mouth is open (the figure is designed for cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
training), otherwise his facial feature is sparingly depicted. Jeong’s calmly and almost 
expressionlessly undresses herself to reveal her frail body and lies down next to the dummy, 
and starts touching him. First, she caresses him gently. Then she raises her body to push his 
hand against her, and reclines so that his hand strolls down her smooth, naked chest, rubs her 
nipples, and then starts touching her lower body. For the first twenty minutes of the piece, she 
remains stern-faced and self-controlled in this silent, physical exchange between the two which 
builds up in intensity, leaving the audience bewildered as to whether her action should be read 
as sexually self-indulgent or an example of radical passivity. 
Then she pauses. She realises that the something is not right with the dummy – that he 
is having a cardiac arrest. She shakes him, only to confirm that she has to take immediate action. 
She briskly gets up, runs to the other side of the space where a medical kit is placed in a cabinet, 
gets the instruments and runs back. Swiftly yet resolutely, Jeong places an assistance device on 
the chest of the dummy and starts pressing. The assistance device prompts the correct 
compression rate and pressure by giving beats and voice cues like ‘continue care,’ ‘insufficient’ 
or ‘excessive.’ She counts the numbers as she presses down on the chest to the rhythm indicated 
and continues for the next ten to twenty minutes. The regular chest compression in CPR practice 
is supposed to keep blood circulation going until the body’s normal heart rate is restored. 
The repetitive pressing, her counting and the automated beats and voices create a 
mechanical symphony, giving a dazed feeling for the audience. Momentarily suspending the 
ever intensive (medical) performance, she runs across the long space to reach out for other 
devices, first the defibrillator to deliver electric shock to the heart and then an artificial 
ventilation machine that pushes air into the mouth of the ‘patient.’ She keeps the repetitive 
pressing while juggling with added devices, at times stopping short to exhale air mouth-to-
mouth, and at others to manually push air into the mouth with the ventilator or to deliver electric 
shock treatment. The scene moves into a frenzied state, when Jeong clearly has exhausted 
herself through by performing a series of medical procedures that have lasted for more than 
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thirty minutes in total. At this point, she gives up, the assistance device still beeps in the 
background. With a sense of solemnity, she dresses herself up and the audience applauds. As 
the audience leaves, she reorganises all the medical devices in silence and puts them back in 
the cabinet, which may be considered the proper end of the performance. 
In Oil pressure vibrator (2008-2015), Jeong compares female masturbation to the 
movements of a hydraulic excavator. In a lecture performance, she recounts the story of her 
professional training in hydraulic excavator operation, which eventually leads to her operating 
a hydraulic excavator on a sand sculpture moulded on her own body. She steers the mechanical 
arm so that it dives straight into the private/sexual parts of the sand figure, culminating in what 
appears to be the orgiastic dismembering of the sand mass. (Fig. 4.2)  
In Fitness Guide (2011-2015), Jeong engages with gym machines in (again) personal, 
intimate ways. In this piece, the audiences sit on yoga mattresses alongside various gym 
machines. (Fig. 4.3) The gym machines are partially refitted with plastic figures of man’s heads, 
and specifically, of White man’s heads. The treadmill, for example, features a head sticking up 
from behind the control panel, so that the trainer faces the man while training, and the machine 
is impersonated, as it were, by the White man. It is a strange, technologised daily ‘monument’ 
reminiscent of an ancient Greek herma statue, which features a bust of a God (originally 
Hermes) sitting on top of a plain, undecorated, rectangular pillar of stone. Conventionally the 
male genitals depicted in these statues are carved, in fine detail, on the lower part of the column, 
highlighting a significant contrast between the hyper-realistic head and genitals, and the 
smooth, bare stone pillar.  
In this fifty minute piece, Jeong makes routine gym exercises with various machines, 
which, over the duration of the performance, take a more intimate turn. Jeong walks into the 
space in a plain, training outfit, and positions herself in front of the vibrating machine -- an old-
fashioned machine with a vibrating belt that was used for its supposed slimming effects. The 
machine, styled by Jeong, features a cast of a man’s head on the top that has been cut half open, 
revealing the brain. As with the presence of the other plastic heads refitted to the training 
machines, it is both grotesque and comical. 
Jeong pulls the belt around her belly and starts stretching against the machine. Her face 
is expressionless, resembling the type of absent-minded trainers one can spot in any commercial 
fitness centre. She pushes her body up and down as her precisely controlled movements resound 
in the space. She then proceeds to lower her body towards the ground and rests her bodyweight 
on her hands stretched behind, her legs split on both sides of the machine/man figure. Then she 
switches the machine to vibration mode to the point that her whole body, strapped at the waist 
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to the belt, starts to tremble. The positioning of her body and the trembling effect have definite 
sexual associations. The intensity increases and the loosely affixed ‘brain’ falls into different 
pieces on to the floor; after which, Jeong stops the vibration function and gently embraces the 
machine as if it were a lover. 
She then moves to a cross-trainer, also fitted with a model of a man’s head. The upward-
leaning upper arms of the machine, intended for better grip and body coordination during 
training, seem to become the arms of a man through the way that Jeong interacts with them. 
She drives the machine with slow, calculated moves using her legs so that one arm of the 
machine hesitantly moves toward her, touches her and then retreats. 
The relation between the machine/man body and Jeong’s body is ambiguous: is the 
machinic body dominating her, preying on her with the gaze? Or is it rather a silent 
communication between them, in which the relationship seems strangely enjoyable and 
satisfying for her? The repetitive nature of fitness training (doing ‘reps’) seems to give a 
symbolic suggestion to the nature of the relationship between Jeong and the machines -- 
progressive yet static, and always evading capture. The resolution and restlessness of Jeong’s 
presence only add to this relationship. 
Jeong continues the performance with stamina and discipline. Next, she walks on a 
treadmill. The machine gives a rhythmic beep, which accelerates as she goes faster. The 
presence of a man’s head fixed behind the control panel produces an alienating, and again, 
awkward feeling. As the acceleration of the machine reaches its zenith, Jeong suddenly jumps 
off to embrace the frontal control console, her body closing the gap with the machine, and 
thereby fulfilling the potential of communication being established between herself and the 
machine/man. Although it should be pointed out that at this moment the very ambiguous 
relationship established between them terminates.  
Fitness Guide is constructed of such moments of strange, serialised intimacy. Even 
though structurally there is no conventional climax in the piece, as the performance unfolds 
with Jeong moving from one training machine to another, a definite sense of rhythm is created. 
Jeong’s engagement with the machines modulates the audience’s own rhythms between 
relaxation and intensification, and fluctuates their sense of acting and being acted upon, as well 
as between being inside and outside of the machines. 
In 2016, as laureate of the Hermès Foundation Missulsang, an annual award given to 
emerging stars in the Korean art scene, Jeong had a solo exhibition titled Private Collection in 
the Hermès Foundation in Seoul, South Korea. Other than the two full-body mannequins 
hanging from the ceiling, she has filled up the exhibition hall with plastic heads, chests and 
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body parts, inflated figures, various medical tools neatly arranged on white pedestals. When 
one takes a closer look, some of the displayed body parts are defunct: the heads are bruised, 
some miss one eye, and some distorted. There are inflated male body parts, suggestive of sexual 
self-indulgence or sexual violence. At the same time, there are more realistic human figures for 
medical training, with parts of the belly open to demonstrate anatomy structures and with 
movable arms. Despite potential shock and awe effect upon closer examination, the over-
display of objects in the exhibition provokes free associations between a science lab, a museum 
setting, and a (sex) supermarket. Indeed, these are exactly the framing conditions of the gaze 
directed toward human bodies in sexual, medical and artistic context, and with the relations of 
commercialisation inherit in the gaze.    
Strangely erotic, the image of the slender-bodied Jeong and the machines – always 
impersonated by male figures – may easily evoke interpretation of relations of power and 
domination based on sexual difference, or the other way around – that she thwarts the sexual-
difference-based gender system by going out of the ways and having intimate relations and 
sometimes breaking the machines. While these interpretations are valid coming from particular 
standpoints, I would like to propose a more careful reading of Jeong’s work situated in the 
larger context of feminism in East Asia as well as gender decoupled from sexual difference. 
The latter leads to the potential non-normative subject formation. To do so, however, we will 
first go through gender as inscribed in sexual difference, which has informed the feminist 
project in the second half of the 20th century.  
 
4.2. Jeong and Feminisms in the West and East 
 
4.2.1. Jeong the feminist? 
 
Foucault situates his project of understanding how human beings become subjects in unpacking 
sexuality, namely how sexuality becomes so central to the understanding of the self, so 
individuals recognise themselves as sexual subjects. By focusing on the acknowledgement of 
the self as a subject of desire, he tries to allow man to ‘discover, in desire, the truth of their 
being, be it natural or fallen’ (Foucault 1990, 5). He sees that starting from Greek and Greco-
Roman culture, sexuality, or what constituted the ‘arts of existence’ for man (gendered-man) 
has already become not just about setting the rule of conduct, but about seeking self-
transformation. These first aesthetics of existence were equivalent to ‘technique of the self,’ 
later mutating into medical and educational norms, conditioning the obligation of men as 
subjects of sexuality (Foucault 1990, 10-11).    
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Foucault’s analysis is astute in revealing the normative discourse and henceforth 
biopolitical control of the populace based on sexuality, as well as pronouncing the end to 
identity politics based on the male phallus identification. His own lack of awareness to sexual 
difference – his speaking of the man in the universal form – has been criticised by feminists 
(Braidotti 2011, 169), his contributions to epistemology are profound nonetheless. Braidotti 
takes inspiration from him and claims, ‘An ethics of relations needs to be developed, according 
to Foucault, that by-passes the despotic mechanisms of sexuality and redefines alternative forms 
of intimacy and relation’ (Braidotti 2011, 172).  
This call to liberate from sexuality is taken on by feminists of different generations. 
Feminism takes as its mission to map out multiple forms of oppression and to show the deep 
interconnected between them, and aims to bring into representation the oppressed and 
unrepresented. The feminists affirm the specificities of situated knowledge and embodied 
experience from women, at the same time emphasis the ‘not-One’ characteristic of womanhood.  
Yet in practice, what emerges increasingly is what Braidotti alarmingly identifies as a 
new normative dominant discourse based on ‘the alleged parallelism of queer identities and 
practices’ (Braidotti 2011, 173). This implies structural equalisation, or ‘flat assimilation’ of all 
oppositional positions to the (conventional) dominant discourse of the White, male, 
heterosexual figure speaking a major language. The new configuration of oppositional politics 
flattens out differences of race, class, age, geopolitical positioning, belief system, among others, 
in favour of a schematic reduction of the subject versus the countersubject, hence letting in 
through the back door the very reductionist tendency of subjecting the inherently different 
‘other(s)’ they set out to criticise. Such flattening tendencies are premised on the affirmation of 
differences only insofar as the differences can be understood as difference of the same. In light 
of this, Braidotti adamantly calls that ‘No parallel is possible in a nomadic perspective of inner 
complexity’ (Braidotti 2011, 173). Or as Mel. Y Chen notes, ‘because of a lingering 
Eurocentrism within what is thought of as biopolitics—its implicit restriction to national bodies, 
for instance, as well as its species-centric bias that privileges discussions about human 
citizens—there are productive openings for transnational race, animal, and sexuality 
scholarship’ (Chen 2012, 6-7). As we will see, Jeong’s works possess an inner complexity that 
goes beyond identity politics of the female artist, the East Asian/Korean, and desiring toward 
machinist beings that are instead situated in the productive position of interstices.  
Jeong’s works are variably labelled as a feminist practice. An article on Korea Herald 
comments, ‘she openly expresses women’s sexual desires through the unusual performances’ 
(Lee 2016). She confirms this feminist labelling by saying ‘I like when people call me a feminist 
	 95	
artist. I try to be a feminist in my performances’. And then she adds, ‘My works are not a fight 
against the male-dominated society we live in. I solely focus on the objects themselves and 
think of ways to express my thoughts through them’ (Lee 2016). It seems that she has taken an 
interesting twist in the understanding of feminism here. On the one hand, there is how feminism 
is interpreted in the mainstream as a kind of sexual-difference-based, anti-patriarchal 
opposition, and on the other, how she wilfully circumvents it to turn the attention to something 
else, namely to the objects. This disparity foregrounds the discussion in the following on 
feminism and East Asia. 
In the East Asian society, there are more practical concerns of feminism, focusing on 
the implementations of gender quality rights, which is no doubt an important constitutive part 
of a social program. Behind this social transformation is an expectation of how feminism should 
work, very much modelled on the experience of Western feminists. In this context, Jeong’s 
‘femininity’ is equated with explicitness of the female (sexual or nonsexual) desire. For a viewer 
with a ‘Western’ mind-set, because of the supposedly traditional, and therefore conservative 
cultural associations, her works are viewed as a feminist statement articulating female desire. 
(I am drawing on the ‘Western’ audience in a simplified, schematic manner. It has to do with 
the fact that Jeong’s works tour in Europe and North America, much more than it does in Asia 
or elsewhere. And it has to do with that East Asian audience may subscribe to a view coloured 
by the Western mindset, which arguably could be seen in the review on her work in the Korea 
Herald.) 
My reading of Jeong’s works locates them on different levels of experience, one of the 
East Asian feminist experience, and the other of a posthumanist experience. Her works are 
multiplicities: at once a continuum of experiences and affects, and at the same time differential 
differences. As multiplicities, she is as much making as by being individuated by connections 
on different levels. In the following I will engage with her work on these multiple intensive 
levels.  
 
4.2.2. Confucian relationality 
  
To unpack the particularity of her works in the context of East Asia feminism, I will first give 
an overview of sexuality in the East Asian and Confucian context, and its relation to global 
feminist discourse. This position of speaking also implies a careful re-examination of the legacy 
of Confucianism itself, which has been criticised, relegated and later revived in the modern 
history, though to some degrees remaining in the cultural unconsciousness. The career of this 
concept is tightly entangled with vying interests in historiography, national identity building, 
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and control and governmentality. In many ways, there is no one position for all when speaking 
about a thematic complex such as Confucianism, which requires me to situate my discussions 
in the particularity of the contexts as they arise. In this context, my analysis of Jeong’s works 
first reacts to the polemics when measuring her work with the benchmark of ‘universal’ or 
‘universalising’ Western feminism. To do so, I draw on Rosenlee’s proposition on Confucian 
feminism, which furthers the analysis in the direction of conceptualising reciprocity and 
relationality. This, I will note, is derived from historical practices, and does not warrant direct 
application in today’s social-political context. 
In traditional East Asian society, women were expected to follow particular gender 
roles. (The Korean women’s experience in the later imperial time until the modern day is largely 
in common with their Chinese peers, not least because of the infusion of Confucianism in all 
practices in society. Hence, I draw on scholarship focusing specifically on Chinese or Korea, 
yet I will speak of East Asian Confucianism in a more generalised way so to highlight the 
tension between that and Western feminism.) This is the more rigid way of reading 
Confucianism put to social practice, that is to say, Confucianism preserves a hierarchy in society 
and attribute roles to each entity. One could argue that following the hierarchical order 
favouring men, there was a double standard of sexuality exercised for men and women, so that, 
for instance, a man’s adultery would be treated differently than a woman’s. It is argued that 
Confucian social consciousness prevails into today’s east Asian society (Shim 2001). This is 
also true. Throughout the twentieth century, women have persistently demanded in getting 
equally represented in law, especially concerning sexual violence, which reportedly has been 
of high occurrence rate but largely silenced upon due to the traditional chastity ideology. In 
light of this, the crime of rape in Korea is classified under the title ‘crime against chastity,’ 
revealing a deep migration of male dominance from the traditional Confucian society to a 
modern society. The law against sexual violence was only legislated in 1993 (Shim 2001). 
While a good number of feminists in the last couple of decades have fiercely opposed 
Confucianism’s outdated sexual morality, it is important to differentiate the position from where 
one is speaking. Clearly, forcing today’s standard onto a bygone past, without accounting for 
the specificities of the different contexts does not yield too much insight. Indeed, as Marguerite 
Duras remarks, ‘I think that the women who can get beyond the feeling of having to correct 
history will save a lot of time’ (Duras 1991). Duras succinctly points out the fallacy of an 
imaginary symmetry between genders that feminists sometimes get trapped in. This myth is 
effectively debunked by feminists such as Irigary in that asymmetry perpetuates because the 
male figure defines what is universal, and that looking for gender symmetry results only in 
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reactive criticism (Irigaray 1994). This is of course not to discredit the struggles of women in 
demanding their rights, but a plea for drawing a cartography of the conceptual differentiations 
one finds oneself in today.  
Traditionally, the ideal Confucian society is one where a set of relations, ranging from 
within the family circle to the enlarged circle of the social, are respected and practiced so that 
everyone finds his or her place in the society. As such, it places premium on the wellbeing of 
relations in the primary order, and as a consequence, the yearning for a better personhood 
comes, rather than the reversed way in which individual will is posited above relations. Many 
scholars argue that in the contemporary East Asian society, family values and interpersonal 
relations – guanxi - still are more dominant than individual wills. Studies have shown that the 
premium placed on guanxi in the social and business context, which can take the form of gift 
and favour exchange, and how the relationship itself is valued over any specific ‘cost-benefit’ 
evaluation. (Luo 2007) 
Before we go into the specific case of Confucian feminism, a story recounted by Pyotr 
Kropotkin, the itinerant figure in my dissertation, captures in a similar way this sense of 
relational ties versus individualism not dissimilar to the Confucian tradition.  
In his autobiography, Memoirs of a Revolutionist, Russian anarchist Pyotr Kropotkin 
records an anecdote. He was asked by Russian writer Turguéneff that with his experience with 
French men, Germans and other people, if he had noticed ‘there is a deep, unfathomable chasm 
between many of their conceptions and the views which we Russians hold on the same subjects 
– that there are points upon which we can never agree.’ Turguéneff related that he was with in 
a theatre with Flaubert and other important French writers, where the play was about a woman 
who had separated with her ex-husband and had had a happy life with another man, and the two 
babies from the previous marriage. Her children had grown up taking the man as their biological 
father. Then came the show-down: the boy had somehow learnt about the truth of their family, 
and shouts at his sister when she kissed their stepfather, ‘Don’t dare!’ Turguéneff accounted, 
‘This exclamation brought down the house. There was an outburst of frantic applause. Flaubert 
and the others joined in it. I was disgusted.’ He had then spent hours discussing with the French 
writers without making himself understood. Kropotkin admits this difference in his 
autobiography and that ‘in many other things there is a similar difference between the Russian 
point of view and that of other nations’ (Kropotkin 1899).  
Incidentally, there is a popular Chinese opera piece, Breeze Pavilion (Qing Feng Ting) 
that depicts a similar story. The piece was performed in folk theatre for a longer time and was 
mentioned as early as in the 18th century in the compendium of Chinese opera. In Breeze 
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Pavilion, the orphan Zhang Jibao is adopted and raised with care by an old couple and thirteen 
years later, he’s reintroduced and returned to his birth mother. He later rises to the most 
prominent government position, yet returning to the Breeze Pavilion where he is adopted, he 
refuses to recognise the old couple as his foster parents and treats them as beggars. The 
saddened old couple commits suicides, and Zhang Jibao gets struck dead by thunders. The 
immediate moral flavours aside, it is interesting to observe how this story contrasts the story 
Turguéneff saw in the theatre. 
Coming from a Confucian perspective, the shock that Turguéneff and Kropotkin 
experienced was completely legitimate, if one focuses on the relation established between the 
children and the stepfather or the foster parents, which weighs more against the relation to the 
blood father. Here one can ask if the French audience were applauding for an essentialised 
‘root,’ which may be in line with the quest of truth of an individual self, an Enlightenment-
predicated, or even Christian project of the self, that stands opposite to relationality. This 
anecdote recorded by Kropotkin is not to complicate the discursive undertaking by bringing in 
still another comparative study, however, it does show that similar to the East Asian/Confucian 
mind-set, there are subconscious differences in the conception of relations.  
Back to the East Asian context. Taking the largely modernised East Asian Confucian 
context into consideration, if sexuality in the form of freedom of sex is achieved in the society, 
or as another instance, if sexual violence is prosecuted consequently reducing the sense of 
shame endured by the victim, what is then today’s lived experience of feminine desire? And 
what is to make of the Confucian legacy, which in itself is too immense to be rejected 
wholesale? How is the distinctive emphasis placed on relationality to be reconceptualised to 
suit today’s practice? 
Counterproductive examples to a more nuanced position abound. For example, once a 
Western sinologist exclaimed at a symposium on contemporary Chinese women that 
contraception in China is the responsibility of Chinese women. And another telling example 
concerns Chinese swimmer Fu Yuanhui, who openly spoke about her less than satisfactory 
performance due to the fact that she had her period, which is something supposedly not 
discussed in the public in contemporary China. The news, with a catchy title like ‘Chinese 
Swimmer Breaking Period Taboo,’ went viral in Western media including all major news outlet, 
as well as on social media. It even rounded up attention of and got retweeted by the likes of 
Melinda Gates. While the social phenomena (contraception and speaking about menstruation) 
are not uncommon, it is, however, a blatant generalisation to say that they are the social norm. 
When the news of Ms. Fu ‘Breaking Period Taboo’ hit China, there were waves of netizens 
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challenging the factuality of the article, usually relating to their own experiences that testified 
otherwise: that nobody really makes a fuss about speaking out and that women do openly 
discuss their period. 
Such discrepancy in the projections and facts points to an underlying conceptual 
rigidity: the well-intentioned Western feminists equate the traditional patriarchal values to 
practices of East Asian women today. It is worth noting that the set of patriarchal value 
allegations themselves may originate from Western projections than from the Confucian/East 
Asian context, that is to say, menstruation in the Christian society – and arguably until today in 
a secularised Christian society – is more a taboo than they are in the Confucian context. It is 
misleading in conflating the dramatically changed social context, and it is especially a 
conceptual slippage if not a counterproductive one to mistake the social context and social 
unconsciousness of the West to that of another society. 
Furthermore, on the discursive level, it implicates another form of conceptual 
domination, i.e. a self-entitled Western feminist to speak for the global ‘sisterhood,’ and at the 
same time there are feminists from East Asia who subscribe to this positionality. It is 
asymmetrical in that it uses a benchmark deriving from the Western experience to describe the 
problems of their Eastern ‘sisters’ in the hope of elevating them from the theme. The project 
gets muddier when the element of time is added. Too often, liberal values derived from the 
recent past are used to contrast practices in a traditional context, or a presumed continuity of 
tradition in a contemporary society, making the case logically flawed. While a noble cause, the 
very self-entitlement implicit in this position repeats the same universalisation process that the 
first-wave feminists fought against. This first-wave is mapped in the tripartite feminist project 
proposed by Braidotti based on her experience with Western feminism. The first level feminism 
demands the insertion of women into the patriarchal history, whence it can claim the 
emancipatory moment of sexual difference. The second level feminism is the feminism of 
difference, which questions construction of personal identities in the dispositif of power 
relations. The third level feminism aims to bring the epistemological and political projects 
together in the hope for different representation of the differences. (Braidotti 2011, 137-165)  
At the same time, parallel to the three stages of feminisms, a parallel process of 
institutionalisation of feminism took place. As Susan Watkins incisively points out in her article 
‘Which Feminism?’ (Watkins), the power of radical feminism (parallel in time to the first and 
the second waves) waned because of the neoliberal expansion of capitalism. In the U.S., the 
affirmative action works fully in line with the capitalists’ interests of expanding the body of 
work forces by able women and blacks, and comes at the time as the systematic criminalisation 
	 100	
and incarceration of the unworthy class of people for the capitalist machine under the name of 
war on drugs. In the 1980s, big foundations like the Ford Foundation sponsored feminist NGOs 
and university departments, staffed by newly created professorships and programs of gender 
studies. This signalled the start of a institionalisation and bureaucraticisation of feminism, just 
as other radical movements before them (in the 1960s Ford had already poured millions into 
radical black and Latino organisations), for communities which used to work collectively would 
now compete with each other to justify funding purposes for their own niche projects. The 
president of the Foundation McGeorge Bundy explained to the Congress that the support could 
‘encourage young organisations towards responsible, constructive projects and guide them 
away from the paths of disruption and discord; “making the world safe for capitalism,” as 
Bundy sardonically put it elsewhere’. This aspect of economy and power underlying certain 
strands of cultural theories will emerge again in later chapters. For now, suffice it to say that 
the social-economic and political conditions for the development of Western feminism make it 
anything but a clean terrain of culturalist discourses. However, in order to understand the 
feminism in East Asia, we have to keep a working concept of culture. 
 
4.2.3. Confucian feminism 
 
Now it is one thing to stress the differential differences in the experience of women in Confucian 
societies to that of the Western counterparts – affirming that there are indeed fine differences 
whether in terms of content or in terms of timing, it is, however, another undertaking to speak 
for the differences within Confucianism itself, as Confucianism lends itself both to 
interpretation as a rigid differential class society and as a dynamic, non-hierarchical social field 
based on non-transactional reciprocities and social mobility depending on the perspective. The 
question here is, just what makes Confucianism nuanced enough as to be possibly compatible 
to and able contribute to a contemporary society? 
Against of the grains of Confucianism as a static hierarchy and thereby oppressive of 
women, recent scholars have offered new readings of Confucianism that highlights its dynamic 
and reciprocal nature, which sheds new light onto the feminist project.  
Rosenlee (Rosenlee 2006) argues that based on a reciprocal, dynamic yin-yang 
cosmology, sexual difference between the male and female body has always been more fluid, 
and therefore informs a more tolerant view of gender in the Chinese/Confucian society. The 
biologically ‘natural’ woman, pitted against a ‘cultural’ man, such that has permeated Western 
society and has become the immediate target of criticism in feminist and critical race studies, 
has never quite existed in the Chinese Confucian society. Indeed, Rosenlee points out that ‘the 
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concept of male/female whose distinction rests exclusively on biological, sexual differences, in 
the Confucian tradition, by and large applies to animals, not humans’ (Rosenlee 2006, 5). The 
concept of a human being, of either biological sex, is always already filial and hence social.  
It is in fact in this emphasis placed on the virtue of filial piety, the continuity of the 
family name and ancestor workshop that is the source of Confucian female oppression 
(Rosenlee 2006, 9). In a way, while there was no essentialised, natural, ‘othered’ woman figure, 
there was the cultured construct of filial relationality that functioned and governed in a way 
close to Foucault’s power dispositif. It is a governing principle which is not exercised in top 
down fashion, but rather bound from within, penetrating the constituent units of a society which 
is a family, and interrelating the constituent members of the family to each other, while binding 
the multiplicities of families into a social body. On every social organisational level, 
relationality comes before the individual. Traditionally, the valued filial continuity conditioned 
women’s role as fulfilling the reproduction duty. As mentioned earlier, if we enforce our 
emancipated feminist standard upon the confined social life of women in history, we are only 
doing a disfavour to our project of mapping conceptual parameters of feminism under a 
Confucian frame. Even though this relationality in history may not be ‘emancipatory’ enough 
for a modern woman, the crucial point here is that women in Confucian society has to be 
considered always already social beings and partaking into various constellations of 
relationalities.  
The features that make up the core Confucian social order, as mentioned earlier, are 
based on pairs of reciprocal relations between rulers and ministers, father and son as well as 
husband and wife. The conventional view of Confucianism as hierarchical comes from a static 
rendering of these relations, which is not unfounded. One can identify one moment in Han 
Dynasty, the first long-running dynasty ruling over a vast, unified territory of China, when Dong 
Zhongshu (179-104 BC) famously proposed absolutising the three sets of relations into 
principles, so that what was initially a dynamic, reciprocal relationality cemented into laws to 
obey (Lin 2013). There were back and forth adjustments in history, suffice to say that the 
dynamism and reciprocity in relationality has been an ideal to achieve in Confucian society.  
Expanding on this dynamic, non-binary frame deeply rooted in the Confucian tradition, 
Rosenlee argues that dichotomies conventionally held as causes of social oppression on women, 
such as that of nei and wai (private and public, in terms of physical and social space), often do 
not suffice as a static and rigid distinction of what women are entitled to do and what they are 
not sanctioned to do. (There were similar nei-wai distinction in Korea too: separation between 
the husband’s quarter called sarangchae near the taemun (the gate), and the wife’s quarters 
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(anchae) hidden behind the chungmun (middle gate). Further, widow chastity was also 
honoured by the government by establishing a yollomun, ‘a gate of the virtuous woman’). Note 
here that the emphasis is not placed on practices where a woman transgresses the private and 
public boundary, such as in the case of women dressed up as men fighting in battles, which 
could be read as a feminist practice of disrupting the patriarchal order by exactly occupying it. 
Such an act (though not unpractised in history) would signal a woman’s demand for recognition, 
and indeed her attempt to strike a symmetry, in the asymmetric order that systematically reduces 
women to the ‘other-than-men,’ hence restrained to the space of ‘nei’. While the reading is 
valid, it does presuppose the divide between the public and the private as such, and the as-
suchness of the divide conditions the politics of transgression as a kind of ‘turning-around’ or 
going in between. The nei-wai divide would be analogous, though not synonymous to, the 
divide between the genders, as well as between nature and culture, both constructed through a 
matrix of discourse, a habitual dichotomy that Western feminists seek to break away from. 
How to think beyond the divide as such in Confucianism? The practice Rosenlee draws 
on is voluntary widowhood, which was analogous to man’s political loyalty and hence defined 
as female virtue, practiced as early as Tang dynasty (618-907 AD). Rosenlee writes, 
 
[…] the practice of voluntary widowhood, protected in imperial statute since the Tang, 
signified more than spousal fidelity; it signified women’s own agency where women’s 
moral intent in safeguarding their integrity as married women must take precedence 
over parental authority, which emphasised the power of the senior over the junior. The 
bestowal of imperial honours on the households of chaste widows institutionalised in 
the Yuan further elevated widowhood from a private virtue to a social virtue with 
practical consequences. Comparable to the civil service examination for men, 
widowhood became a means of social mobility for women; that is, a means through 
which women were able to acquire the highest honour – imperial recognition – because 
of their own actions instead of the deeds of their father, husband, or son. (Rosenlee 2006, 
11) 
 
In her careful analysis throughout the book, the measuring of female agency is made 
within a context appropriate to their means in the given era, that is to say, in the traditional 
Confucian society when women did not go to take office in the public and instead stayed home 
to fulfil their familiar and filial duties, and at the same time, nurtured their own ways of 
expressing their desire. Only in this way can we justly discuss feminism in a Confucian context 
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without disregarding what is appropriate to a particular context. And we may indeed realise, 
this feminism doesn’t necessarily resemble on the surface radical, oppositional politics, which 
is the universalised image of feminism that have taken root both in the Western society and 
arguably in the East.  
This fundamental embedding of agency in the female life in traditional Confucian 
society affirms that women were always already cultured. It follows that the first phase of 
Western feminist project, taken at the level of anti-sexism or the quest for recognition, fails to 
fundamentally address either the lived, nor the social, symbolic realities of the 
Chinese/Confucian women. In other words, the first level feminism seems to concern women 
in a traditional Confucian society very little, as indeed the point of exit – that women are 
historically and problematically viewed as the ‘second sex’ (de Beauvoir 1949), i.e. as 
irrational, pertaining to the state of ‘nature,’ and so forth – do not hold ground in a society based 
on relationality. 
What Rosenlee dedicates much of her book to is the practice of reciprocity. The practice 
of becoming a good wife, rather than obeying the prescribed rules of a good wife figures more 
importantly in the ideal Confucian women. The practice leads to an inner articulation of the 
multiplicity of womanhood. This offers a substantiation of differential difference articulated 
conceptually by Braidotti in the second and third level of sexual difference theory: the transition 
from ‘differences among women’ to ‘differences within each women’. 
This differential view brings us back to Geumhyung Jeong. When she engages with the 
mannequins, machines, tools and toys, her presence as a frail-bodied East Asian woman too 
often attracts interpretations that take her practice as part of a project of first-level feminism 
that addresses sexual desire or anti-patriarchal will of the oppressed East Asian woman. Such a 
view is unsubtle for me for it disregards the historical context in which women were not reduced 
to the non-male, which still codes the society today. Even while it tries to relay a sense of care 
in the ‘global sisterhood,’ it does harm in victimising the ‘othered’ females of the non-West 
cultures and stripping them from their own agency which have been historically in place (in 
some forms). More importantly, such a view forecloses the possible engagements of Jeong’s 
works on the second and third levels of the feminist project, which go beyond cultural tropes of 
female oppression but offer more transversal connections that are of epistemological and 
political validity. Such foreclosure, as we have already seen, is based on universalism, itself 
borne of a Western patriarchal order. The true epistemological and political potentials of the 
Confucian feminist project remain untouched on this level of conceptual criticism. 
Resonating this complex in manner though not exactly in content, Deleuze unpacks the 
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binary structure in sadomasochism in his book Coldness and Cruelty (Deleuze 1971) and points 
out that, contra common conception, the uncomplimentary relation between the two sides in 
sadomasochism. The woman torturer of masochism is not and cannot be sadistic because she is 
in the masochistic situation, she is an integral part and a realisation of the masochistic fantasy. 
The torturess is not masochistic in person, but rather is a pure element of masochism, and thus 
escapes from her own masochism by assuming the active role in the masochistic situation. 
Similarly, the female prey in sadism is not masochistic because she is a pure element of sadism 
escaping her own sadism. By this strange doubling, the dynamic and potential of desire is finally 
freed from the echo chamber of the powerful versus the powerless.  
When Jeong decided to create a new piece called Fire Drill Scenario for a performative 
program I curated which involves fire excavation procedures as choreography, she jokingly told 
me that some people gasped upon learning about her new piece: ‘They say there is no sex!’ This 
is not a point to criticise or to embrace, but it does tell the very confined notion of sex based on 
sexual difference. Certainly, one way of interpreting Jeong’s engagement with mannequins, 
machines and tools is to see it as explicating feminine sexual desire in a very straightforward 
way. But as discussed earlier, such view is complicated when cultural and symbolic power 
relations are at play. As shown by newspaper reviews, it may well be a Korean audience who 
holds the view on feminism of a more normative order, that is, taking Jeong as East Asian 
woman fighting a patriarchal order in her art. For me, the patriarchal order does not necessarily 
figure as the most prominent issues and the struggle against which does not exhaust the potential 
of her actions.  
I see Jeong’s works as an enactment of abstract sex – borrowing the notion from Parisi 
discussed at length in the last chapter – that is, sex not based on discharge and not driven by 
predetermined goals, but rather on the organisation of and exchange between micro-bodies, i.e. 
shifting the focus from the gendered, racialised body to the pre-personal bodies, as well as the 
bodies of machines decontextualised from mere functionality. This shift of focus does not 
undermine the previous focus on gender and race, rather it serves as a new conceptual tool to 
tease out the ontological and political potentials harboured in the microbodies. Contra the 
immediate association by the public, the mannequins appear awkwardly too real to be 
suggestive of the anthropomorphised man-subject that informs the exchange and qualifies the 
relationality-building between two subjects in the macro world. The interaction between the 
machines and Jeong is a choreographed, or indeed almost engineered, set of procedures that 
allows contact, transmissions and metaphorically proliferates differences. The micro here 
implies the multiple bodies at metastable states that make up the artist Geumhyung Jeong’s 
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body and the body of the machines or mannequins she interacts with. Different from the works 
of Vanouse and Spiess/Strecker involving real microbes, the performances of Jeong provide a 
metaphorical image because there are no wet lab interventions involved, so the ‘micro’ is less 
technically determined (as in microscopic) than being a cultural-philosophical concept of the 
minoritarian. It takes a desire for becoming to enact the transversal connections between 
Jeong’s multi-levelled differences and the machinic beings. 
In what follows I will explore Jeong’s works in relation to feminine desire beyond 
‘second sex,’ or the immediate level of reasserting the female self into the patriarchal order. To 
do so, I will bring in another differential reading of her work – that of ‘animism,’ which points 
to the conceptual potential of her work but needs to be thoroughly anchored in a non-
reductionist framework. With the desire for transversal connections, I see a potential for 
renegotiating the conundrum between embodied subject positions at the ‘natural’ as well as 
cultured full-body level, and the micro level of the pre-personal body. 
 
4.3. Animism, Multiperspectivism and Relationality 
 
4.3.1. The Orientalisation of Animism 
 
Shamanism and animism come up in association of Jeong’s works. Again, this is not to pass a 
judgement on the interpretation in itself – at the very least, it’s still a fair way of describing 
something that one has little access to but is presumably there. But as we have tried with 
analysing Jeong’s works in such ways that avoid essentialist presumption of her being East 
Asian first-order female feminist, in a similar way we should cast animism and shamanism in a 
non-essentialising light. The politics behind animism and shamanism, as we will see, exposes 
the particularity of race to the risks of being subsumed to a flat assimilation, so that the 
particularity of belief system is also subject to a kind of ‘saming,’ or universalised difference.  
 In the introduction chapter, I have discussed various theoretical focuses of materialism, 
including material efficacies in composing dynamic and complex systems, in emergence in self-
organisation. A further point of investigation is how the materialist agency figures or constitutes 
in a social context. In performance studies, new materialist and posthumanist discourses have 
been openly embraced. For performance studies as a field has been already dedicated to 
‘tracking the various material affects of bodies, attending closely to the social impacts of 
repetitious patterns of behaviour and force, and trained to consider the representations of objects 
and persons not as happenstance but rather as meaningful sites of inquiry’ (Brisini and Simmons 
2016, 193). In Latour’s Actor-Network Theory in which both human and non-human agents 
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assemble, inanimate things can be actants and exercise agency given to them. However, this is 
not a case of merely imbuing a specific object with agency, but things are rather the result of 
processes of negotiation between the material world, human agency and context.  
In a thematic issue dedicated to New Materialisms, Rebecca Schneider maps the arena 
of new materialist scholarship in relation to performance. She draws on John Emigh who 
analyses the interrelation between masks and humans in relation to the practice of topeng in 
Bali:  
 
When a Balinese topeng performer picks up a mask being considered for purchase, he 
[...] gazes upon the mask, turning it this way and that, making it move to a silent music, 
he is assessing its potential life. He searches for a meeting place between himself and 
whatever life is inherent in the mask’s otherness. If he is successful, then a bonding 
takes place that will allow him to let that potential life flow through his own body. 
(Schneider 2015, 10) 
 
While an empathetic treatment attending to the interrelation between humans and things, 
the tendency of anthropomorphising is clear in this analysis - what ‘whatever’? Of course, 
attempting to answer what is ‘in’ the inherent otherness of the mask would be equally 
speculative and therefore devoid of political efficacy. The problem of such a claim in the form 
of self-conscious speculation is that it reduces the potential of things, and indeed of humans, to 
a structurally determined exchange foregrounding always already the divide between the 
subject and object; the difference is only that the conventional role attribution of the actant and 
the acted upon gets swapped.  
There is again potential cultural discourse hegemony at play regarding such a work in 
the field of cultural production. The art world has embraced anthropocene-related discussions 
– and we should point out, largely in the West – to question and decentralise the human species’ 
place in the world in a much broader frame of examination. This follows a longer tradition of 
scholarship and cultural production that attempts to break the anthropocentric and totalising 
image of the world by bringing, for instance, indigenous belief systems into the focal point. 
Yuk Hui points out that thinkers like Latour and Descola are drawn to the ‘non-modern’ to 
overcome occidental modernity especially as the age of the Anthropocene weighs down on the 
human race (Hui 2016, 45-46). Here, one needs extra caution not to fall prey to the co-option 
into a retrograde politics based on culturalist assumptions, as expounded on in the introduction 
chapter. The Subaltern Studies, as a branch of postcolonial theory, has provided perhaps the 
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most institutionalised form of critique on eurocentrism and has proposed to decentre Europe by 
learning from non-West peoples. Yet as Vivek Chibber points out, this can lead to new ways of 
orientalising the non-West, as he incisively critiques the work of Dipesh Chakrabarty, who 
builds an entire social ontology in defence of the exotic (Chibber 2013, 289). And one needs to 
be especially aware of the capitalisation on such discourses in the arts and culture sector, as 
conjunctive capitalism incessantly incorporates new virgin lands into its operation of value 
extraction, discussed with the perceptive analysis from Marina Vishmidt, also in the 
introduction. 
In this light, one can legitimately ask, is the discussion of Confucian feminism 
mentioned above all too culturalist? What Chibber makes clear here is that context matters. The 
Indians do have a cosmological view of time and the world different from the West, and yet the 
context in which the analysis of Chakrabarty is carried out is engrained in a modern, global 
economy which presents concrete and sometimes violent material conditions concerning labour 
that should not be ignored in the interest of advancing a cultural theory. In other words, the 
learning from non-West itself is a well-intentioned and noble gesture full of urgencies, but the 
context in which it should happen must not once again universalise or re-orientalise the other. 
In contrast, the context in which Rosenlee inserts her critical analysis is a historical one, 
and by staying closely with historical praxis, she is able to pinpoint the contemporary critique 
that speaks from the present on a historical subject, necessarily effectuating discrepancy of 
standards. What she does is that she contributes a theoretically founded notion of relationality 
based on historical studies and offers it to a contemporary society without interjecting claims 
based on the traditional into the present. The equivalent to a culturalist position would be if a 
Confucian scholar analyses the social codes of rule-obeying in history, and uses is to explain 
away why there is little outcry for the loss of privacy in contemporary China, as the government 
uses omnipresent surveillance tools to control its people. This equation between historical 
Confucianism and contemporary Chinese society is misleading to begin with. More worryingly, 
it also reduces the potential of creative subversion witnessed on the internet (though the sombre 
mockery of Kafka’s The Great Wall of China remains as topical as ever). Historian Pamela 
Kyle Crossley debunks the purported historical continuities turning China into a perennial ‘big 
data empire’. For in imperial China, Crossley shows, there was a preference for small 
government. Importantly, she demonstrates that the Chinese population did not succumb to any 
illusions that their state was statistically precocious or an omnipresent watchful eye, constantly 
looking out for riots, rebellions, murders, theft and corruption, which occurred as frequently as 
anywhere else. The current frenzy for big data does not so much hearken back to Confucian 
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precepts as to the recent history of Communism and the development of digital technologies. 
(Crossley 2017) This urges us to examine the question, if and in which ways the tradition plays 
out in the increasingly transcultural world where multiple value systems intermingle, case by 
case instead of flatpacking everything as traditional.  
As Haudenosaunee and Anishinaabe scholar points out, critiquing Donna Haraway’s 
devising the coyote as an alliance of feminist theory, that it is ‘a level of abstracted engagement,’ 
and ‘[w]hile it may serve to change the imperialistic tendencies in Euro-Western knowledge 
production, Indigenous histories are still regarded as story and process – an abstracted tool of 
the West’ (Watts 2013, 26). This leads to the concern that ‘well-meaning contemporary artists 
and academics recreate exploitative patterns from the past,’ and that ‘the Anthropocene, like 
any theoretical category at play in Euro-Western contexts, is not innocent of such violence’ 
(Todd 2015, 251). 
Just like the reading of East Asian female against oppression debases the actual agency 
of East Asian women, the attribution of animistic ‘agency’ to things forecloses any discussion 
on the sociopolitical context in which such a re-reading emerges. It seems that this is tinted by 
a kind of post-Enlightenment wishful thinking, showing the dialectical paradox that Adorno 
and Horkheimer anticipated half a century ago. It’s a delegation of thinking that the ‘whatever’ 
must be the harbinger of something beyond the rationale of the human subject, and more 
crucially, that this wishful thinking forecloses any real attempt of engagement with the matter 
beyond the abstractedness and ‘toolness’ aspects of it. As argued by Vanessa Watts, the radical 
embrace of non-West tradition, as it were, by a leap of faith, reveals certain underlying power 
structures.  
One simple and straightforward critique to this endowing of agency to nonhuman things 
is thinking through the extreme, fictive (or real) cases. Schneider succinctly puts this as 
potentially leading to ‘exoneration of responsibility’ in her treatment of the quotation about 
Balinese topeng performer and the mask above. She writes, ‘Granting inanimate objects agency 
might let human exploiters, who are responsible for the excesses of the anthropocene, off the 
hook (this would be “the gun made me shoot it” defence, which might actually bear some 
analysis)’ (Schneider 2015, 10). In this case, the ‘who makes who’ argument may remain sheer 
speculative and impotent to jurisdiction because of the obviously moralised context. Predicated 
on such a degree of subject and object differentiation instead of the relational network, it’s 
difficult to advance a thinking focused on the potential of transversal relationalities. In response 
to this form of simple-minded animism, I will make an attempt of accounting for the violence 
in which non-human spirits and the human seem to be both implicated in history to be accounted 
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for in materialist ways in the following chapters, with the examples of Ho Tzu Nyen’s Ten 
Thousand Tigers and Royce Ng’s Kishi the Vampire, featuring respectively the tiger and 
vampire as a figure moulded by a world of mutating desires. 
 
4.3.2. From the epistemological to the ontological: multiperspectivism 
 
Beyond the exoneration of responsibility and the complexity of culturalist assumptions, I would 
argue that the naïve reductionist tendency using animism as a stand-in fails to answer the 
question, how do we really approach and deal with the moments of relational emergence and 
connection beyond the conventional, ‘objective’ kind? Such an engagement demands not just 
recasting the subject and the object of knowledge, it also requires a fundamental refocusing 
from the epistemological to the ontological.  
Philosopher Thomas Nagel asks famous question ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ (Nagel 
1974), and points out the misleading aspect of the expression ‘what is it like,’ for it does not 
mean ‘what (in our experience) it resembles,’ but rather ‘how it is for the subject himself’ 
(Nagel 1974, 440). Shaviro identifies this affirmation of how the bat feels being a matter of its 
own as a move ‘from the problem of access to the problem of being: from epistemology (the 
question of how we can know what a bat is thinking) to ontology (grasping that the bat is indeed 
thinking and that this thinking is an essential aspect of the bat’s own being, even though we 
cannot hope to comprehend it)’ (Shaviro 2014, 92). This resonates with the Chinese concept of 
ziran N=, which is the common rendering of the English word ‘nature’ in Chinese, Japanese 
and Korean, and which in itself is a term used by Daoist master Laozi as a predicate meaning 
‘to be so of itself’. Laozi famously claimed ‘`8N= Dao follows what-is-so-of-itself’. Nature 
is, then, what is so of itself. This can be then extrapolated to each and every individualised 
entity and affirms the quality of what-is-so-of-itself, or the ontology of its own mode of striving. 
This ontological affirmation does not put the bat and the human on equal footing in the 
sense that they share the same essence, but rather in a parallel relation of manner, through which 
singularity can be seen to resonate with universality, without the need for any sort of mediation 
(Shaviro 2014, 150). This corresponds with Deleuze’s idea of univocity of beings, which he 
describes succinctly as follows, ‘not that Being is said in a single and same sense, but that it is 
said, in a single and same sense, of all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities’ 
(Deleuze 1994, 36). Shaviro further expounds on this, ‘the being of any one thing is different 
from the being of any other thing, but being per se is identically attributed to all things’ (Shaviro 
2014, 150). 
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On this point, it is worthy considering the notion of multiperspectivism proposed by 
anthropologist Viveiros de Castro, already mentioned in the last chapter. Based on his studies 
of the Amerindian tribesmen, multiperspectivism is the view that ‘all beings perceive 
(“represent”) the world in the same way. What varies is the world that they see’ (Viveiros de 
Castro 2004, 471-472). In order to construct this multiperspectivist universe, de Castro recasts 
nonhuman beings in a radical light: they are humans in their own sphere and they see things 
just as people do. It is only that the things that they see are different. He uses the allegory that 
what to us is blood is maize beer to the jaguar; what to us is soaking manioc is, to the souls of 
the dead, a rotting corpse; what is a muddy waterhole to us is for the tapirs a great ceremonial 
house. De Castro further expounds on the relational nature between an entity and the entity that 
perceives it, which typically can be found in the description of kinship – a father is only a father 
in relation to his children. In the Amerindian perspectivism, however, substances named by 
substantives like fish, snake, hammock, or beer are somehow used as if they were relational 
pointers, something halfway between a noun and a pronoun, a substantive and a deictic. This 
implies that something is a fish only by virtue of someone else whose fish it is. (Viveiros de 
Castro 2004, 472-473) 
This amounts to a paradigmatic change from the access to knowledge to the affirmation 
of the existence of a different form of knowledge, resonating with the shift from the 
epistemological to the ontological, which implies that in order to know something, we should 
not take it as an object of study but rather learn to take its perspective.  
However, careful differentiation should go into the interpretation before drawing hasty 
conclusions such that we need to treat machines like human beings. Masahiro Mori writes on 
the relationships between robotics and Buddhism in the book The Buddha in the Robot: a Robot 
Engineer’s Thoughts on Science and Religion. The opening line reads, ‘I believe robots have 
the Buddha-nature within them – that is, the potential for attaining Buddhahood’ (Mori 1985). 
Jordi Vallverdú interprets the argument as, ‘all things in the universe are related one to another, 
in a way that the whole can be seen in any part. Taking this further, belief in the discrete 
existence of beings and things, that is, between beings and their bodies, is totally flawed. The 
illusion of a discrete world populated by entities is simply that – an illusion. The basic life-
force, called ku, forms and moves everything. In animist Japanese tradition, this force is present 
in inanimate objects and is called kami. Kami is the fundamental unit of the sacred in Shinto. 
This life is in animals, people and rocks, trees, rivers and mountains too. Consequently, matter 
has the nature of Buddha. For this reason, he argued that the Buddha-nature must also be present 
in the machines and the robots that roboticists make. The truth of the universe is embodied in 
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all its parts’ (Vallverdú 2011, 177) Is the view of kami founded on extensiveness or 
intensiveness? Without going into a discussion on Shintoism, it does seem that the logical 
construction of concatenation from kami to matter to Buddhahood is too simplified and follows 
the scheme of distributing or imbuing spirits to matters. Another case concerns Sophia, a 
humanoid robot to receive ‘citizenship’ from Saudi Arabia government in 2017. Quickly 
drawing awe and shock, Sophia is dubbed the first robot to be recognised with a national 
citizenship, which in this case is no more than a number plate for a more sophisticated car. And 
on the other hand, the kafala system in Saudi Arabia monitoring foreign workers and Sharia 
Islamic law forbidding women to appear in public space without a company show the 
controversies and hypocrisy of such purported ‘recognition’ bestowed to Sophia.  
If it tells us anything, it tells us about ourselves and our anthropomorphising tendency, 
not about technology. The question lies in the interpretation. The interpretative frame can easily 
be tricked to follow the extensive view that separates the human and the robot in the first place 
as subject and object, and merely endows the robot with spirits inexplicable in human terms, 
then it becomes a naïve and anthropomorphic form of animism, a mere delegation of power and 
responsibilities and a leap of faith. If we assume the relational arising as conditioning the robots 
– with or without spirit – and the human, then there is always already the technological-spiritual 
relation, which evolves over time and takes on new dimensions. In this way, the machines and 
robots with ‘spirits’ can escape the anthropomorphic interpretive frame, and enter into a realm 
pertaining to multiperspectivism – at least a weaker version of it. 
Similarly, to view Jeong’s practice in this light, here I do not wish to suggest that the 
artist attempts to quest into the world of machines of various complexities, dummy figures and 
sex toys, to demonstrate or to approximate how machines think or work. Nor do I wish to 
equalise them in essence, and by so doing, endowing the machines with spirits. Rather, her 
works evince a deep respect for the ontological status of the objects and dummy figures and 
acknowledgement that the operations and engagements with the machines, however much or 
little they are determined by herself, are founded on this ontological affirmation. They give a 
strange manifestation of the relational co-existence of two distinctive kinds of ‘entities,’ that of 
the human and machine/object, especially as they co-evolve through the performative works. 
The strangeness comes from her using the technical/machinic means for non-conventional ends, 
such as operating the hydraulic truck to ‘masturbate’ the woman figure made of sand. Her 
endeavours amount to a retuning or retraining of the way we look at the machines/objects as 
something existing in their own rights, beyond the utilitarian purposes they are designed for. Of 
course, they do exist in the first place as designed by us, but even the designing process involves 
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a certain degree of co-participation.  
In this sense, the objects can never be isolated from the man-machine constellation that 
gives rise to new capacities and modes of being. But beyond the utilitarian desire, there are 
other articulations of desire out of the assemblage, for example, when something goes wrong 
on the material level, unexpected results may happen. We can push the assemblage to the 
speculative realm, namely the primary condition of the experience of technics which is nothing 
less than cosmology, which Yuk Hui terms ‘cosmotechnics’ (Hui 2016, 203-223). This will be 
more fleshed out in the last chapter. 
A nuanced analysis on the relational assemblage concerning multiple agents casting 
influence upon each other can be found in Isabelle Stengers’ treatment of magic. She traces 
how in Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage to which everything immanently belongs, one is not 
endowed with agency or intention, but that the agency, or desire, belongs to the assemblage as 
such (Stengers 2012, 7). This debases the subject-predicate forms of mystifying the power of 
the ‘object’ in animism, for the ‘object,’ whatever it is, does not emanate magical power by 
itself but rather participates in the whole material-metaphysical assemblage that leads the 
observer to believe that something happens beyond the sum total of the parts.  
Furthermore, David Abram examines how magic, more than something to be subjected 
to critical reason, reveals the creativity of our senses:  
 
From the magician's, or the phenomenologist's, perspective, that which we call 
imagination is from the rest an attribute of the senses themselves; imagination is not a 
separate mental faculty (as we so often assume) but is rather the way the senses 
themselves have of throwing themselves beyond what is immediately given, in order to 
make tentative contact with the other sides of things that we do not sense directly, with 
the hidden or invisible aspects of the sensible. And yet such sensory anticipations and 
projections are not arbitrary; they regularly respond to suggestions offered by the 
sensible itself. The magician, for instance, may make the magic palpable for the au- 
dience by following the invisible coin's journey with the focus of his own eyes, and by 
imaginatively ‘feeling’ the coin depart from the one hand and arrive in the palm of the 
other; the audience's senses, responding to subtle shifts in the magician’s body as well 
as to the coin, will then find the effect irresistible. In other words, it is when the magician 
lets himself be captured by the magic that his audience will be most willing to join him. 
(Abram 1996, 58) 
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In the magician-magical objects-spectator assemblage of intensiveness, the non-sensual 
sense perception (as Massumi terms it, as analysed in the chapter on Lawrence Abu Hamdan 
and the materiality of language) casts the discussion of animism in a new light: not only is the 
nuance of animism implied in the multiperspectivism argued above, it also attests to the creative 
advance in the world, which – though largely invisible – can intensify our experiences, as 
incompatibles and contrasts are positively prehended to add to the greater complexity of the 
world.  
In Jeong’s works, the desire/agency that verges on being (mis)interpreted for sexual 
desire emerges out of Jeong’s carefully orchestrated assemblage of machines, dummies and 
tools. The creativity of our senses is the very faculty that Jeong’s performances enlists as we 
intuit the fine relation between Jeong and the material constellation she constructs, decoyed and 
captivated by the co-evolution of the human and nonhuman actors alike. In this way, we are 
intuitively tuned to sensations and senses beyond the logical order, just as Jeong, the artist 
herself is led and lured by what she’s performing. Not focused on the mere procedures of 
operating machines and manipulating dummy figures, the artist – an unwitting magician – 
becomes part of a larger assemblage desiring or evincing an agency of a strange love.  
 It is therefore logically consistent that one reviewer of Jeong’s exhibition writes that, 
‘[t]his folding from inflator to inflated, from medical to erotic, and erotic to comic and ludic, 
created the overwhelming impression that within and between these articles a narrative is 
written – a script waiting to be performed. […] Seeing both sides of this darkly erotic and at 
times implicitly violent mechanical mirror, we’re invited to reflect on a question regarding 
objects and people: Which performs which?’ (Carter Miles 2017) This feeling that there is an 
invisible script unfolding in the performance is prompted by the sensible itself, a desire that 
pertains to the virtual.  
To conclude this part, the theory of multiperspectivism adopted creatively here helps to 
trace the multiple lines that the works enact: the line of Jeong, a minoritarian becoming, and the 
lines of the machines, each having its own modes of movement. Doubtlessly, the ‘perspectives’ 
of the machines are less comparable to the perspectives of jaguars and tapirs, for the plain reason 
that the machines were invented in the first place, in a network of human and material actors, 
to fulfil certain ends. At the same time, if we play down the aspect of the intention of design 
arising out of the network, and indeed replace the network with a different network, such as that 
enacted here, then the interdependence of the machine, the human, and the practical 
functionality of design do not necessarily hold true. In this way, the operations of both the 
animals in Ameridian belief and the machines in Jeong’s works could be said to be based on 
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non-cognitive intentionality, though it does not imbue them with self-conscious spirits. And if 
we are to observe things, created by us or not, we ought to do so above the layer of cultural 
construction where we can find another plateau from where to view the objects as they are. This 
new light reveals the ‘strangeness of things,’ which is to say, ‘the ways that they exist without 
being “posited” by us and without being “given” to or “manifested” by us’ (Shaviro 2014, 66). 
To explore how the mode of univocal and relational existence functions, the following section 
will examine the ideas of Whitehead.   
 
4.4. Intensive relations: prehension, perception, individuation 
 
4.4.1. Whiteheadian prehension and feeling  
 
The reductionist view singles out one relation of exchange such as the subject and object. This 
mode of thinking is extensive, for in the Bergsonian sense, it spatialises the participants in the 
moment, and by doing so relegating many other relations that are intensive in nature. Our 
subject-predicate mind is used to conceive extended things, which is conditioned by a generic, 
homogeneous notion of space. When we conceive this space, we excise our power over real 
space, that is, we are using ‘our faculty of decomposing and recomposing it as we please, we 
project the whole of these possible decompositions and recompositions behind real extension 
in the form of a homogeneous space, empty and indifferent, which is supposed to underlie it’ 
(Bergson 1998, 169). 
What comes as conceptual aid is the view based on intensiveness, which is not just a 
reactive opposition against the view of spatialisation and extensiveness, but also fundamentally 
undermines the assumption of spatialisation. For Deleuze and Guattari, earth is the primary full 
body that is unengendered, while the territorial machine tries to inscribe or mark on the body 
to create filiations. The nature of this filiation is intensive, ‘this inclusive disjunction where 
everything divides, but into itself, and where the same being is everywhere, on every side, at 
every level, differing only in intensity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 154). Only under the 
despotic regime does something comes from on top, under whose reign the body of earth ceases 
to be inclusive, and instead it becomes exclusive. ‘Once this occurs, there is a dismembering of 
the full body, a cancelling of twinness, a separation of the sexes marked by circumcision, but 
also a recomposition of the body according to a new model of connection or conjugation, an 
articulation of bodies for and between themselves’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 155). As we 
have already seen in the previous chapter, the separation of the two sexes marks one such event 
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of extensive inscription. Here, similarly, the analytical tool helps shed light on the process 
through which bodies are separated and become entities for themselves in an extensive mode.  
The intensive and dynamic nature between entities, no longer constrained to the 
preconditioned subjecthood and objecthood, also challenges what is typically exalted as the 
most important feature of humanism, that of thinking, which spatialises into the image of a 
thinking subject thinking an object. This leads to correlationism, the charge ‘according to which 
we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either 
term considered apart from the other’ (Meillassoux 2008, 5). What this non-dualistic, and non-
correlational relation amounts to is that what the ‘mind’ philosophers so relentlessly seek to 
locate as ‘thinking’ is nowhere but immanent to things themselves. In other words, mind is 
immanent to being.  
Whitehead offers a systematic explanation of this paradigm of thinking through the 
concept of prehension. Prehension, which he defines as ‘uncognitive apprehension’ (Whitehead 
1967 [1925], 69), renders legible the relational connections between people, things and their 
surroundings by highlighting the operation of uncognitive ‘grasping’ – a pre-epistemic, not 
necessarily knowledge-based operation of relating to things and environments. Prehension 
‘does not require explanation but must enable the exhibition of the common feature of all 
situations in which something makes a difference for something else’ (Stengers 2011, 147). So 
the Earth orbiting around the Sun prehends the Sun, the apple falling from the tree prehends 
the ground. In light of this, no entity is ever fixed or static, for ‘[a] new entity comes into being 
by prehending other entities; every event is the prehension of other events’ (Shaviro 2009, 28).  
A ‘feeling’ for Whitehead is ‘positive prehension,’ or ‘the definite inclusion of [one] 
item into positive contribution to the subject’s own real internal constitution’. In contrast, ‘[a] 
negative prehension is the definite exclusion of that item from positive contribution to the 
subject’s own real internal constitution’ (Whitehead 1929, 41). As such, the ‘feeling’ operates 
regardless of the human perceiving mind, as indeed the apple tree can be said to ‘feel’ the earth. 
This Whiteheadian ‘feeling’ is more of a non-intentional kind and can be disassociated from a 
human sensing subject. This does not discount the experience of the human by negating it and 
pronouncing it as unauthentic all together, but questions the registration of the feeling by posing 
a contrast ‘between a “self” and “that of which there is experience,” but without duplicating it 
by reference to an “I” or a “me”’ (Stengers 2011, 31). The disposition of the sense of self and 
that which there is a feeling is a way of describing – at the verge of the non-explicable – what 
happens before the ‘I’ emerges out of the assemblage.  
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This amounts to a new paradigm which does not favour the subject-predicate, or the ‘I 
think…’ as the condition of thinking, and instead refocuses on the process of feeling as 
preceding and conditioning the ‘I’. In other words, ‘the feeling entity is “conditioned” by, or is 
an “effect” of, all the other entities that it feels’ (Whitehead 1929, 236) and this entity, in turn, 
becomes a condition, or a cause, for whatever subsequent entities feel it in their own ways. 
Every entity thus ‘conforms to the data’ that it receives from the past, in that ‘it feels the data’ 
(Whitehead 1929, 236). In the act of feeling its data, every entity ‘also selects among, shapes, 
and alters these data, until it reaches a final determination’ (Shaviro 2009, 63). 
 
4.4.2. Perception, cognition beyond senses and the body 
 
For Whitehead, perception is the ‘cognition of prehensive unification’ or, more simply, 
‘cognition of prehension’ (Stengers 2011, 47). Similar to the debasing of ‘feeling’ from a 
feeling subject, it follows that the intelligible process we characterise as thinking is to be untied 
from an exclusive and defined human subject, and is indeed to be understood as 
‘nonphenomenological, insofar as it goes on without establishing relations of intentionality to 
anything beyond itself and even without establishing any sort of reflexive relation to itself’ 
(Shaviro 2014, 126). Thinking does not need to think itself, nor does it need a subject that 
participates in sense-perception to qualify as thinking. It just happens or passes, ‘as a sort of 
flavouring – of the very world that it is supposed to be “about” and whose objects it is supposed 
to “intend”’ (Shaviro 2014, 80). This Whiteheadian frame of human and nonhuman prehension 
lays the foundation for theorising cognition beyond sense-perception.  
Importantly for Whiteheadian thinkers, ‘nonconscious experience is not an oxymoron; 
it is simply that more things are felt than can be known’ (Shaviro 2014, 79). Once we accept 
that perception is unbound from the sensing and sense-making operations of the human, then 
everything senses and perceives and it does so in its own ways. As Shaviro succinctly analyses, 
‘everything is mindful, or has a mind, but this does not necessarily entail that everything is 
“given” or “manifested” to a mind’ (Shaviro 2014, 82). Our attempt to understand the way the 
tree senses by resorting to vocabulary pertaining to human knowledge and even biology will be 
of no avail. Echoing the bat question earlier, certainly the bat has its own form of ‘mind,’ but 
its form of mind is not necessarily manifested to our form of mind. This further confirms that 
the way things are and the way they evolve – including especially nonhuman things – are 
adequate to themselves and have to be no more adequate than to themselves.  
Trying to strike a balance between speculative philosophers associated with the Object 
Oriented Ontology school and Whitehead, Shaviro emphasises that the character of mindfulness 
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of and among things should be recognised appropriate to their own context. The way the 
seemingly inanimate entities exert their mindfulness, for Whitehead and Shaviro, equals their 
valuing themselves, for the value of an entity lies in its ‘sense of existence for its own sake, of 
existence which is its own justification, of existence with its own character’ (Whitehead 1938, 
109). And the way they manifest their value is to persist through time and undergo self-
transformation. Shaviro writes, ‘the value activity of an entity that persists through time is not 
just a matter of self-perpetuation or of the continually renewed achievement of homeostatic 
equilibrium. It may well also involve growth or shrinkage and assimilation or expulsion, or an 
active self-transformation and becoming-other’ (Shaviro 2014, 89). This is what Whitehead 
calls ‘conceptual initiative,’ or ‘the origination of conceptual novelty’ (Whitehead 1929, 102). 
The aspect of the novelty could be considered an update on Spinoza’s concept of ‘conatus,’ 
which is the striving of a thing to persist in being that Spinoza equates with the essence of the 
very thing. (Spinoza 1992) Whitehead duly expands the persistence into processes of 
transformation, thus bringing dynamism into the discussion.   
If the way things ‘are’ is conceptualised as such, then the fallacy of reductionist animism 
becomes obvious. The tendency of projecting the known into the invisible and unknown, which 
implies concepts of self-contained entities and spatialised relations, is categorically 
anthropomorphising and loses its ground in the face of the nonhuman mind immanent to things.  
The process of prehension and feeling thus puts everything in a relational network, an 
immanent and emergent network in the material world. In the words of Shaviro, ‘Feeling, as 
such, is the primordial form of all relation and all communication. […] An act of feeling is an 
encounter – a contingent event, an opening to the outside – rather than an intrinsic, 
predetermined relationship. And feeling changes whatever it encounters, even in the very act of 
“conforming” to it. That is why feeling is irreducible to cognition’ (Shaviro 2009, 63). 
 Hansen goes further to point out that feeling is the source of the ‘feelers’ and precedes 
the constitution of any distinct ‘feelers,’ thereby foregrounding the process of relational 
encounter – feeling as the condition for feelers to emerge out of the relational network:  
 
Rather than characterising the feeling (or positive prehension) first and foremost as a 
‘contribution to the subject’s own real internal constitution,’ we would do better to 
divide feeling between two distinct standpoints, that of the objective data informing 
process and that of the incipient subjective polarisation. Prior to giving rise to the latter 
– and in order to do so – feeling characterise the pattern of contrasts of objectified data 
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as they bond together and converge around a congealing unity that can only 
subsequently emerge as the prehender or feeler of these feelings. (Hansen 2014, 76) 
 
Art affords us a particular situation whereby we can explore the rich dimensions of 
feeling, before or aside from cognition. This is a similar process to the ritual dances mentioned 
in chapter two, which brings forth virtual events that are pertinent to feeling before its bodily 
articulation by the feelers. We can only obtain ‘a clear-cut experience by concentrating on the 
abstractions of consciousness’ (Whitehead 1938, 108), because ‘very few aspects of our 
experience are actually clear and distinct’ (Shaviro 2009, 97). We are reminded that if we 
exercise a heightened attention to these feelings, we are able to dwell in them longer. Yet, it is 
naïve and all too anthropocentric if we seek a certain spirit to animate an object so that through 
the mediation we get to feel something different, as if we need to find another agent that ‘feels’ 
the feelings. That something different is already there – in this relational network of feeling, but 
we often overlook this level of relation and communication due to our habitual abstraction in 
thinking. 
Now, how does this heightened attention work so that feeling comes to be felt? 
Whitehead conversely describes the primitive form of physical experience as a blind emotional 
feeling, felt in its relevance to a world beyond, and at that stage, ‘the feeling is blind and the 
relevance is vague’. It functions as a ‘vector feeling, that is to say, feeling from a beyond which 
is determinate and pointing to a beyond which is to be determined’. The way this feeling is 
transmitted into higher or lower phases of experience is by way of, similar to physics, 
undulatory pulses through increased or inadequate dimensions of width. (Whitehead 1929, 162-
163) Here, Whitehead uses the term of vectors and waves borrowed from physics to illustrate 
feelings, because he makes ‘no essential distinction between physical causality (the way that 
one entity transmits energy or movement to another entity) on the one hand, and perception (the 
way that one entity feels, and responds to, another entity) on the other’ (Shaviro 2009, 63). 
This explanation through physics amounts to the view that consciousness is ultimately 
materially constituted. Shaviro threads together the various strands of thinking in Deleuze and 
Bergson as follows, 
 
For Bergson, sentience emerges without reflexivity and is a kind of experience that 
remains ‘in-itself’ without transcendence toward an external object. Deleuze, following 
him, formulates that if ‘all consciousness is something,’ then thought immanently 
coincides with matter in ‘the absolute identity of the image and movement’ (Deleuze 
	 119	
1986, 59). This leads Deleuze to claim that ‘it is not enough to say that consciousness 
is consciousness of something’ (Deleuze 1994, 220); rather, we must move backward 
and downward in order to reach the primordial point at which ‘consciousness ceases to 
be a light cast upon objects in order to become a pure phosphorescence of things in 
themselves’ (Deleuze 1990, 311). (Shaviro 2014, 131)  
  
In this physical causality-perception determination, we, among all the things, come to 
be (or better, become) in the world. The way to move forward in the world – the creative 
advance – is not to be confined to orders achieved but to intensify experiences: ‘[e]motions are 
intensified, and experiences made richer, when incompatibilities, instead of being excluded 
(negatively prehended), are transformed into contrasts that can be positively integrated within 
a greater “complexity of order” (Shaviro 2014, 70). 
Yet it is imperative to stress that resorting to physics to explain phenomenon seemingly 
pertaining to the ‘mind’ does not mean that consciousness is purely a set of mechanics and 
therefore can be rendered in disembodied forms. Instead, the contrasts and incompatibilities 
that open to more intensive experiences take their roots firmly in the embodied experience. 
Therefore, feelings and perceptions are fully grounded in the materiality of the body: 
 
For Whitehead, bodies - which are, again, one kind of society among others (society 
being compositions of actual entities of varying complexity) – are compositions of 
attained actualities or susperjects, each of which has come to exist and to wield 
‘superjetal-subjective’ force because of its own self-inaugurating feeling of the entirety 
of the settled world to which it adds itself. Bodies, for Whitehead, can be said to have 
or to experience affectivity not because they respond to ‘virtual’ forces but because they 
are literally made up of elements that all have their respective origins in feeling and that 
cohere together through higher-order resonances that build upon, but do not supersede, 
their constitutive affective relationality. Far from being the source of power, bodies are 
more like hosts or channels for the force of worldly matter. As the superjectal-subjective 
force of the universe itself, feeling is what impels the constitution of such entities, and 
as such can only be felt in a mode of receptive passivity. (Hansen 2014, 74) 
 
The view of the body as that embodied reality bringing higher-order resonances together 
is an acute reminder of the materiality of bodies, human or otherwise. Even though Whitehead’s 
theory can be easily extrapolated to the studies of information theory which in turn contributes 
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to a process-based understanding of cybernetics, it does show the complex interplays between 
embodied forms of subjectivity and disembodiment in the cybernetic tradition.  
 
This long theoretical reflection on feeling, perception and thinking takes us (by way of 
critiquing naïve animism) back to the embodied choreography of Geumhyung Jeong. What we 
see on stage is no longer Jeong as an individual artist but rather it is Jeong as a multiplicity in a 
metastable state who emerges through the performance. The multiplicity, that is, the many 
levels of differential differences of Jeong (gender, race, age etc.) connect to the fragmented 
bodies of the mannequins and machines, forming an intense moment of intimacy, challenging 
the cultural signifiers conditioning social norms on micro and macro levels. On the one hand, 
we witness the intensity of Jeong’s desire for becoming something different, that is, other than 
being gendered, racialised and perhaps determined by age. And on the other, the intensity of 
the desiring machinic bodies in (less articulated) terms of persisting in itself – which fails with 
the rather mocking scene of the vibrating machine (or does it?), and of transformation in the 
face of new relations and communications with Jeong’s body/bodies.  
Through this process of multi-layered, differential becoming, the dancer ‘individuates,’ 
to borrow Gilbert Simondon’s beautiful term. For Simondon, the individual is but the 
momentary result from the process of individuation, and we should not, as we habitually do, 
take the cause as the effect. We have to understand ‘the individual from the perspective of the 
process of individuation rather than the process of individuation by means of the individual’ 
(Simondon 1992, 300). Importantly, the individuation resulting in the individual does not 
terminate the potential from the preindividual state but rather carries it on. Simondon writes,  
 
[…] the individual is to be understood as having a relative reality, occupying only a 
certain phase of the whole being in question - a phase that therefore carries the 
implication of a preceding preindividual state, and that, even after individuation, does 
not exist in isolation, since individuation does not exhaust in the single act of its 
appearance all the potentials embedded in the preindividual state. (Simondon 1992, 300) 
 
 Simondon’s individuation resonates with Whitehead’s idea on the body, or the hosts or 
channels for the force of worldly matter. Jeong’s practice bespeaks this wilful intensification of 
experiences by enacting the contact between herself and the machines. Co-inhabiting the stage, 
Jeong and the machines, and sometimes including the audience as well when they are seated on 
the stage, unveil and expose a creative experience based on incompatibilities. By bringing 
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contrasts that can be positively integrated within a greater ‘complexity of order,’ such as the 
machines decontextualised and transformed into other performative modes, the experiences of 
the audience are intensified and enriched.  
When perceiving – and participating in – her work this way, the power relation between 
Eastern female bodies and the observer, or the man-machine hierarchy, or any reading on the 
symbolic level slips away. And instead, the carefully constructed choreographic co-presence 
and relationality open the work to be experienced on the level of ‘feeling’.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
Geumhyung Joeng’s works present differential differences of her being East Asian, female, 
working shamanically with technology, yet they transgress beyond the conventional gaze. They 
open up to the indeterminate potentials arising from the ‘magic’ to which a world pertaining to 
the virtual momentarily emerges.  
This chapter brings a set of culturally specific parameters into the discussion of 
materialism, namely the lived and symbolic realities of East Asian womanhood. The intention, 
however, is to establish an immanent network of relationality as the lens for interpreting 
interpersonal, or better, infrapersonal and man-machine assemblages.  For what is commonly 
understood as interpersonal and between the man and machine is always already bordered, 
whereby discrete entities are charted in spatialised ways. As Rosenlee points out, the man-
woman relation in the traditional Confucian society goes beyond the divide between the 
biologically ‘natural’ woman and the ‘cultural’ man, and the praxis of reciprocity is crucial for 
co-constituting the personhood in a relational network.  
At a dramatically different scale, the naïve understanding of animism is similarly based 
on a presumed subject-object dichotomy. I’ve gone through Whiteheadian prehension, 
perception and cognition to situate what happens – however speculative or esoteric the question 
may sound – in animism and magic. What is enacted in Jeong’s works is an animism favouring 
the relational co-emergence with the man-machine assemblage, and the embodied reality of the 
body bringing higher-order resonances together. Instead of a ‘whatever’ life, but a life that 
equally imbues the doer, the material objects and the observer. A life, that is at the same time, 
a transversal desire that makes Geumhyung Jeong enter into a process of individuation under 
the condition of multiple connections with the fragmented machines and her pre-individual self.  
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5. Chapter Five 
Immanence, Performance and History: 
On Ho Tzu Nyen’s Ten Thousand Tigers 
 
 
Nature, that framed us of four elements  
Warring within our breasts for regiment, 
Doth teach us all to have aspiring minds.  
Our souls, whose faculties can comprehend  
The wondrous architecture of the world  
And measure every wandering planet’s course,  
Still climbing after knowledge infinite […] 
Christopher Marlowe, Tamburlaine the Great (1590) 
 
 
5.1. Ten Thousand Tigers and its Reception 
 
An opening teaser: when confronted with Singaporean artist Ho Tzu Nyen’s theatre production 
Ten Thousand Tigers (2014), audiences not familiar with the Chinese language may wonder, 
why ten thousand? Those recalling Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus 
may work out the math and see an image of ten tigers resting on each plateau. And those who 
know about Ho’s more recent video installation, titled Two or Three Tigers (2015), may be 
even more perplexed with the numbering. The numbering is not arbitrary, of course. In Chinese, 
‘ten thousand’ and ‘two or three’ are fictive numbers that allude to ‘magnitude/multitude’ and 
‘casual instance,’ respectively. At the same time, the unspecific number references what 
Deleuze and Guattari draw on as counterargument against Freud in the treatment of a wolf 
dream: instead of counting the specific numbers of wolves and relating the numbers to cultural 
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significance such as the parents, they allow the patient to confess, ‘How stupid, you can’t be 
one wolf, you’re always eight or nine, six or seven’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 29) Wolves 
are always in packs, one among others, at the same time one and multiple. The wolf numeric 
offers a good entry into the universe of Ten Thousand Tigers.  
 This chapter focuses on Ho Tzu Nyen’s Ten Thousand Tigers and delves into its 
multitude of layers in which animistic belief, history, man, and non-human and non-organic 
actors intermingle into a grandiose narrative. Ten Thousand Tigers interweaves the history of 
Southeast Asia through the figuration of the tiger. In folk belief, the animal is said to possess 
humans under certain circumstances and make ‘weretigers;’ yet this ambiguous, more equal 
relation between man and tiger has changed in modern times. Further, the ruthless Japanese 
generals in World War II known as Malay Tigers and the many-faced Lai Teck, the Malayan 
Communist Party secretary who was likened to a tiger, add historical weight to the man-tiger 
relation.  
 When the piece was shown at the Vienna Festival in 2014, it garnered enthusiastic, if 
somewhat over-exoticising, reviews. The Tiroler Tageszeitung review, for example, celebrated 
that the piece successfully conveys the making of the Malayan world by the colonial powers; 
at the same time, it remarks that ‘the past and the future belong to the tiger’ and that the artist 
develops ‘the old myths around the secret cult animal of shamans and the miraculous’ (Online 
2014). Perhaps a regional popular newspaper could be excused for exaggerating the ‘mythical’ 
aspect of the theatre piece, yet it evinces a general tendency for things beyond the rational frame 
of understanding to be categorised as ‘cult’ and the ‘miraculous.’ More alarmingly, it should be 
pointed out that the notion of the ‘timeless’ character of Asia slips in unquestioned, so that with 
a leap of faith the tiger as a figuration has to possess potential for the future. Such a 
categorisation is similar to the question of animism analysed in the last chapter on Geumhyung 
Jeong’s works. 
 The work was celebrated in Singapore, and the local newspaper The Straits Times 
offered a more in-depth reading of the piece. Aware of the cultural and historical backgrounds, 
the critic remarked that the work ‘examines the authority of folklore and its subconscious 
impact on the local psyche’ (Tan 2014). Here I refrain from labelling either review as a right or 
wrong interpretation; yet it is telling to observe how the reviewers choose to highlight or not 
highlight the dynamic transformation process between man and tiger, and its spiritual, material, 
historical and political implications.  
  In the following, I will pursue the unfolding of the narrative and revisit each historical 
station to bring to the fore the trans-historical and meta-historical scheme of Ten Thousand 
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Tigers. The analysis is situated in an expanded field of media theory, encompassing the 
technicality and affectivity of (inter)mediated encounters, as well as proposing a view of matter, 
time/space, and events as non-fixed and dynamic. In this way, I hope to flesh out the affective 
and philosophical dimension of Ten Thousand Tigers, which renders the performance both as 
an experience and as a kind of ‘thinking’ (Cull 2013). Based on the analysis of the work, I will 
further pursue a trans-historical and meta-historical philosophy of history, following the lines 
of thinking of Deleuze and Guattari. 
 
5.2. The multiple transformations in Ten Thousand Tigers 
 
5.2.1. The set as intermedial edifice  
 
The piece opens in darkness. With the sound of the play button being pressed, light is shed on 
a magnetic tape deck on the upper left side of the stage. A voice comes from an old tape 
recorder, in Mandarin Chinese: ‘Most of what is known about us comes largely from spies, 
traitors, double agents, informers…’ (Ho 2014) The adjacent compartmental space is lit up and 
reveals piles of documents in it, resembling an unattended archive. Against the vast space of 
darkness yet to be revealed on the theatre stage that tiny window of light seems to forecast a 
looming presence of memory. 
 In Ten Thousand Tigers, the performance happens in an intricately designed ‘stage 
edifice’ with vitrines and display boxes of varying sizes stacked up to fill almost the full width 
and height of the stage. (Fig. 5.1) The audience only comes to see the entirety of the stage 
almost at the end of the performance; before that, only parts of the stage are revealed to the 
audience through meticulously controlled lighting. Invoking the aesthetics of a cabinet of 
curiosity, to the political dimension of which we will return, the vitrines and boxes contain real 
and virtual, mechanised and immobile objects, as well as four actors – themselves remaining 
immobile throughout the performance. (Fig. 5.2) The edifice on stage thus inaugurates a dense 
interplay of objects, bodies and variations of media technology. This amounts to what Chiel 
Kattenbelt calls ‘intermediality’ of theatre, demonstrated in its efficacy of inducing mutual 
affect, which entails ‘co-relations between different media that result in a redefinition of the 
media that are influencing each other, which in turn leads to a refreshed perception’ (Kattenbelt 
2010, 25).     
 In the close reading of key moments in Ten Thousand Tigers that follows, we have to 
perhaps come up with a more adequate terminology than ‘scenes’ to describe what we register 
from our experience. Duly mirroring ‘intermediality,’ Ho aptly calls the distribution of 
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experience in theatrical time-space ‘fragments’. In these fragments, the audience is constantly 
confronted with the alliance created between bodies and technologies onstage which thwarts 
the dominant gaze. This means seeing the technological apparatuses of media ‘performatively 
on stage as agents for form and content, not merely as the systems through which ideas are 
imparted, but as ideas, subjects, themselves’ (Parker-Starbuck 2011, 40). 
 Back on stage, the narrator continues in a solemn and emphatic voice: ‘He who controls 
the flow of stories, controls history. The art of the narrative belongs to the police’ (Ho 2014). 
Ho’s script is a masterfully crafted flow of texts of narration and commentary, some of which 
are in deep resonance with philosophical texts. The audience may be reminded of George 
Orwell’s remark on politics of historiography or Michel Foucault’s politics of knowledge 
production, and may wonder to which extent this political framing of history will condition the 
piece. At this point the magnetic tape deck abruptly starts fast-forwarding. Is it a sign of a living 
machine? We will see later. As it comes to an equally abrupt halt, music starts. Another 
compartmental space is illuminated on stage, resembling a cabinet of curiosities from afar. We 
can discern busts of Lenin and Ho Chi Minh, mannequins of other figures, skulls, and on the 
small flat screens tucked neatly in between physical figures, photos and three-dimensional 
models of heads are to be seen. 
 
In voice-over, a story is told in Japanese about Lai Teck, Secretary-General of the 
Malayan Communist Party from 1939 until after World War II, who goes by many different 
names: Nguyen Van Long, Hoang A Nhac, Pham Van Dac, Mr Light, C.H. Chang, Wong Kim 
Geok, D. Ling, Malaya’s Lenin, the right hand of Ho Chih Minh, etc. While these names are 
enunciated, the spotlight switches on and off on different busts and objects and the heads on 
screens fade in and out. This multi-media segment about the mysterious Lai Teck concludes 
with: ‘He is every name in history’ (Ho 2014).  
 Now spotlights are on a series of deformed heads as if undergoing transformation (in 
this segment, Ho was inspired by the painter Francis Bacon). The narrator speaks in a low-
pitched voice, ‘when one does not know a man, he is a tiger to man’ (Ho 2014), heralding the 
theme of the piece, and its variations that trigger inexhaustible permutations – man and tiger, 
tiger to man, man as tiger, and so forth. 
 The opening scene sets the basic parameters of the performance: the stage machinery 
carries out calculated manipulations of the objects, the actors do not adhere to narrative 
personalities but are rather implicated in the timing of the machinery. Here, we are confronted 
with mediality both in its technological constitution as media device and, in the expanded sense, 
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mediality as process of transformation – transforming from one format into another in the case 
of the tape recording, and from one form of being into another in the case of the Bacon-inspired 
deformed figures. This further adds dynamics to our understanding of intermediality, in which 
the matrix of transformative and transforming participants may be said to enter into ‘a becoming 
that changes both the work and the world as representation or differential repetition’ (Cull 2013, 
5). The variety of objects – digital or analogue machines, screens and showcases – that are to 
sustain the curiosity of the audience in the entire performance posit a challenge at the same 
time: ‘What can we learn about bodies and technologies through their exchanges?’ (Parker-
Starbuck 2011, 51) The question of ‘liveness’ and ‘life’ itself also comes into play; the two at 
times follow separate paths to reinforce the separation of the theatre and its audience, and at 
times intermingle and prompt philosophical questions.  
 
5.2.2. Transformation of Man and Tiger 
 
Subsequently, other parts of the stage machinery are lit. We see a silhouette of two squatting 
figures against a light box and hear a quiet voice in Malay: ‘No one here calls the tiger by its 
proper name, unless in a whisper. For speech is spell, and words warp the weave of the worlds’ 
(Ho 2014). The squatting figures are in the dark and their faces illegible; their postures are 
steady and unmoving. In the enticing whispering, it is conveyed that ‘Man is not a being but a 
place. Of ceaseless divisions’ (Ho 2014). The transformation, or transmogrification, between 
man and tiger is deeply imbued in the narrative of Ten Thousand Tigers. More than a folk belief 
that confers magical power to man while allowing man to elude responsibility from potentially 
inhumane actions, it rather paints an entirely different worldview in which the tiger and man 
are both immanent to a grand process of transformation and, to a certain extent, on an equal 
footing. What this means, and more importantly, what this feels like, will be explored 
throughout the piece.  
 To shed more light on the transfiguration of man and tiger into each other, it is said that 
‘in the river, the tiger bleeds, into the shadow of man’ (Ho 2014). A key element in the Ten 
Thousand Tigers cosmology is thus introduced: water. The squatting figures – now we could 
take them for weretigers – further recount, ‘The being of animal in the world is like that of 
water in water. This is why in the midst of crossing a river one is able to dissolve into a tiger’ 
(Ho 2014). They further relate, in almost a chanting way, ‘I touch, but I never touch my hand 
touching,’ ‘Am I a tiger among men? Or a man among tigers?’ (Ho 2014) 
These poetic lines give an indication of the univocity of being: multiplicity within 
univocity. In which way is the being in the world univocal? It is, to be sure, not an erasure of 
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difference. As Deleuze puts it, ‘In effect, the essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a 
single and same sense, but that it is said, in a single and same sense, of all its individuating 
differences or intrinsic modalities’ (Deleuze 1994, 36). It is best grasped in the image of water 
in water – ‘A single and same voice for the whole thousand-voiced multiple, a single and same 
Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings’ (Deleuze 1994, 304).  
This image is important for Bataille too. In the Theory of Religion, Bataille uses the term 
‘animality’ to refer to immediacy. ‘The animal is not a separate consciousness defining itself in 
opposition to the world but is, rather, … fully continuous with the world. Each animal is in the 
world like water inside of water’ (Bataille 1992, 24-25).  The encounter between Bataille and 
the animal happens as follows: in the movement of the waters, a lion is only a slightly bigger 
wave, overturning other, smaller ones. Bataille writes: ‘the animal opens before me a depth 
which attracts me and which is familiar to me. In a sense, I know this depth: it is my own’ 
(Bataille 1992, 22). Yet the undifferentiated continuity glimpsed in the animal is also ‘that 
which is farthest removed from me… which is unfathomable to me’ (Bataille 1992, 22). The 
emergence of a subject-object relationship between the human being and the world signifies, 
for Bataille, the end of the intimacy which envelops and dissolves the animal in its environment. 
The rupture in our intimacy with the world is consummated and made irrevocable by the human 
use of tools. The tool forces the subject/object split and indicates the end of the ‘indistinct 
continuity of the animal realm’ (Lushetich 2016, 122). 
The emergence of tools in the name of scientific objectivity rewrites the relation 
between man and the world in the modern period, even though for a much longer period of 
time, the relation remained intact in societies of the nomads or the Chinese. The animal is 
relegated to the depth of the unknown and irrational, hence presenting itself as ‘familiar’ at 
times, and horrifying at others. The animality and desire embodied by the tiger is far from the 
only case where modernity takes myth to issue. For example, the exercise of rationality and 
instrumental reason is captured in Horkheimer and Adorno’s allegorical reading of the Siren 
myth. For them, when Odysseus sails past the Sirens bound to the ship so that he will not be 
lured to shipwreck, he is the model for an individuated, isolated subject exercising his ability 
to think rationally (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 26-27). In contrast, the image of water in 
water perfectly captures this relation of continuity, not based on individuated subjects or objects 
in the first place but always already part of a larger whole.  
At this moment, another part of the stage awakens. We see a transparent water tank 
mounted on the upper part of theatre machinery; in it, vibration-induced black torrents 
continuously shoot upward and mingle with clean water. The two different liquid substances 
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swirl and dance without mingling to become one body of liquid. This creates a sensorial image 
of two bodies of water entwined – or is it the tiger bleeding into the shadow of man – being one 
of the same, of water, yet differentiable. More than a theoretical concept, the ‘indigenous’ belief 
offers a practical instance of univocity in the moment that tiger bleeds into the shadow of man 
in the image of the squatting figures.   
The power of theatre lies in the affective enaction. Now, even if we put ‘water in water’ 
as an ontological inquiry aside, the audience can still approach the affective space that water 
opens for us, which is to say the dissolution of the delimited body of the subject in the water, 
phenomenologically. Performance scholar Jose Gil proposes a wonderful exercise: ‘Let’s 
immerse ourselves completely naked in a deep bathtub, leaving only our heads sticking out of 
the water; lets drop onto the surface of the water, near our submerged feet, a spider. We will 
feel the animals contact on the entirety of our skin. What happened? The water created a space 
of the body defined by the skin-membrane of the bathtub’s water. From this example we can 
extract two consequences pertaining to the properties of the space of the body: it prolongs the 
body’s limits beyond its visible contours; it is an intensified space, when compared with the 
habitual tactility of the skin’ (Gil 2006, 22). 
Water here becomes a medium that allows a sensual experience of univocity, whereby 
the affective image of water in water triggers our projection of our own manner of being in the 
world – there is a parallel, not of essence, but of manner.  
 
5.2.3. The Camera and the Uncanny 
 
The water segment is neatly followed by the introduction of the camera in the context of 
Malaya: in 1906, the first photograph of a Malay weretiger was taken by the English 
anthropologist Walter William Skeat. In the conception of the staging, the photograph serves 
as a reference for the posture of the squatting weretiger figures against the light box. Another 
segment on the left side of the stage edifice with an old-school camera is revealed; its flash bulb 
is suddenly activated, creating a burst of light. At the same time, the squatting weretigers on the 
right side of the stage are lit up by a flash, making the figures momentarily visible and appearing 
paper-flat, as if they were captured in a photograph. The flash recedes quickly, and the 
weretigers voice a meditation on photography: ‘Men love tigers for the same reason they love 
the photograph: the love of the dead. Every photograph preserves the future death of a captured 
object. Every photograph promises the return of the dead’ (Ho).  
As put forth in the chapter on Geumhyung Jeong, animism, being a belief of a belief, 
symbolises the retraction of the modern mind in the face of a bifurcated world. Art, in the 
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moments when it activates its world-producing potential, can render these different worldviews 
legible, or perhaps more than legible, experienceable. For this reason, this moment of 
photography and gramophone is worth unpacking in Ten Thousand Tigers.  
In the West, nineteenth century rationalist science frequently referred to the soul as an 
image: 
 
It is a thin, unsubstantial human image, in its nature a sort of vapour, film or shadow; 
the cause of life and thought in the individual it animates; independently possessing the 
personal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, past or present; capable of 
leaving the body far behind, to ash swiftly from place to place; mostly impalpable and 
invisible, yet also manifesting physical power, and especially appearing to men waking 
or asleep as a phantasm separate from the body of which it bears the likeness; continuing 
to exist and appear to men after the death of that body; able to enter into, possess and 
act in the bodies of other men, of animals, and even things. (Tylor 1871, 429) 
 
In his study on animism and its relation to images, Anselm Franke points out that the 
way the soul is rendered in this account is similar to photography: ‘Though substantial, the 
photographic image, too, moves through time and space, appears as a phantasma bearing 
likeness, continues to exist after death, and has a certain physical and mediumistic power to 
“possess” other bodies, as any observation of a crowd in a cinema suffices to show’ (Franke 
2010, 26). 
Here, the retraction of the rational mind meets the ‘irrational’ other, strangely resonating 
each other. Photography assumes the status of an ‘actor’ on stage in Ten Thousand Tigers 
against a two-fold background. On the one hand, photography was institutionalised in the 
scientific program of colonisation and implicated in the hierarchy of the gaze, which renders 
the subject – weretigers, or the indigenous people in general – in the anthropologist’s eye as 
nothing more than the prey in the eyes of a hunter. Through its mechanical appropriation of the 
colonial gaze, the theatre performs and enacts the conditioning of the objectified human bodies, 
to subsume the bodies ‘as a text to be marked, traced, written upon by various regimes of 
institutional, (discursive and nondiscursive) power’ (Grosz 1994, 116). Yet on the other hand, 
the weretigers do not shy away from the camera; their comment on the camera and its user – 
the (implicated) Western men – rather thwarts the domination of the dominating gaze in that it 
returns photography to its pre-rational image of photography-soul.  
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 In light of this, the comment of the weretigers on technology contaminated by 
colonialism seems to thwart sheer dominance of Western technology; here the camera harbours 
something uncannier. The love for the dead is a perversion that does not allow much 
rationalisation; one may recall how it was believed, in the early days of its invention, that 
photography may capture the images of ghosts, just like it was believed that telegraphy may 
channel messages of the dead. Is this not one of the moments when the rationally-minded 
inventors, users and worshippers of technology are suspended from the rationalising frame of 
technology? Similar to Geumhyung Jeong’s relation to the machines in the previous chatper, 
here we are confronted with a media critique of photography that rather de-rationalises the 
technology and returns it to an assemblage that does not see the camera as a singled out entity, 
but part of a constellation. 
I’d like to draw on an extended case concerning camera and photography. While the 
West has ridded of the animist view on photography, for people in some parts of the world it 
continues to hold true that photography could capture the soul, or even steal the soul. The Grassi 
Museum für Völkerkunde in Leipzig recently commissioned a wax figure to be made based on 
a photograph of an indigenous shaman from Australia to be placed in their permanent collection 
display (despite the obvious racialising gaze implicated in such a gesture). Upon consultation, 
the shaman demanded that the figure be destroyed upon his death, for no other reason than that 
if his images would remain in the world, he would not be able to depart from this world after 
his death. The museum, hoping to make the most out of their financial investment on the display 
object, then suggested that they would make a figure with a face that morphs the features of 
both the shaman and his son, who was also a shaman. In this way, they hoped that the ‘expiration 
date’ of the figure could be extended for at least one more generation. This suggestion was 
accepted by the shaman and his son, and it is a figure with their morphed face that is on display 
in Grassi Museum. Such examples abound and are not constrained to ethnographic contexts. 
Chinese ‘superstition’ also stipulates that one should not use the photo of one’s junior children 
as background on the smart phone, for the ‘metallic’ energy associated with electronics will 
transduce harm to the well-being of the junior.  
Donna Haraway’s cyborg project as a weird marriage between the subjugated ‘other’ 
and technology resonates here: just like the feminists, the indigenous subject of colonialism has 
no eyes for a state of purity and does not want to return to a fictive origin, a supposed state of 
nature (Haraway 1985). For the delineation of nature and culture, organic and inorganic has 
always been there and negotiated differently. This makes possible the emergence of cyborg 
subjectivities – the weretigers and the recreated shaman figure, conceived as ‘othered’ bodies, 
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now form close kinship to photographic, computer or medical technologies, which ‘begin to 
shift and crack, exposing the materiality beneath such conceptions’ (Parker-Starbuck 2011, 98). 
This case of the shaman widens the discussion of media and ‘animist’ technology. The 
linking of image with the soul for Franke is ‘an expression of the modern belief in the continuity, 
as well as the rupture between magic and technology’ (Franke 2010, 33), even though as I have 
argued earlier, the attribution of soul to image is itself already embedded in a spatialised pre-
conception of the world, affirming what Franke calls ‘belief in belief’ (Franke 2010, 33). In this 
light, it is more pertinent to look at the relational practice emerging out of the assemblage of 
indigenous people, photography and the world that can be objectively captured or not.  
 If we take the indigenous perspective in this assemblage of desire seriously, we do not 
in fact go to quasi science to account for the transmission of ‘soul’ to the technologically 
mediated object of photography on a particle level. Instead, we allow ourselves to see that the 
relation between the shaman and the photographic rendering of him is one of continuation that 
he himself affirms. The making of a ‘cyborg’ wax figure morphing features from both himself 
and his son would amount to a creative act of unknown consequences for them. While this 
intervention from the museum may invite protests from post-colonialism minded critics, it may 
indeed be something of subversive potential from the perspective of the people concerned. The 
question is rather, how can we elevate the differences in perspectives and make them matter, or 
concretely, act on existing political structures? 
This leads to another case study on the film Les Maitres Fous (The Mad Masters, 1955) 
by anthropologist and filmmaker Jean Rouch. In the film, Jean Rouch records a possession in 
Ghana called Hauka, a ritual in which the colonised people perform military ceremonies of their 
colonisers. The documentarian images and the subjective experiences of being at the ritual 
interweave, gradually introducing the audience into a reflective mode, whereby the violence 
induced by colonialism is correlated to another kind of violence, that of the gaze. At the same 
time, the possessed participants in the ritual assume the roles of the ‘colonisers,’ i.e. the soldiers, 
doctors and governors, and enact what seems to be a business meeting between them. For the 
local colonised people, the supernatural power is exactly in the hands of the colonisers, in the 
way they exercise their will to subjugate other peoples, to change the natural environment, and 
to carry out scientific interventions. The film was expectedly controversial, as some 
anthropologists celebrated the Hauka as subversive, and others, notably some African audience 
saw it as racist. Anthropologist James Ferguson points out that for the latter group, within the 
cultural politics of the colonial order, imitation was less about sympathetic magic and 
accommodating white power within indigenous cultural orders than about claims to 
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membership within modern society and negotiations of the rights proper to such membership 
(Ferguson 2002, 557). The question of ‘who can speak for whom’ still lingers, though with his 
reflexive anthropology, the angle and scope of the perspective should have been enlarged. 
Without going deeper on questions pertaining to the anthropological discipline, this study is 
intriguing for a cultural philosophical reflection on the parallel perspectives that may seem 
excruciating from a certain postcolonial point of view, or at the same time subversive for others, 
but that nevertheless is a valid perspective for those concerned. The fact that the locals enact 
the scenes of their colonial masters shows that in their world order, there is still the man-heaven 
alignment, and changes are assumed to be activated through the shamanic ritual. This world 
order pertains to the despotic regime in Deleuze and Guattari, which I will analyse more in 
detail. As such, this kind of world view acts as acute reminders of a bygone order, though it 
should not be romanticised – which is to say, this discussion does not in the very least endorse 
a view they don’t deserve to be elevated out of colonisation, as discussed in Chibber’s stance 
against orientalising tendency in some strands of postcolonial theory. 
 
5.2.4. Tiger and Transformation in War  
 
On the upper part of the stage edifice, we see a vitrine containing a diorama reprenseting a 
battlefield, with stroboscopic lighting effects suggesting bombing. A deep-voiced Chinese-
speaking person chronicles the fall of Malaya under the Japanese in WWII, and pronounces the 
name under which the Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita is known – ‘The Tiger of 
Malaya’ (the second ranking officer, Takuma Nishimura, was known as ‘the other Tiger of 
Malaya’). The weretigers relate this to the fact that, ‘the Japanese shed the prison of their human 
form, becoming tigers’ (Ho 2014).  
 At this point, a vertical compartment dimly lights up. A solider can be discerned amidst 
a thick forest. He speaks Japanese in distress, and recounts horrendous events of killing and 
how vulnerable he has felt. A ghastly presence of a shrouded human body emerges into the light 
in a compartment on the lower part of the stage. As if alluding to the events of WWII too terrible 
to relate, one of the weretigers pronounces, ‘In man live two animals that never coincide. The 
first is an internal machine of respiration, assimilation, excretion. The other is a being of relation 
to the external world. In man, these two animals live together, but they do not coincide. Unless 
you are a weretiger, and your skin is made of cloth’ (Ho 2014). This is followed by a detailed 
account in Chinese and Japanese of how one transforms into a tiger and returns as human. The 
appalling feeling induced by the unidentifiable, shrouded body gives way to the suggestion that 
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the body in the cloth has yet to transform. This triggers in the spectators a strange, tantalising 
feeling, related to their own bodies.  
 Moments later, the centrepiece of the stage edifice comes partially to light, and indeed 
through light – it is a massive shadow puppet theatre screen presenting a composition of 
intricate, monochrome cut-out figures. (Fig. 5.3) A selective light source creates shadow plays 
out of the chosen elements, so that the audience can discern the contours of trees, a human 
figure, and a tiger individually. These puppet figures are made of buffalo skin, lending texture 
to the translucent material when projected on. As a later piece of Ho Tzu Nyen, One or Several 
Tigers (2017) reveals, buffalo is popularly depicted in shadow theatre in Southeast Asia, while 
the puppet figures are often made of buffalo skin and sometimes bear patterns carved by buffalo 
horn. This gives a strange footnote to the question of immanence: a distribution of being, or 
doing your own undoing.  
 
Now something rather curious happens. The weretigers burst into crying at the end of 
the shadow play as if they are undergoing transformation. At one point, however, they stop 
wailing but the wail continues as a recording – the voice is separated from the body. After the 
weretigers resume the mode of chanting speech, they offer a meta-commentary, ‘The death cry 
of a tiger detaches itself from flesh, and falls outside the world of man, like a vow unredeemed. 
Perambulating the surfaces of the ocean and the earth. Lingering, awaiting, the taste of fresh 
blood’ (Ho 2014). 
 This is an astute enactment of what could be dubbed ‘a technological capture of 
infinities’. One has to unfix technology from the rational framework of thinking as I have 
already hinted at; in this case, the recorder captures the weretiger’s cry, but not just the 
weretiger’s cry. Similarly, the camera captures the face of the weretiger, but not just the image. 
The reading of this enactment as a capture of the infinities is based on the view that the object 
of the technological capture and the technology are part of the univocity, part of the order of 
immanence. Hence, the divide between the object of technology and technology itself is blurred. 
The imbrication of scientific instruments in material bodies is best conceptualised in terms of 
affect, or ‘the preindividual bodily capacities to act, engage, and connect – to affect and be 
affected’ (Clough 2007, 2). The body’s capacity of affectivity is what informs our perception, 
which is famously attested by Spinoza – we do not know what a body can do but our thoughts 
come from being affected (Spinoza 1992). Patricia Clough and Mark Hansen argue that 
focusing on the affective capacity of the material body allows us to grasp how technology enters 
the human subject, namely by ‘tingeing or flavouring the embodied perceptual present’ (Hansen 
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2004b, 605). The performance of scientific instruments is imbricated into the material body by 
way of exerting affect, which ‘inserts the technical into felt vitality’ (Clough 2007, 2), before it 
is captured in conscious registration. Only when this conscious registration of affectivity 
happens does there emerge an observing/feeling subject, who ‘perceives’ a certain object. 
Hansen aptly describes this as ‘feeling without feeler’ (Hansen 2014, 65), a force traversing the 
dichotomy of material body and inorganic technology, nature and culture that is none other than 
the ‘dynamism of matter’ itself in the picture Clough paints. 
 Here, the enactment of ‘technological capture of infinities’ does not refer to the wailing 
of the weretiger as sound transmitted by radio, which would invoke an image like the RCA 
trademark in which the dog Nipper answers faithfully to a gramophone replaying his master’s 
voice. This would be a mechanical capture, or one-to-one transference of the sound of the cry. 
What the scene hints at is a second-order nature: it is what informs the cry of the weretiger that 
is made visible through a technological intervention and that underlies technology itself, 
however poetic and speculative this intervention is. In other words, it enacts the affectivity that 
is in excess of the weretiger (hence articulated as the cry), and that, ‘registered by’ the radio 
and presented to an audience, is equally in excess of a person’s consciousness and sense 
perception, and rather signals a pre-personal, pre-conscious space. This space is similarly 
indefinable and untraceable as that which informs the cry: hence the loop is completed.  
 This lingering cry of the weretigers resonates conceptually with the animist view on 
photography, analysed above. An affective analysis on both is key to understanding the material 
continuum that is in excess of technology. Hansen regards the reign of digital information and 
digital images as opening new ways for the body to engage affectively, for the body’s capacity 
of embodied perception can ‘in-form’ what seems to be disembodied information, i.e. giving 
form and framing to them. (Hansen 2004a) Hansen draws on the scene in Blade Runner (1982), 
where Rick Deckard puts a two-dimensional photograph of a room to a reader/scanner, and the 
scanner renders a three-dimensional space on a monitor which Deckard can navigate as if he 
were going into the physical room. He could locate miniscule objects and change the view 
angle. Hansen analyses, 
 
As fascinating as it is puzzling, this scene of an impossible rendering – a rendering of 
two-dimensional data as a three-dimensional space – can be related to the crisis brought 
to photography by digitisation in two ways. On the one hand, in line with the film’s 
thematic questioning of photography as a reliable index of memory, this scene 
foregrounds the technical capacity to manipulate photographs that digital processing 
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introduces. In this way, it thematises the threat posed by digital technologies to 
traditional indexical notions of photographic realism. On the other hand, in what has 
turned out to be a far more prophetic vein, the scene presents a radically new 
understanding of the photographic image as a three-dimensional ‘virtual’ space. Such 
an understanding presupposes a vastly different material existence of the 
photographic image: instead of a physical inscription of light on sensitive paper, the 
photograph has become a data set that can be rendered in various ways and thus viewed 
from various perspectives. (Hansen 2004a, 92-93) 
 
 It would be futile to examine the scientific possibility in the two moments, that of the 
three-dimensional space rendering in Blade Runner and that of the lingering voice of the tiger 
attaching to the recording, just as it is futile to see the wax figure of the shaman in Australia as 
harbouring his soul. What they do share in common, however, is an imagined relational space 
that blurs the boundaries between the visible material space with technological mediations and 
the spaces beyond. In Blade Runner, it is an entire data space, ‘the whole repertoire of possible 
images it could be said to contain’ (Hansen 2004a, 95). This space, when accessed, gives rise 
to new realties and sensations. In the wailing of the weretigers, it is the wail of the tiger itself 
that perambulates and transduces through suiting media into new realities. Note that although 
Hansen’s formulation is based on his proposal for the digital image versus traditional media, 
here it is nevertheless fruitful to draw a parallel to the ‘analogue’ wailing and the 
technologically remediated recording of the wail. This relational view – as miraculous as it is 
and precisely because of that – is made tangible by the artist and is captured by the sense 
perceptions of the audience.  
 
5.2.5. The Japanese, Communists, Violence, and History   
 
The transformation between man and tiger is nontrivial in that it does not stay in the realm of 
mythology or folk belief; rather, it has to account for concrete consequences in the realm of 
history and politics. As the transformation between man and tiger dismantles the border 
between nature and culture, is there a way to read the history of man and nature together?  
 On stage, the narration goes into ‘The Red plague’, the communist guerrilla resistance 
against the Japanese during WWII, and the Japanese soldier repeatedly shouts, ‘Kill all. Burn 
all. Destroy all.’ Following that, he frantically recites variations of the verse, ‘When you meet 
the Buddha, kill the Buddha!’, and finally, ‘Only thus will ye attain deliverance. Only thus will 
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ye escapethe trammels of material things and become free’ (Ho 2014), as the shrouded bodies 
can be spotted moving. 
 The variations of the ‘Kill the Buddha’ reference the famous Zen Buddhism koan which 
is said to help a person rid themselves of rational thinking to directly attain enlightenment. In 
this context, the killing of the Buddha may be interpreted as a vehicle to transcend the mind’s 
fixation on the material world. The rhetoric of ‘killing’ anything that hinders the way to 
enlightenment and the context of WWII in Southeast Asia make an uneasy juxtaposition. It is 
all the more uneasy if one recalls that Colonel Ishiwara Kanji’s rationale for the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria to use it as social laboratory before WWII was also based on Buddhist 
principles.  
 While the audience is left in this moral ambiguity, the narration goes on to relate the 
mysterious stories of Lai Teck, the man of ‘every name in history,’ who is said to have been a 
double agent for the French, close to the British, risen to become Malayan Communist Party 
leader, and turned into a triple agent by the Japanese during WWII, only to be denounced after 
the war for causing the arrest and execution of at least 105 of his colleagues. A few scenes later, 
we will see a man’s head drifting in spotlight aloft in one of the compartments, and we will 
recognise this head as that of Lai Teck. He voices his deep hopelessness in a soliloquy: ‘We 
have always marvelledat the existence of demons and spirits: but we no longer marvel at 
man.What causes a man to moveand to speak?What makes me believe in the root of my 
beliefs?’ (Ho 2014). These earnest questions present the moral ambivalence between a location-
based and situated history and a meta-historical narrative that penetrates the course of history 
and the constitution of humanity.  
 Lai Teck confesses: ‘As for me, I have always attributed my lack of success in this life 
to the influence of my previous life. The six paths of transmigrationare inscrutable indeed, and 
I have no right to complain’ (Ho 2014). Is his attempt to attribute his brutal decisions to the 
influence of a previous life a convenient yet insufficient interpretation of Buddhism or a similar 
school of thought? The theatre piece makes no immediate judgment. I will explore the 
implication of relating Lai Teck to the tiger in detail at the end of the chapter. 
 These two moments are poignant reminders of a history that in some ways continues to 
shape present-day Asian politics. Post-war Southeast Asian countries took Japan’s model in 
hopes of a similar economic boom, and Japan still has its firm economic and political ties to 
Southeast Asia. The post-war Communist struggle in Southeast Asia was to be situated in a 
global Cold War context, and has left haunting marks in many Southeast Asian countries. The 
Japanese generals and Lai Teck are singular figures and at the same time part of many serial 
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figures and events, which all share the tiger-man transformation arc. It would be superficial if 
one treated the tiger as an allegory for human moralism – or the absence of which, as seen so 
often in the tactic of introducing spectre figures in literature. This makes it all too easy to 
condemn the nightmare of humanities. Instead, Ho offers a meta-historical commentary that 
goes beyond immediate judgement of good and evil and makes possible the comparison 
between distinctive historical periods, figures and events. The review in The Strait Times makes 
explicit the association with Singapore being dubbed as one of the four ‘Asian Tigers’ in 
economic growth (along with Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan), which may suggest yet 
another episode of the tiger figuration in the age of a global economy. I will return to the 
economic history in the following chapter on Royce Ng’s work. 
 
5.2.6. Divine Machine against Modernity, and Intermediating Immanence 
 
Referring to the expedition party led by the Irish civil architect George Dromgold Coleman in 
1835 into the Malayan jungle, in hopes of charting a new road, one weretiger narrates, ‘A tiger 
erupted into their midst. And attacked. Not the men but only the theodolite. The instrument of 
measurement. Of mapping. Of order’ (Ho 2014).  
 The shadow puppet tableau at the centre of the stage is revealed again, and what 
appeared earlier as colourless cut-out figures comes to life through projection – piece by piece, 
the video projection maps onto the men, the tiger, and finally, the theodolite and gives colour 
to each cut-out piece. What is revealed is the complete composition of Road Surveying 
Interrupted in Singapore, a dramatic wood engraving after Heinrich Leutemann from 1885. 
(Fig. 5.4) 
 The weretiger further relates: ‘Modernity is the disappearance of tigers and myths as a 
constant state. But the tigers never truly vanish. They linger on in the world as spectral 
reproductions’ (Ho 2014). As stated earlier with regard to cyborgs, this is no romantic sentiment 
advocating for returning to a pure state of nature. For if it compels us to think of that force in 
its variant articulations beyond our understanding, or a Deleuzian desire that subsumes the 
writing of history, then the only way for such a force to exist is to continuously transgress and 
take on new material agents. Hence the tiger perambulates in the world and assumes other 
incarnations, from a primordial half-mystified unruly creature, to the violent Japanese war 
machine, and Lai Teck, the triple agent.  
 All ten mounted television screens are now switched on, resulting in a visual symphony 
that shows tiger imagery in its natural habitat, while an ode to tiger is delivered collectively, in 
Malay, Chinese, and Japanese: 
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A tiger is inhabited solely by singular moments, each one sinking into the night, passing 
into another moment, another world, another history… Undying, the tiger simply 
expires, transpires, shifts its animus to other bodies. Each animal is an extension of 
another. Each animal an undying swarm, unfolding, enfolding in a limitless continuum, 
returning anew to the world in another figuration, a different conduit, a new medium, 
each time, a divine machine. (Ho 2014) 
 
On the note of ‘divine machine,’ all of the media machines come back to life – the 
magnetic tape deck, the radio sets and the gramophone, each channelling sounds of the tiger. 
They awake with all the different temporalities they embody, the politics of gaze they are 
embedded in, the coloniality and decoloniality they represent, and they also bear non-traceable 
remainders of the dynamism of matter they are part of. This is again a nontrivial moment, for it 
activates the ‘dynamism of matter itself’ without falling into the trap of literal enactments of 
technological objects. Tiger as a machine – the collective enunciation is as mesmerising as its 
implication is utterly complex. 
 
5.2.7. The Epilogue of Ten Thousand Tigers 
 
Every water tank on stage is revealed, bubbling, vibrating, spurting: a tide of sensations. The 
performers sing an ode to the Malayan Archipelagos. Water represents the univocity of being. 
The human desire to manage water, however, gives rise to cultivation, and in turn leads to urban 
settlement, to modernity, and to wars. The weretigers, the Chinese-speaking person, and the 
Japanese soldier join forces in chanting to a humming background music, ‘Kings and murderers. 
Gods and monsters. The coming of one evil spirit after another. The return of same spirit in 
different form’ (Ho 2014).  
 All the backlights slowly go on to put the entirety of the intricate stage edifice on 
display. Each integral part, including the vitrines, water tanks, objects, media technology, 
humans and their mannequin counterparts, models and scenography can be appreciated as part 
of one coordinated theatre machine. The piece ends with a grandiose history of the cosmos, 
uttered by the weretigers:  
 
3.8 billion years ago, life began in the waters. The source. The origin. 
2 million years ago, the first tigers dispersed across a single land mass, the Sunda Shelf.  
And the seas rose. And the land sundered. 
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Malaya. Sumatra. Java. Bali. Borneo.  
100,000 years ago, the first men arrived. (Ho 2014) 
 
 A tour de force narrative of tiger and man in Southeast Asia thus comes to an end. The 
conceit of Ho Tzu Nyen’s Ten Thousand Tigers is the transformation between man and tiger. 
Yet it does not replace the qualitative differences between the human, tiger and machine, nor 
does it argue for a connectivity or continuum between them that can be reduced to the image of 
some kind of flow of elements that binds and conjoins. The operative force is already at play in 
things and phenomena, manifested as it does as affectivity in human, in animal and in 
technology alike. In establishing a theatre edifice and conflating the unfolding of the narrative 
into the co-operation of the objects, machines and narrators, Ten Thousand Tigers achieves a 
truly intermedial form. Not only does it highlight the interplay of technological objects and 
performance resulting in new sensibilities of theatre watching, but it also renders into 
experience a radically anti-binary philosophy of immanence or univocity, so that everything 
partakes in transformation processes without bifurcating into fixed entities such as actors and 
objects, human and animal, the organic and inorganic. In the remainder of the chapter, I will 
dive deeper into the philosophical dimensions that Ten Thousand Tigers tease out concerning 
time, history and agency/responsibility.  
 
5.3. Ten Thousand Tigers and history 
 
5.3.1. Tiger and time 
 
Up until now, this chapter has unfolded following the structure of Ten Thousand Tigers, which, 
though not a chronicle of Southeast Asian history, does place a few temporal markers and 
interweaves a narrative between them. This part of the chapter takes a distance and observes 
the piece as a whole, in the hope of teasing out the philosophical dimensions of the work, 
especially the line of philosophy of history. 
Ten Thousand Tigers is an elegant example that interweaves philosophical reflections 
on media and questions with concrete political, historical and cultural weights, which makes it 
particularly pertinent to my research on new and old materialisms. The theatrical edifice in Ten 
Thousand Tigers, being a complex assemblage of display vitrines, acts as a potent site to locate 
the multiple threads of history. Everything is on the stage from beginning to end, though not at 
once brought to light, suggestive of a world of immanence where nonlinear crossings take place. 
Quietly resonating Deleuze and Guattari, ‘earth is not one element among others but rather 
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brings together all the elements within a single embrace while using one or another of them to 
deterritorialise territory’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 85). As such, the set resembles a 
geological body more than distilled historical moments. The narrative that Ho threads together 
has historical anchors that lend themselves to be read in a linear historical way, yet such an 
understanding is merely factual. I’d like to suggest that the artistic affectivity and conceptual 
rigour of Ten Thousand Tigers conjoin in presenting a materialist, contingent and beyond-
human take on history. 
In Ten Thousand Tigers, the figuration of tiger becomes a medium of transformation, a 
channelling of the ‘dynamism of matter’. It posits a fundamental challenge to our generic 
perception of time and space. Henri Bergson sees time not as clock-time that is taken as generic 
and spatialized time, and pertains to order and eternity and that stands, as it were, outside of 
time and conditions of our being and perception. Bergson’s theory of time as durée is a powerful 
way to reconceptualise time. Bergson writes, ‘Just as we separate in space, we fix in time. The 
intellect is not made to think evolution, in the proper sense of the word – that is to say, the 
continuity of a change that is pure mobility’ (Bergson 1998, 163). This pure mobility, or 
duration, refocuses our bodily being and bodily perception as that which informs our mental 
registration of time. This way of highlighting the body in relation to the mind also indicates that 
there are other images, pertaining to the infinite variations of beings that are not captured and 
henceforth perceived. They make up the ‘virtual,’ which allows for emergence and creation. As 
such, ‘it does not prefigure or predetermine the actualities that emerge from it. Rather, it is the 
impelling force, or the principle, that allows each actual entity to appear (to manifest itself) as 
something new, something without precedence or resemblance, something that has never 
existed in the universe in quite that way before’ (Shaviro 2009, 15-16). A practice of heightened 
attention is due, if only to ‘dissociate the permanence of my body, here, from a world in which 
things happen, there’ (Stengers 2011, 65), or in other words, to probe the construct of the self 
vis-à-vis the happenings in general.   
 In Ten Thousand Tigers, the continuous being can be seen to assume variations of forms, 
depending on its passing into variations of images. There are no traceable threads that help us 
out draw the contours of what traverses the images, indeed we cannot assume that the Japanese 
general is one ‘image’ and the Communist leader follows from him. No one passing remains 
thoroughly one, so we can, at best, recognise the commonality between figures, events and 
objects. In the affective realm, certain characters of heritage are discernible, however 
speculative they are. These are exactly the liminal moments that the theatre piece aims to 
highlight and zoom in on: the affective lineage between the water, the roar, and even the evils 
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in history. It depicts a world in the image of a smooth, transforming, continuous surface; figures 
and events emerge out of this surface and become temporarily legible. Ten Thousand Tigers 
hence enacts mutual affect and gives an intermedial form to this practice of heightened 
attention; one that gives us affective as well as intellectual tools to reconcile history, morality 
and time that remains open to the outside. An infinity, but also in general. 
Deleuze and Guattari, following Bergson, adamantly oppose the spatialised time, and 
proposes instead a ‘stratigraphic’ time (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). The geophilosophy once 
again figures prominently here. Like geological strata stacked upon each other with necessary 
fissions and shifts, time is translated into materialist sedation. This materialist approach to time 
is pitted against the purely conceptual clock time and historical linearity, despite or precisely 
because of the image of the rational distribution of equally sliced blocks. Though this scheme 
does not replace clock time and linearity with loops, such as in the Indian conception of time, 
which is to say that time points marking on the historical line do exist (once) and are relevant. 
The strata allow the folding of before and after, and on the vertical axis, there is always a 
continuation that builds on the before. Colebrook uses the stratigraphic time to draw a diagram 
of history, composed of different strata each having different speeds:  
 
These intensities require non-linear models, for it may be the case that one series of 
becoming (such as technological development) may create a slowing down in another 
(so that the expansion of human efficiency machines in factory labour might lead to 
forms of corporeal impoverishment precluding the development of language skills), and 
these in turn would need to be connected to geopolitical timelines, such as the 
‘development’ of Western consumer cultures and their increasing efficiency through the 
connection of their sign systems, economic modes of production and military regimes 
with geographic milieus, whose histories operate at different speeds and intensities. 
(Colebrook 2009, 6) 
 
Ten Thousand Tigers operates as a machine – both physically and metaphorically, for it 
enacts the differential speeds of different historical strata while at the same time making cuts to 
the flows on some of them. The stratum of British colonisers and the stratum of the indigenous, 
for example, meet at a confrontational moment when colonisation takes place and the camera 
captures the weretigers on photographs, but at the same time, they both exist on their own strata 
with their own speed, and the contact point of colonisation effectuates an irrevocable change in 
the speed of the weretigers. Hence, it pertains to the artistic nuances of the piece that the contact 
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points are never depicted as actual contact points, and that the actors are always speaking facing 
the audience, for the enactments through lighting, films, diorama, puppetry and figures are all 
aligned on the same surface. This artistic choice only highlights the impossibility of a linear 
and purely causal construal of history. In doing so, the artist affirms what thinkers like Deleuze 
and Guattari, DeLanda and to some extent, Marx, deem of history: that it is contingent and 
material. This leads to the central idea of desire that underlies life and history in the scheme of 
Deleuze and Guattari, to be discussed in the following section.  
 
5.3.2. Flow of desire, the schizo 
 
In the following, I will examine the flow of desire, which serves as the fundamental lens of 
interpreting history proposed by Deleuze and Guattari.  
As I have briefly mentioned in the introduction, this is not an exclusive take on the 
philosophy of history, but rather builds on the different modes of relations to desire, namely in 
the primitive society, the despotic society and the capitalistic society. Desire to connect and 
expand is the natural state of things. Whereas precapitalistic societies code desire through 
inscription, the capitalistic machine frees the flow of desire. Inscription entails marking bodies 
(the human, the non-human bodies as well as abstract bodies) so to create representations of 
things and to attribute meanings, and this in turn represses the flux of desire. This process lies 
underneath the development of the social formation, in other words, desire is socialised by 
coding. In the next stage of their philosophy of history, the despot comes in and imposes a new 
alliance system and places himself in direct filiation with the deity. This can be observed when 
there arises a spiritual empire or when a new empire replaces the old one. The despotic state 
dreads the flow of production and exchange and tries to rule by tightening control. Yet what 
will overcome the despot state is the capitalistic machine, which captures these flows of desire 
by making them part of its own operation, that is, through the appropriation of production - 
capital begets capital, bypassing the production of commodities. 
Following the flow of desire, we are led to revisit history through the means with which 
history is cast in terms of production, conjunction, affiliation. In typical Deleuze and Guattari 
fashion, they turn the relation between cause and effect on its head and rather place them in a 
non-causal relation, or on a plane of immanence they draw. With regards to the flow of desire, 
they maintain that it is inscription, and not exchange, that lies underneath the development of 
the socius. In fact, exchange is created in a society in which bodies of things are so inscribed 
that creating a universal standard as foundation for exchange is made possible.  
Twice in Ten Thousand Tigers, the idea of exchange in the form of bounty comes up: 
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once during the colonial development of the Malaya, when bounty was offered on tiger to give 
way for human settlements, and another time, when the Malaya Communist Party leaders and 
guerrillas have retreated into the forest and as rebellious forces, they are ordered to be arrested. 
In the latter case, there is a succinctly composed commentary: ‘And like tigers, they were once 
again to be subjected to the deadly law of exchange, when a bounty was offered for the capture 
of their leader’ (Ho 2014). Before the deadly law of exchange, there is only the continuous flow 
of things. Deleuze and Guttari comment thus: 
 
 …exchange is known, well known in the primitive socius—but as that which must be 
exorcised, encasted, severely restricted, so that no corresponding value can develop as 
an exchange value that would introduce the nightmare of a commodity economy. The 
primitive market operates through bargaining rather than by fixing an equivalent that 
would lead to a decoding of flows and a collapse of the mode of inscription on the 
socius. We are brought back to our point of departure: the fact that exchange is inhibited 
and exorcised by no means attests to its primary reality, but demonstrates on the contrary 
that the essential process is not exchanging, but inscribing or marking. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983, 186) 
  
This provides a helpful insight on the nature of non-exchange forms of bargaining, 
which pertains to the order of flow of things and desire, and the consolidation of exchange based 
on inscription into things in the flow. The latter leads up to further developments such as 
commodity, though exchange and commodity may not necessarily develop into capitalism, as 
seen in traditional societies which forbade trade and put merchants in low rank. Ray Huang’s 
study on Ming dynasty tax stations on the grand canal provides good insights on how goods 
were taxed according to a fixed yearly amount rather than by percentage (Huang 1964). 
Similarly, there were restrictions on commerce and maritime activities in pre-modern Japan 
(Benedict 1946).  
 
The body without organs emerges as an instance of antiproduction to the production of 
hierarchical structures, such as the familial tripartite of father-mother-me that defines the 
Oedipus in psychoanalysis. Instead of triangularisation, disjunctions are established on the body 
without organs, which makes the subject escape identities based on social conventions. The 
body without organs is pertinent to the schizo, a figuration that Deleuze and Guattari prefer to 
Oedipus: ‘A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's 
	 144	
couch’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 2). 
The schizo is the result of the flow of desire in the society, especially under the 
capitalistic regime where all forms of desire are subjugated under the productive machine of 
capitalism. The way it manages to do so in a way that pre-capitalistic societies did not manage 
is through the differential relation between value of labour and value of capital. There is no 
longer a determination of correlation between both. Capital becomes ‘filiative’ and ‘suddenly 
presents itself as an independent substance, endowed with a motion of its own, in which money 
and commodities are mere forms which it assumes and casts off in turn’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983, 227). In light of the creative flow of the capital, the schizo is the thing that registers its 
destructive power through its own psycho-social being and pushes its limit. Examples of the 
schizo derive from psychoanalytical literature and personal accounts. Antonin Artaud, for 
instance, ‘discovered this one day, finding himself with no shape or form whatsoever, right 
there where he was at that moment’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 8).  
 
Ten Thousand Tigers suggests a way of viewing the tiger as a schizo, or body without 
organs. This tiger-schizo takes various forms, many subtracted from folkloric stories and 
recorded in ethnographic accounts: the appalling chants that simulate the roar of the tiger, the 
meticulous instruction that family members of someone who turns into a tiger have to follow 
in order to resurrect him when he returns from the forest, and the deep-rooted alertness to water 
due to its purported transformative capacity. And in the comments the weretigers make on 
photography: ‘Men love tigers for the same reason they love the photograph: The love of the 
dead. Every photograph preserves the future deathof a captured object. Every photograph 
promises the return of the dead’ (Ho 2014). Still further, the tiger, captured under the scientific 
structure and labelled primitive, is also participating in a regime of un-enlightened, illogical 
actions, for it attacks not the British but the theodolite they use to conquer nature. All these 
moments demonstrate the embeddedness of the weretigers in a world in which a transgressive 
desire is invested in the social field, the body of the socius, in both its organisation and 
disorganisation. There exist no longer the boundaries between man, tiger, and their natural 
environs, and instead they are connected and disconnected by relations of production and 
antiproduction. This could be compared to a similar moment Deleuze and Guattari observe in 
George Büchner’s story ‘Lenz,’ in which Lenz, the protagonist modeled on a real person with 
mental disorder – who exemplifies the schizo, is out for a walk in nature and identifies, or rather, 
feels the consciousness of the rocks, the clouds and the sun. Lenz’s existence turns the 
conventional image of the world around, as Deleuze and Guattari comment:  
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Everything is a machine. Celestial machines, the stars or rainbows in the sky, alpine 
machines— all of them connected to those of his body. The continual whirr of machines. 
[…] Lenz has projected himself back to a time before the man-nature dichotomy, before 
all the co-ordinates based on this fundamental dichotomy have been laid down. He does 
not live nature as nature, but as a process of production. There is no such thing as either 
man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other and couples 
the machines together. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 2) 
 
In Lenz we see the shadow of the tiger-man or weretiger: ‘Lenz is Homo natura because 
he feels he is at one with the production of nature, but he is Homo historia inasmuch as he 
registers that production of nature as though it were somebody other than himself who was 
witnessing it’ (Buchanan 2008, 42). What happens in the process of transmogrification is that 
‘there is no Lenz-the-self, author of dramatic works, who suddenly loses his mind and 
supposedly identifies with all sorts of strange states of being (blissful contact with rocks, metals, 
plants, and so on); rather, there is the Lenzian subject who passes through a series of states, and 
who identifies these states with the elements of nature as so many names from history (there is 
in this regard little difference between saying “I am a rock” and “I am Attila the Hun”)’ 
(Buchanan 2008, 42). 
 
In another case, Deleuze and Guattari analyse the cure in the Ndembu communities in 
the study of Victor Turner (1964). They reveal the subterranean layers of desire at play in the 
process, instead of the tripartite structure of Oedipus that Freud holds to govern the desire in 
the social convention. In the case study of the Ndembu community – a matrilineal society, one 
man, who was at the same time son, husband, son-in-law, and tribesman, became ill. The native 
healer located the illness in the ill-wishes of the man’s wife, mother-in-law, his diseased father 
and the whole community. The healer then summoned the whole community to perform a ritual 
of exorcism. 
Deleuze and Guattari highlight the role of desire in making the socius in the recorded 
case, ‘[it] is not only a question of discovering the preconscious investments of a social field by 
interests, but – more profoundly – its unconscious investments by desire, such as they pass by 
way of the sick person’s marriages, his position in the village, and all the positions of a chief 
lived in intensity within the group’. This stands in stark contrast to the inscriptive structure of 
the Oedipal, which the Western psychoanalysis resorts to when confronted with the case of 
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Ndembu:  
 
 We said that the point of departure seemed Oedipal. It was only the point of departure 
for us, conditioned to say Oedipus every time someone speaks to us of father, mother, 
grandfather. In fact, the Ndembu analysis was never Oedipal: it was directly plugged 
into social organisation and disorganisation; sexuality itself, through the women and the 
marriages, was just such an investment of desire; the parents played the role of stimuli 
in it, and not the role of group organisers (or disorganisers) – the role held by the chief 
and his personages. Rather than everything being reduced to the name of the father, or 
that of the maternal grandfather, the latter opened onto all the names of history. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983, 168) 
 
In still another case, Deleuze and Guattari draw from the study of Claude Lévi-Strauss 
on prohibition of parallel cousins and approbation of cross cousins in marriage in the book The 
Elementary Structures of Kinship by adopting a simple rule where each marriage between two 
lines is marked with a + or – sign. In general, a man cannot receive a wife except from the group 
from which a woman can be claimed, because in the previous generation a sister or daughter 
was lost. (As Deleuze and Guattari note, it does not matter if the regime is patrilineal or 
matrilineal.) What this amounts to for a cultural philosophical reflection is that the prohibition 
of incest is based on familiar relations, which are but socially constructed and do not universally 
hold true. They claim that the placenta is a ‘substance common to the mother and the child, a 
common part of their bodies,’ resembling the full body of earth before it is inscribed. The 
placenta conditions the relation between the mother and son so that ‘these bodies are not like 
cause and effect, but are both products derived from this same substance, in relation to which 
the son is his mother's twin: such is indeed the axis of the Dogon myth related by Griaule. Yes, 
I have been my mother and I have been my son’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 158). This ‘I have 
been my mother and I have been my son’ is the ‘natural’ state of relations before the socially 
inscribed norms of mother and son comes about. It resonates with the ‘delirium’ of the schizo 
only because the schizo has access to the same continuous flow of bodies. 
The distinction between the flow and scission in this case results in two configurations 
of bodies, the one ‘continuous and germinal,’ and the other ‘discontinuous and somatic, it alone 
being subjected to a succession of generations’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 158). A parallel 
pattern can be identified here between the generational differentiation and the social-cultural 
attribution of sexes in eukaryotic cells, as discussed in the third chapter, following Parisi. The 
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radical embrace of a state before the separation is tantamount to reclaiming the true nature 
underlying desire: ‘What is desired is the intense germinal or germinative flow, where one 
would look in vain for persons or even functions discernible as father, mother, son, sister, etc., 
since these names only designate intensive variations on the full body of the earth determined 
as the germen’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 162). 
The wandering body without organs is at play here, whether in the Ndembu society’s 
rituals or the continuum of mother-son, so much so that it opens to all the names in history. This 
is an important change of perspective, not least because it was made first by Nietzsche that 
echoed in Deleuze and Guattari – Nietzsche’s letter to Jakob Burckhardt dating 5 January, 1889 
reads, ‘What is unpleasant and a strain on my modesty is that in fact I am every name in history’ 
(Nietzsche 1986). 
In his letter to Cosima Wagner on January 3, 1889, Nietzsche writes, ‘Among the 
Hindus I was Buddha, in Greece Dionysus–Alexander and Caesar were incarnations of me, as 
well as the poet of Shakespeare, Lord Bacon. Most recently I was Voltaire and Napoleon, 
perhaps also Richard Wagner … However, I now come as Dionysus victorious, who will 
prepare a great festival on Earth … Not as though I had much time … The heavens rejoice to 
see me here … I also hung on the cross …’ (Nietzsche 1986) To the schizophrenic, as we have 
seen in Lenz, the names of history do not designate persons living or dead, but states of intensity, 
or ‘effects’ – ‘God is the feeling of omnipotence, divine fury, judgement, and so on, while 
Napoleon might be the feeling of triumph, persecution, victory, defeat and so on’. (Buchanan 
2008, 80) 
This ‘feeling,’ or state of intensities is paramount to understanding the tiger world, and 
‘every name in history’ in Ten Thousand Tigers. For the tiger, or weretiger, bears every name 
in history, precisely because the tiger is a state of intensities that pass into or is passed into 
different momentary figures. The tiger, weretigers, or human agents in Ten Thousand Tigers 
should not be taken literally as individuated entities (as the opening teaser suggest, they are 
rather in the context of packs) such that the passage between them can be likened to a line 
connecting individuated dots. Rather, the line is everything there is, and the dots – the Japanese 
general, Lai Teck, and so forth – are temporary articulations.  
Lai Teck, the Malaya communist party chief, for example, is a weretiger capable of 
passing through multiple states of intensities and acquiring various identities. He’s known as 
Nguyen Van Long, Hoang A Nhac, Pham Van Dac, Mr Light, C.H. Chang, Wong Kim Geok, 
D. Ling, Malaya’s Lenin, the right hand of Ho Chih Minh, among others. In one way, this 
suggests that a weretiger, readily transforming into as many personifications as it likes, is 
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exactly the embodiment of the schizo, the body without organs, the multiplicity that sees it as 
every name in history. At the same time, it counterbalances this transgressing of states with the 
weight of history, so that the passage deliberately opens up to a dark side – treachery and 
betrayal, as Lai Teck the triple agent caused the arrest and execution of at least 105 of his 
colleagues. This leads us to a discussion on violence. 
 
5.3.3. Cruelty and animality, tiger and spy 
 
The lingering schizo – embodied by Lenz or Lai Teck – serves as a figuration for the continuous 
desire that has been tamed in the despotic regime and appropriated by the capitalist machine. 
The antiproduction that they instigate opens a wild field of deterritorialisation and possibilities 
of becoming beyond the strictures of human subjectivity. This process, however, has concrete 
violent implications. It thus adds layers of complexity to the discussion of desire, life and 
animality.  
Animality in Bataille, as discussed earlier, is an experiential dimension that is not 
exclusive to non-humans. If anything, it makes us realise the continuum between our purported 
humanhood and animality. The notion of ‘a life’ in Deleuze, captures this sense of animality in 
that it presents ‘an indeterminate vitality,’ a ‘pure a-subjective current’. The pure power of a 
life can manifest as beatitude but also as ‘an unspeakable, sheer violence’ (Bennett 2009, 53). 
This is a poignant reminder that new materialism should not disregard the dark side of becoming. 
In this sense, the tiger manifests different facets of ‘a life;’ it can be the unconstrained source 
of flow that precedes taming through civilisation and modernisation, yet, importantly, it can 
also assume the power of violence that civilisation itself imposes on it. Deleuze and Guattari 
write: 
 
Cruelty has nothing to do with some ill-defined or natural violence that might be 
commissioned to explain the history of mankind; cruelty is the movement of culture that 
is realised in bodies and inscribed on them, belabouring them. That is what cruelty 
means. This culture is not the movement of ideology, on the contrary, it forcibly injects 
production into desire, and conversely, it forcibly inserts desire into social production 
and reproduction. For even death, punishment, and torture are desired, and are instances 
of production (compare the history of fatalism). (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 145) 
 
Without exonerating individual responsibilities in history, the passage locates cruelty in 
the generic movements and developments of the human civilisation. Inscription is always 
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already repressive. And the scission of the man from the continuous flow that encompasses 
man, animal and other organic or inorganic things, similar to the inscription and encasing of the 
earth in the first place, is equally repressive. A production always comes with an anti-production, 
and a doing always comes with an undoing. The passage into different states of intensities may 
reveal the force of nature, but it may also induce the dark side of it – multiplicity and/in one in 
the case of espionage. Under this light, these moments of Ten Thousand Tigers posit the tiger 
as a figuration embodying the primary flow of desire confronted by forces that try to capture 
and tame it. The desire in itself is multi-directional and connective (conative), yet it is also 
constantly ‘shackled to, or worse converted into interest, and as interest it is susceptible to 
capture, domestication and pacification’ (Buchanan 2008, 11). Hence the most important 
question for Deleuze and Guattari, how it is possible for desire to act against its interest 
(Buchanan 2008, 21)? 
 
Can we say here, that the theatre of Ho Tzu Nyen presents an updated version of ‘theatre 
of cruelty’ by presenting the historical movements of desire, hence offering a non-moralist 
sense of cruelty? Antonin Artaud’s ‘theatre of cruelty’ confronts the audience with an acute 
sense of immediacy through acts of violence, madness and other forms of agitation, thereby 
waking up with a compelling force their dulled senses and expectations. For Artaud, cruelty 
signifies ‘rigour, implacable intention and decision, irreversible and absolute determination’ 
(Salter 2010, 107). And performance is a savage exorcism of the darkest latent forces inhabiting 
human experience. The ontology of performance lay in its confrontation with ‘the revelatory 
aspects of matter’ (Salter 2010). The absolute determination in revealing the matter itself, in the 
body, the flesh and the spasms of savage acts is the enaction of a restless desire overspilling the 
reign of codification. In this way, cruelty is embedded in history as this history unfold in the 
dreamy chants of the weretigers.  
 
5.3.4. Espionage, judgement and history  
 
We have reconciled the relation between the ‘savage’ tiger and the various human figurations 
it takes. Lai Teck, the Communist Party chief and triple agent appears as the most complex 
figure to unpack. Fascinated by him as the person bearing ‘every name in history’, Ho Tzu Nyen 
has dedicated a series of related works to him, such as the video installation The Name (2015) 
and The Nameless (2014), both presenting Lai Teck with found footage from various films 
featuring Tony Leung, a famous Hong Kongnese actor, who not infrequently stars as spies in 
films. Ho has also produced a live performance piece, The Mysterious Lai Teck (2018). 
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If the Japanese general in World War II coincides with the state of intensities of the tiger, 
then Lai Teck structurally approximates the tiger – he passes through different states and takes 
on different names, like waves after waves or water in water. A triple agent is never morally 
acceptable. Yet the artist leaves some leeway in situating him in history. He makes Lai Teck 
confess in Ten Thousand Tigers, ‘What makes me believe in the root of my beliefs?’ (Ho 2014) 
Questioning the authenticity of his judgement, Lai Tek relates to Buddhism, ‘I have always 
attributed my lack of success in this life to the influence of my previous life. The six paths of 
transmigrationare inscrutable indeed, and I have no right to complain’ (Ho 2014). Of course, 
one cannot be exonerated of one’s responsibilities by resorting to influences of past lives. But 
what does it mean to fully judge a situation? In order to answer this, I will go into a seemingly 
abstract field – mathematics, and relate it to a Confucian perspective on the question of 
judgement and responsibility. 
 
In his book Laruelle: Against the Digital, Alexander Galloway proposes a cultural 
philosophy of digitality. Of particular interest is how Galloway focuses attention on movements 
and changes in history in the model of digitality. The digitality is the process of bifurcation and 
differentiation: ‘The digital is the basic distinction that makes it possible to make any distinction 
at all. The digital is the capacity to divide things and make distinctions between them. Thus not 
so much zero and one, but one and two’ (Galloway 2014, xxix). Instead of reducing worldly 
matters to mathematics, Galloway brings nuances from the field of mathematics to the notion 
of differentiation. In this light, Ten Thousand Tigers is carefully crafted to show the bifurcation 
of the human kind against the body of earth – a full body in the Deleuzian sense that the 
humanity always falls back on. 
A brief allusion to the discussion of the digital and the analogical can be discerned in 
Deleuze’s Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (Deleuze 2005a), in which he comments on 
digital synthesisers as ‘integral,’ that is, ‘their operation passes through a codification, through 
a homogenisation and binarisation of the data’ (Galloway 2014, 95). 
Here the ‘integral’ and the related process of ‘integration’ are borrowed mathematics 
concepts in the studies of calculus. Imagine a curve defined by f(x), the integral of a and b is 
then the sum of the area between the curve and the x-axis, when x=a and b. The reason why 
Deleuze likens the digital device to integral seems to lie in the condition through which the 
operation of a digital device happens: that it has to codify an input data (in this case, sound, 
analog sound) into homogeneous units to be processed henceforth. The codification qualifies 
the integration by anchoring the curve in a set of homogeneous values, each value of x 
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accounting for the curve of f(x). 
Deleuze contrasts digital synthesisers with analogical synthesisers (as exemplified by 
hardware modular synthesisers): ‘Analogical synthesisers are “modular,”’ and further, ‘They 
establish an immediate connection between heterogeneous elements.’ (Galloway 2014, 93) 
Galloway comments, ‘What this means is that different elements, remaining relatively whole 
and heterogeneous to one another, are nevertheless able to interoperate immediately. They can 
touch each other directly, despite their differences’ (Galloway 2014, 103). Here we either have 
to do away with a curve f(x) attributed to the account of x-axis values, for the immediacy of 
interoperations does not need to resort to the x-axis, or we have to find a new way of looking at 
the curve. 
Galloway proposes to expound on the digital and analogical divide in Deleuze by going 
one step further into mathematics: 
 
Let us return briefly to the mathematical theme. Although Deleuze does not say it 
explicitly, neither in the ‘Postscript’ nor in the book on Francis Bacon and painting, it 
is possible to infer that the digital means integration and the analogical means 
differentiation. Thus, while integration means area under a curve, differentiation or 
‘taking the derivative’ means instantaneous slope of the tangent line. Instead of 
summing the area under the curve defined by f(x), one extrapolates a secondary function 
derived from the first function, a secondary function consisting of a straight line 
tangential to any position x = a on the curve. The logic is slightly counterintuitive; do 
not be fooled by the curves of integration, for it is still a question of solving via a 
multiplicity of regular slices, and hence it is digital. Likewise, do not be fooled by the 
semantic similarity between the words differentiation and difference. Differentiation is 
an analogical event because it brings together the immediacy of two modular and 
heterogeneous spaces: (1) the space of the function curve and (2) the adjacent virtual 
space of all the tangent lines that can be derived from the curve. (Galloway 2014, 104) 
 
Here, Galloway connects a different function and treatment of the curve – differential 
calculus, the tangent – to the discussion of the analog. The invisible tangential line to any visible 
point on the curve measures the tendency of change at that point in the curve. On the one hand, 
integral calculus seeks the derivative, or the tangent of the point in the curve; on the other, the 
future of the curve can be read by the slope of the tangent – the tendency toward bending. In 
this regard, Galloway rightly draws the allegory between the tangents to the virtual space, and 
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henceforth, between all the possible tangents at a point before it moves on and all the possible 
futures of the curve.  
What is important in this question of digitality is how it works on the univocity that the 
chapter invokes earlier: 
 
[T]he digital is a transformative process in which a universe grounded in the univocity 
of an identity of the same becomes a universe grounded in discrete distinctions between 
elements, elements that, although divided, are brought together and held in relation, 
suspended opposite each other like cliffs over the banks of a great river. (Galloway 
2014, 102-103) 
 
This process lies underneath the transformations between tiger and man. The univocity 
is figured in the tiger, as water-in-water and as a roar in the many roars in nature, which gives 
rise to concrete entities such as humans. 
 
This line of thinking is aligned to the non-deterministic, non-teleological view of history 
and points to a way of seeing events as pertaining to ‘vitalist geneticism’ that is shared by 
Deleuze. Colebrook emphasises the genesis of the present as follows, ‘one ought not to accept 
any already given and actualised form but should ask how such a form emerged, what that 
emergence can tell us about the life from which any actuality has taken shape, and how such a 
life – beyond its already created possibilities – might yield other potentials.’ (Colebrook 2009, 
9) The fields of virtuality are there as an event actualises and concretises, and harbours 
potentials for other outcomes as the event evolves.  
The mathematical lucidity may easily give way to the messiness of real world events, 
when this principle is applied to culture. It seems vigilant avoidance is in order when it comes 
to mentioning the course of real world affairs and the continuation of an abstract curve in one 
breath. This recalls the moment when cybernetics, first theorised as a set of principles of 
information, control and communication that can be identified in living or cultural systems and 
intended to help better interaction between men and machine, is taken as a universal principle 
and is reverted to apply to understanding human beings. This is done through a movement of 
‘reflexivity,’ whereby ‘that which has been used to generate a system is made, through a 
changed perspective, to become part of the system it generates’ (Hayles 1999, 8). In this sense, 
cautiously, one could see the movement of reflexivity in applying the principles of integration 
and differentiation in mathematics to life itself.  
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The question then becomes how to reconcile between tendency and contingency, and 
how does the judgement of a conscious subject figure there. Following a materialist line, 
however, the question seems to pertain to different scales: what happens at particular moments 
is fully contingent, but in retrospect, may be read as showing certain tendencies.  
and that the idea of tendency probably comes before there is a mathematical model for 
developments and change. It is only tricky when we try to project certain events in the world 
completely in a diagrammatic way – that is to say, in representative values on the x, y, and even 
as many axes as you wish, within generic planes made up by the axes. The sheer number of 
factors in real-world events rules out attempts of such kinds. (Despite this, world-systems 
theorists are not shy to use diagrams to explain the macro-scale rise and fall of different 
cultures.)  
The virtual space as harbouring potentials for changes in the form of latent tendencies 
enters in fruitful dialogue with the idea of shi , tendency, in Confucian philosopher Wang 
Fuzhi (1619-1692). Chinese philosophers have a long tradition of contemplating on change, 
particularly situated at the intersection of the ‘natural’ realm of observable changes in the 
environment and the ‘cultured’ realm of political and social affairs. Starting from the Yijing/ I 
Ching, Book of Changes, Chinese philosophers have positioned everything in dynamic 
processes.  
Wang Fuzhi, a thinker and writer with multifaceted interests has a particularly 
interesting formulation when it comes to philosophy of history. He has made proliferate 
commentaries on the voluminous historical books, most notably A Treatise on Reading 
Tongjian (Du Tongjian lun) (Tongjian, or Zizhi Tongjian is a chronicle going back to circa 400 
BCE) and A Treatise on the Sung Dynasty (history of the Song Dynasty, 960-1279 CE). 
Through careful examination of historical events, he infers the principle of change – a dynamic 
process between chaos and prosperity. Importantly, this is not to establish a transcendental order 
outside of the realm of the human that determines the fate of particular human beings or groups, 
but one that requires one’s agency in instigating changes. There is no state of perfect standstill 
either, as everything and anything is always and forever in flux. In order to act wisely in 
particular situations, one has to understand the shi, or ‘tendency’ of the moment. If in earlier 
time, intellectuals have always believed in a closely entangled relation between ‘natural’ 
phenomena and human affairs, Wang offers deep readings into particular moments of the latter, 
and yet is not dismissive of the idea of natural-cultural synthesis. 
Wang Fuzhi describes tendency as follows: ‘All tendencies of the world are such that if 
one follows a tendency, it will grow to its extreme; once it reaches the extreme, the opposite 
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will come’. And elsewhere, ‘What is natural according to principle or tendency is simply what 
is right for that time’.   
It is important to reiterate that the introduction of tendency does not diminish human 
agency. Chan emphasises on the action in accordance to tendency: ‘In reality, each historical 
event results from a certain developmental tendency (shi). Therefore, to be able to judge the 
correct orientation in the developmental tendency is crucial for the fulfillment of any goal of 
action’ (Chan 2011, 93). It is on this emphasis of judging the time and taking the right action 
where a righteous man’s conduct lies. Wang Fuzhi examines numerous occasions in history in 
his commentary on history when the action of someone is seemingly against codes of Confucian 
conduct or even general codes of conduct, for instance, when one starts a coup to overthrow a 
regime, as opposed to being loyal to the emperor as prescribed by Confucianism. Yet measured 
by the tendency of the moment, it is often revealed that the emperor himself is too corrupt so 
that the tendency of affairs bends in favor of an opponent. Note that to be able to say that the 
tendency at one moment is changing without the appearance of things necessarily changing (as 
if the slope of the tangent of a curve bends even when the curve seems to go headlong into one 
direction, and also if as the virtual world interfaces with the real world and opens up new 
possibilities), one has to sum up an inherently complex situation in such a way that reductions 
are necessary. Hence historical judgement and commentary in retrospect always have the 
thinking movement of ‘digitality’ in Galloway’s definition of the term, i.e. differentiation from 
a situation. Galloway himself sums up the course of development of the Soviet Union as from 
differentiated to one, and that of Maoist China as one to differentiation (Galloway 2014, xxxi), 
which may be too simplistic and stays only on the level of ideology than accounting for the 
complexities.  
Notwithstanding Galloway’s take on the Soviet Union and China, here we have to 
understand that Wang Fuzhi’s tendency is not a tool crafted to evaluate history in hindsight, 
more importantly, tendency is to be understood as momentary articulation through self-practice 
of understanding and judgement within the very moment. Liu comments, ‘With a tendency, 
either one eventually brings it to its completion, or one does not eventually bring it to its 
completion; it is all up to one’s judgment’ (Liu 2001, 333). This immanent understanding of 
tendency at each particular moment before things ripen to have manifest outcomes, is firmly 
against any transcendental claim on history. The tendency is not a grand narrative: in Liu’s 
interpretation of Wang Fuzhi, there are ups and downs, and they rotate is a general way of 
change, or ‘global determinancy,’ instead of ‘atomic determinacy’ (Liu 2001, 329). They are 
the generalised material outcome, but not the cause of any embedded moment under 
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investigation. Liu puts it thus, ‘Wang Fuzhi’s assertion describes a formal principle of history; 
it does not make any causal claim on the existence of this formal principle’ (Liu 330). And in 
describing the local, situated moments in relation to tendency, Liu comments, ‘In Wang Fuzhi’s 
philosophy of history, it is not possible to obtain atomic determinacy. For a local tendency to 
have its global effect, it depends not just on its own force, but also on the interplay of other 
competing tendencies. The interplay happens both diachronically and synchronically’ (Liu 
2001, 334).  
The discussion on tendency as an immanent understanding of the situation and on the 
virtual as harbouring unactualised potentials for events may seem purely theoretical, yet it is 
precisely this distance held between philosophy and historiography/history that allows one to 
take a more critical position beyond the dominance of linear developmental model of history, 
and at the same time, to not fall into nihilism or pessimism.  
To return to Lai Teck, the figure that is most difficult to place in Ten Thousand Tigers, 
the artist deliberately avoids a simple, moralist judgement on him, and instead uses him to raise 
the question of our own judgement. It may be the case that judging from the tendency of the 
time, Lai Teck was lured into judgements that eventually ended up on the wrong side of history. 
In China, Wang Jingwei, the leftist governor of Kuomintang who chose to collaborate with the 
Japanese to run a puppet government during WWII, partially out of the reason that he didn’t 
see China winning the war and partially for being ousted and threatened by his archrival Chiang 
Kai Shek, would be another case of such kind. Lai Teck, at any rate, is a darkly figure, having 
blood on his hands. However, Ten Thousand Tigers raises our attention to the moral conundrum 
of the time, conditioned by the violence in and of history itself. Perhaps this is why in the 
chanting at the end of Ten Thousand Tigers, it mentions in one breathing the unlikely poles of 
kings and murders, Gods and monsters, and it is iterated that ‘The coming of one evil spirit after 
another. The return of same spirit in different form’ (Ho 2014). 
 
If, as discussed earlier, the relay of responsibility from the coloniser to the unruly tiger 
is too simplistic a view, then the social mechanism around the unconscious reveals a deeper-
rooted problem. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is not the unconscious that pressures the conscious; 
on the contrary, it is the conscious that pressures the unconscious (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 
371). For them, oedipus is colonisation pursued by other means, or interior colony. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983, 170) It is not the tiger appearing from somewhere in the deep sea of the 
unconscious that comes haunting the humanity, but that the human socius always consciously 
oppresses the underlying flow of desire. This is, as Buchanan puts it, a head full of unruly 
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thoughts that have been made to look into the mirror by a domineering conscious only to be 
told they are something other than what they see (Buchanan 2008, 27). 
This sheds light on the double-folded nature of colonialism, as it involves both the 
expansive operations in overseas colonies and the oedipusisation at home. I will expound more 
on the question of desire and necropolitics in the context of colonialism and war – with the 
vampire as figuration – in the next chapter on Royce Ng’s work. Again, the work operates both 
on a concrete historical ground, and also on the meta-level of desire in/of capitalism to suggest 
how it returns to the body and the psyche.  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
In its richly layered narrative of Southeast Asian history, Ten Thousand Tigers enacts a 
materialisation of the field of potentiality at various moments. In fulfilling this, it doesn’t make 
the most explicit claims, such as posing the blatant question of how history could unfold 
differently? What would have been the social form of Southeast Asia, had it not been colonised? 
What relation of man and nature would have been possible, had the mitigation not happened in 
the first place? Ten Thousand Tigers also does not venture into providing answers or writing 
alternative histories. Instead, it hints at the very subtle tendencies where the flow of desire 
escapes the common governing structure that explains it.  
The omnipresence of the tiger, corresponding with its modern brother – the schizo, is at 
the same time an ancient figuration and a modern/contemporary embodiment of the free flow 
of desire. When the voice of the weretigers detaches from the bodies of the weretigers and 
meanders into the technical (and colonial in that particular context) apparatus of the 
gramophone machine, more than bothering with any quasi-scientific justification, it gives an 
artistic rendering of the flow of desire that transverses the boundaries of the apparatus made to 
capture and delimit. The flow of desire is an important lens through which historical 
developments could be revisited, as we will see in the following chapter. Even though the flow 
of desire cannot be anthropomorphised and should not be taken as a physical compulsion that 
pushes for the limit of things, but is constituted by and emerges out of the materialist assemblage 
in question – the tiger emerges out of the man-earth relation. 
Finally, as a continuation to the discussion on immanent materialism and 
multiperspectivism, this chapter also gives a sensational rendering of how univocity is at work 
in the poetic image of water in water, a reminder of the univocal world before and below 
bifurcation, and at the same time an allegory to the analogue and digital divide. 
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6. Chapter Six 
Manchukuo, Capitalism and the East Asian Modern: 
Transhistorical Desire in Kishi the Vampire 
 
 
Gazing at the western capital, my mind is ill at ease  
I grieve for the splendor of ages past:  
Ten thousand palaces are returned to the earth.  
In the flourishing state, the masses suffer  
In the fallen state, the masses suffer 
Zhang Yanghao (1270 – 1329) ‘Meditation on the Past at Tong Pass’ 
 
 
This chapter focuses on Hong Kong-based Australian artist Royce Ng’s Kishi the Vampire, a 
lecture performance on the Japanese puppet-state of Manchukuo (1932-1945) and the invention 
of East Asian capitalistic system under its finance minister Nobusuke Kishi (1896–1987), 
portrayed as a vampire. (Fig. 6.1 and 6.2) Closely reading Kishi the Vampire, the chapter 
investigates the question of nationalism and Pan-Asianism in Manchukuo, Kishi’s invention of 
state-guided capitalism and its implication for East Asia, to further move to a theoretical 
reflection on the mutation of desire under capitalism, manifesting in the perversion of desire in 
the erotic-grotesque culture and necropolitics. These interlocking questions are anchored in 
concrete historical annotations and at the same time construct a meta-level historical materialist 
frame of transhistorical flows of desire. The artistic project offers a fruitful site where these 
questions are explored, sometimes by way of interlocution, and sometimes tangentially.    
 
6.1. Kishi the Vampire 
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Manchuria, the modern name given to designate the vast area roughly encompassing north-
eastern China today, was the homeland of the Manchu nomadic people who overthrew the 
Chinese Ming dynasty and established Qing in 1644, the last dynasty of imperial China. Qing 
intentionally kept the vast land unpopulated to have a buffer zone to Russia. Starting in the 19th 
century, large influx of Chinese peasants from the inland moved into the area to nurture the 
fertile virgin land, Korean peasants too, moved from the peninsular. Russia’s geopolitical 
interest in the Pacific ports led to the construction of the eastern part of the Transsiberian 
Railway through Manchuria, which Japan seized after the Russo-Japanese war and re-
established as South Manchuria Railway Company to infiltrate its political and economic 
control into this area abundant in natural resources. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese 
Kwantung army staged a detonation on the rail route near Mukden as excuse to effectively 
occupy Manchuria. In 1932, they installed the last Qing emperor Puyi as emperor and 
established Manchukuo as a constitutional monarchy. Though formerly independent and with 
necessary alliance with local Chinese warlords and elites, Manchkuo was run de facto by 
Japanese technocrats and the military. The narrative of Kishi the Vampire takes Nobusuke 
Kishi, the finance minister of Manchukuo, as the main protagonist.  
Ng, as the narrator, takes the audience through different historical chapters consisting 
of grotesque assemblages of spaces and scenes. In the 1927 segment, a heavily industrial 
landscape emerges out of a haze as the narrator recounts Nobusuke Kishi’s absorption of 
Western economic organisational models in the face of increasing Japanese economic 
stagnation. Nobusuke Kishi served as the vice minister of industry and deputy chief of the 
Office of Administrative Affairs in Manchukuo from 1936 to 1939. Kishi adopted a syncretic 
economic policy and implemented state-guided capitalism, while the government ran an opium 
monopoly. The economic success of Manchukuo largely provided for the Japanese war engine 
in the years that followed. Kishi’s lavish sexual appetite is explicated in the animation. The dark 
interiors of brothels are permeated with a sickly atmosphere, with scenes from Japanese monster 
and erotic manga as backdrop, where a young girl’s body is consumed by a ghastly vampire-
like figure, and where enlarged sexual organs and splashed blood can be spotted. In the second 
segment, we move to the year 1937, which marked the beginning of Japan’s war on China and 
the proliferation of production in Manchukuo as the end and no longer the means; this is 
accompanied in the animation by the full revelation of the interconnected spaces—the industrial 
structures, brothels, and drug dens form but one monster body with an ominous skeleton in the 
centre. In the third segment, the narrative fast-forwards to 1987 and finds Nobusuke Kishi on 
his death bed while East Asia’s political future is being shaped. Here, a skeleton figure dances 
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to a backdrop of what looks like a Pan-Asian conference room, with national flags of postwar 
Asian countries in the background and fleeting images of Nobusuke Kishi’s grandson, Shinzo 
Abe, as well as Park Chung-Hee, anticipating their impact on the Asian political arena. It’s 
narrated that the legal heir of Kishi’s economic policy is postwar South Korea, as Park steered 
the country into industrialisation following the model Kishi set forth.  
In Kishi the Vampire, Ng appears on stage with an original Japanese propaganda kimono 
produced in the late 1930s, featuring on its backside the map of Japanese-ruled Manchuria and 
Korea, with a piece of newspaper clipping portraying the Mukden Incident. (The kimono was 
kindly provided by Johan Jacobs Museum, Zurich, which acquired it from The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, New York.) The sheer historical weight of such a rare historical artefact 
amounts to the unique performativity of Kishi the Vampire as a ‘performative museum’. This 
is in part because of the museological nature – explicitly pertaining to ethnographic museums 
– of the kimono piece. At the same time, an affective history is embodied in and enacted by the 
museological object – the kimono used in Kishi the Vampire. If displaying such a kimono in a 
museum setting affords a critical distance with which questions of history and modernity could 
be reflected upon, then the immediacy of wearing the kimono in this piece conjures up the 
militarist and nationalist frenzy that still haunts postwar East Asia today. This is where the 
affect of a museological artefact transgresses historical timeframes and lends itself to new 
syntheses – syntheses that point to new forms of domination and violence.  
Moreover, embodying the museological object brings into focus the materiality of the 
body and the biopolitics and necropolitics it is implicated in, pertinent to the piece. This works 
in synergy with the grotesque animation in the backdrop as Ng pieces together a compelling 
narrative with historical facts, told through real and fictive personal accounts. The animation 
illustrates with arresting details a series of architectural assemblage, where the spaces of 
brothels, cabins, offices and industrial structures flow into each other, and where Kishi the 
protagonist moves through. At the same time, bodies of human labour, bodies exploited in sex 
and acted upon with violence make up part of the assemblage and momentary stations visited 
in the animation, suggesting the connection between slave labour and death, and the perversion 
of desire under the capitalistic machine, which will be analysed later.   
Thinking along the notion of a ‘performative museum’ and how a historical, or perhaps 
transhistorical museum could be enacted differently, the artist writes, ‘This is done to avoid the 
inherent problems of the museum, namely the power inscribing practices of collecting, 
labelling, teleological narrativising, embalming and encasing of objects as well as eschew the 
colonial history of the modern European museum by positing an unstable, immaterial place 
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whose architecture is ephemeral and its living exhibits speak of a disordered history of ghostly 
objects, spaces and subaltern voices which is a history of the modern Asian state without the 
corrupted ideological underpinnings of the traditional museum’ (Ng 2017).  
In this way, the artist creatively follows the way anthropologist Michael Taussig retells 
the history of Columbia within the history of Spanish imperialism through the optic of cocaine. 
In the parallel context of South America, Taussig’s book My Cocaine Museum is presented as 
a counterpoint to the official Gold Museum housed in the Banco de la Republica in Bogota 
representing the official hegemonic narrative of Columbia through the history of gold. After 
decades of fieldwork amongst Indian communities in the jungles of Columbia, Taussig 
dedicated the ‘Cocaine Museum’ to the indigenous inhabitants whose labour and natural 
environments were exploited under imperial rule to construct the museum of gold but were 
excluded from its history. (Taussig 2004) 
In Kishi the Vampire and in other works, Ng actively engages with historical research 
and skilfully transforms objects of anthropological interest into quasi objects – at once material 
and immaterial, blurring the lines between historical research, critical ethnography, artistic 
production and presentation, thereby questioning the politics of representation. 
 
6.2. Opium, Manchukuo and Kishi 
 
6.2.1. Opium and the global economy 
 
The Qing emperor Yongzheng banned the smoking of opium in China in 1729. In 1764, The 
British East India Company seized the monopoly of opium cultivation from the Mughal rulers. 
There was ballooning trade deficit effected by the demand for Chinese tea, porcelain and silk, 
while the Chinese wanted nothing from the British and only accepted silver as currency. 
Consequently, the British foreign currency reserves were being depleted. In order to redress the 
imbalance, the British established opium as a commodity. Despite the official ban, opium 
flooded into China through smugglers. Opium, or ‘black earth’ as Bengali opium is called, was 
cultivated in poppy fields in Bengal and processed in the British East Indian Company’s 
sprawling factories in the town of Patna and near Benares. From there the refined opium was 
transported to Calcutta, capital of Bengal and until 1912 capital of British India, where it was 
stored and auctioned, and then shipped on to China. In 1830, the sale of opium made up a sixth 
of the gross national product of British India. (Koester 2008, 142) 
To give a contemporary weight to the historical figures, trade deficit between British 
East India Company and China in 1879 was equivalent to 2.8 billion US dollars in today’s 
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currency. China’s manufactured goods exported to the West leads to mounting trade deficits in 
the West. Trade deficit between US and China in February 2018 amounted 375 billion US 
dollars. China holds 3.12 trillion foreign currency reserves as of late 2017. In 1838, just before 
the First Opium War, annual import of opium into China was 40,000 chests. By 1858 they had 
risen to 70,000 chests, approximately equivalent to global production of opium for the decade 
surrounding the year 2000.  
In the face of trade deficit, British merchant William Jardine went back to England and 
convinced Lord Palmerston to petition the British parliament to wage war against China in order 
to open up the country to free trade. This led to the First Opium War and the opening up of 
China and the seceding of the island of Hong Kong to become a British colony, essentially 
established as a holding bank for British opium profits. In order to compensate for 
administration expenses, the British resorted to force again at the excuse of a minor incident. 
The consequence of Second Opium War was that the Britain and the French forced the Chinese 
state to legalise opium, which they did in the form of placing a levy on the import of opium, 
and the British also forced them to be as low as possible. These government run ‘opium 
monopolies,’ in which opium control was ‘farmed out’ to government licensed drug dens, 
became the dominant system through which opium was distributed in the European colonies 
throughout Asia. The system the British established in Hong Kong was used in French colonial 
Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos), and the Cocaine Factory run by the Dutch being 
supplied by the East Indies. The colonial system of constructing government controlled narcotic 
economies as a form of pacification of the local population, while using that same population 
to farm the raw material, at the same time extracting profit from the sales of the drug to that 
same population was deployed by the Japanese when they acquired their own colony of 
Manchuria in North-East China.  
 In Manchukuo, around 50 to 55 percent of the government’s revenues came from drug 
sales, and by 1944, 20 percent of Manchukuo’s Chinese population of forty million was 
seriously addicted (Driscoll 2010, xiv) As Kaneda Sei, former Manchukuo Minister, testified 
in China in 1954, ‘The sale of opium was both a huge source of capital to support our military 
imperialism and a means to weaken and kill Chinese people… The way we accomplished this 
was through the market, where we used our military strength to buy opium as cheaply as 
possible and then sold it at astronomical prices to desperate addicts’ (Driscoll 2010, 227). 
The necropolitical economy of opium is made explicit when Marx cites the English 
reformer M. Martin: ‘Why, the slave trade was merciful compared with the opium trade: We 
did not destroy the bodies of the Africans, for it was in our immediate interest to keep them 
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alive. But the opium seller slays the body after he has corrupted, degraded and annihilated the 
unhappy sinners’ (Marx 1858, 213-214). Marx describes that the opium business made ‘gold 
out of nothing’ and ‘[g]reat fortunes sprang up like mushrooms in a day,’ consequently, 
‘primitive accumulation went on without the advance of a shilling’. Primitive accumulation 
marks the beginning of class differentiation, between the capitalist possessors, and the 
proletariat non-possessors. It happens through the proceedings of colonialism, violence and 
war: ‘The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and 
entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting 
of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, 
signalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production’ (Marx 1990, 915) What follows the 
stage of primitive accumulation is the full flung machine of capitalism, as we will see later. 
 
6.2.2. Manchukuo in the context of nationalism and Pan-Asianism 
 
East Asia in the first couples of decades in the 20th century was brimming with discourses of 
modernisation, various strands of nationalism, anti-imperialism and republicanism. The case of 
Manchukuo affords a lens for understanding the East Asian modern, as Prasenjit Duara’s 
seminal study on Manchukuo reveals. The state-building project of Manchukuo and its quest 
for national identity was born of the post WWI international order, as the institutional 
consequences of imperial nationalism in an emergent postcolonial time of mobilisation and 
identity politics. (Duara 2003, 77) It was the time when nationalism and national identity served 
not exclusively the will of the people under the principle of self-determination, but was more 
used as a leverage of imperialist enterprises of the developed states, mostly European nation-
states and in this case Japan. 
Following the Bolsheviks’ ‘Declaration of the Rights of Peoples,’ in which peoples of 
the empires were bestowed the rights to national self-determination and essentially to forming 
sovereign states, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson embraced the self-determination principle 
and popularised it as the fundamental way for a postimperial world. Yet as Michael A. Reynolds 
rightly points out, the principle was accommodated when it served the interests of the great 
powers and bent when it did not. Consequently, backed by the British and French, Poland was 
strategically attributed a part which is ethnographically one-third non-Polish so to create a 
buffer zone between Germany and Russia. In the Middle East, out of interest of connecting with 
the overseas colonies as well as creating power balance against Russia, the British and French 
created ‘mandate’ zones and effectively took control over Iraq and Palestine, and Syria and 
Lebanon respectively. (Reynolds 2011, 254) 
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Under this light of national self-determination, it is possible to understand the Japanese 
effort of narrating a continuous history of one nomadic/semi-nomadic people under different 
names, with a history going back to second century BCE, to which the Manchurians are 
attributed to. Duara sharply observes that by comparison, the Chinese historical account of 
Manchuria in the 1920s did not appeal to, or was not yet conscious enough to appeal to a ‘deep 
history’ ethnography testifying that Manchuria had always been Chinese. Instead the account 
emphasised practical facts – that 30 million Chinese immigrants had been living in Manchuria 
at the time – more than historical claims. (Duara 2003, 54) The recent debates around ‘New 
Qing History’ is interesting to follow yet beyond the scope of this chapter, especially in 
comparison to the constructed ‘deep history’ of Manchuria for the purpose of installing 
Manchukuo. 
At the same time, Japan profiled Manchukuo as a nation based on the alliance of five 
ethnic peoples, Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Manchurian and Mongolian. For example, it 
tolerated different religious practices and in fact mobilised religious leaders of the respective 
peoples. Yet most of the time the polyethnic alliance appeared merely rhetoric, when Japanese 
privilege could be seen from wage to access to goods, not to mention the wartime fascist 
mobilisation of non-Japanese forced labour, which we will see later.  
The other discursive resource for the polyethnic Manchukuo was Pan-Asianism. The 
Kyoto School has been largely condemned for association with the idea of Pan-Asianism and 
‘Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere,’ an economic, cultural and political collective entity 
encompassing parts of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia guided by Japan. The Kyoto School 
is a group of 20th century Japanese thinkers who developed original thinking based on 
interlocution of Eastern and Western philosophies. Kyoto School thinkers have drawn on 
Confucian ideas of tenmei (tianming in Chinese), or the ‘mandate of heaven’ to characterise a 
regime whose rule is legitimised by destiny, moral authority, practical effectiveness and raw 
power (Williams 2014, 24-25). Further, they have illustrated a ‘regional leadership by consent,’ 
which entails that the elites should ‘inspire, lead, support and listen if the requisite measure of 
public cooperation and economic effectiveness, at the level of the individual member of society, 
was to be attained’ (Williams 2014, 54-55). They saw this ‘Greater East Asian Co-prosperity 
Sphere’ as both end and means based on the prediction that the permanent solution to Japan’s 
global vulnerability lay in the sustained improvement of its capacity to wage a protracted 
defense of its regional base in East Asia and the Western Pacific. (Williams 2014, 55-56) The 
Kyoto School thinkers rejected implementing this idea through force, yet militant Japanese 
ultranationalists used it to their end and led Japan to wage wars. Recently, however, scholars 
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have called for reading the Kyoto School beyond apologetic positions, in a similar move that 
rescues Heidegger’s philosophy from his biography tainted by the Nazi chapter.  
Meticulously combing through texts of the key figures in the Kyoto School, Christopher 
S. Goto-Jones attempts to investigate their philosophy as philosophy in itself. Not to take a 
revisionist approach, he evaluates the validity of the ‘world-historical standpoint’ (sekaishiteki 
tachiba) developed by the Kyoto School as ‘an attempt (qua intellectuals) to transcend the 
question of national loyalties’ (Goto-Jones 2005, 13). En route, we see the world-historical 
standpoint as presented by Keiji Nishitani as following the historical movement from the  
Mediterranean, Atlantic to arrive at the Pacific: ‘Naturally, this does not mean that the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic have lost their meaning, but only that the Pacific, which has not 
played a world historical role before, has graduated onto the stage of world history – which is 
to say that these three aforementioned oceans have now reached the point of communicating as 
though they were a single living creature. In other words, the world’s major oceans have, in 
political terms, united to form a single ocean’ (Goto-Jones 2005, 107) Carefully weighing the 
historical context of this writing and reading it without the synthesis to the imperial ambitions, 
Goto-Jones posits that, ‘Nishitani does not go so far as to argue that the Japanese nation should 
impose its will on the world, but his caution revolves around his doubts about whether Japan 
knows what to do, rather than about the morality of such action per se’ (Goto-Jones 2005, 109).  
I will return to the philosophical proposals of the Kyoto School and the idea of the 
resonance between major oceans to form a ‘single ocean’ at the end of the chapter. The way 
that ideas of Asian alliances translated into military plans, however, was utterly another story. 
The Japanese ultranationalists were motivated by the vision of an evitable holy war between 
the East and West and took to their task to rescue and help the East Asian and Southeast Asian 
neighbours. This was reflected in the gesture of Japan renouncing its extraterritorial rights in 
Manchuria and elsewhere, while in daily practice, in the labour conditions and governmental 
structures, it’s clear that the Japanese superiority was the norm and hierarchy was cutthroat. In 
the ‘colonial’ daily business of administration, it is impossible to fully understand why the 
military encouraged the rapid modernisation and industrial buildup in Manchuria without 
grasping its framing within pan-Asianism and without working closely with alliances (Duara 
2003, 267-268).  
It is worthwhile mentioning the conceptualisation of Asia from other major Asian 
geopolitical players to provide a counterpoint to the world historical of Japan. Here, I take China 
as example. During the period of modernisation, the notion of Asia was informed by its member 
regions’ common struggle against the western and Japanese imperialist forces, and thus it was 
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underpinned by nation state transformation projects, as, for example, proposed by Liang 
Qichao. Furthermore, as an ultimate goal, it should lead to internationalism in the case of ‘Great 
Asianism’ of Sun Wen and ‘New Asianism’ of Li Dazhao. There is an element of transnational 
alliance in the ultimate vision; for example, Wang Hui characterizes Li’s vision as ‘not alliance 
among states but rather an alliance among “the masses as a whole”’ (Wang 2007, 13). Where 
is such an alliance to be found? Certainly this has influenced the course of postwar China in 
creating alliances with the Third World in the spirit of the Non-Aligned movement. All in all, 
these are short-lived sparks of conceptualising Asia in Chinese intellectual history; yet, in 
general, a horizontal way of thinking about Asia culturally and socially has not taken deep root 
in practice. 
It is noteworthy that a populist version of tianxia is on the rise; yet what is less discussed 
is that it is under the fully transformed structure of China as a nation state, and this further 
complicates the discussion of China’s relation to Asia. Korean scholar Bai Young-seo thus 
claims that ‘there is no “Asia” in China’, in reference to the absence of horizontal 
conceptualisation of Asian neighbours. Baik advocates for cross-border ‘intellectual praxis’ in 
the context of East Asia: ‘Intellectual praxis means here to conceptualise East Asia not as a 
fixed entity, but as a way of thinking that understands East Asia to be in a state of flux, always 
subject to self-reflection, and it includes a process of practice on the basis of this understanding’ 
(Baik 2002, 278). 
If the lack of ambition or interest on Asia on the part of China contrasts starkly with the 
Kyoto School and Japan’s move in Asia, then another early modern Chinese thinker’s challenge 
on the Confucian order of governance contradicts the view of his contemporaries. As mentioned 
earlier, thinkers of the Kyoto School justify the leading role of Japan in modernising Asia with 
the Confucian mandate of heaven. Taixu (1890-1947), who would later become a widely 
respected Buddhist monk and thinker, proposed in the 1910s to modernise Buddhism. He was 
inspired by anarchism in general, and Kropotkin’s ideas of mutual aid in particular, which puts 
forth that mutual aid is instinctive and a kind of innate conscience, but gets distorted by the 
structures of authority. When the anarchist utopia is fully implemented, the Buddhist pure land 
of bliss will appear. He especially took up names (ming), profit (li) and boundaries (jie) as 
things to rid of in order to achieve the utopian Buddhist pure land. Under names, he understood 
both the old imperial system as well as the new Republic of China, and under boundaries, 
national borders. He saw that ‘the authority of the state rests ultimately on force, but political 
names serve to mask that fact, augmenting its power and even leading people to participate in 
their own exploitation. In imperial times, dynasties were founded by force of arms, rather than 
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the charismatic virtue attributed to them by the Confucian doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven’ 
(Ritzinger 2014, 231). Taixu’s account of power is close to the historical materialist analysis 
that this dissertation tries to follow as one of the core threads, even though the Confucian 
mandate of heaven may appeal to war-time intellectuals. 
Having examined the cultural-historical background of Manchukuo, the following 
section traces the rapid industrialisation of Manchuria and its postwar resonance.  
 
6.2.3. Kishi and the Industrialisation of East Asia  
 
In the backdrop animation, office spaces, factories and brothels are abstracted and assembled 
around a giant skeleton to form one machine. (Fig. 6.3) They are rendered in splashy colours 
and infused in a mysterious, sickly haze. Royce Ng narrates the Japanese plan of 
industrialisation in Manchuria. Nobusuke Kishi served at prominent positions as the vice 
minister of industry and deputy chief of the Office of Administrative Affairs in Manchukuo 
from 1936 to 1939. A strong believer in state-led industrial capitalism, he used Manchukuo as 
his test ground and organised its economy with guided investment plans, utilising forced labour 
and funds from drug trade that largely provided for the Japanese war engine later. Big 
conglomerates such as Nissan made profits by following the governmental guidance to invest 
in key sectors. Having observed industrial organisations in Western countries, Kishi admired 
American Taylorist labour management, economic planning, and industrial rationalisation and 
Germany’s adaptation of technologist-engineers together with business management and 
planning. Combining these methods, with Soviet-style Five-year plan, Kishi’s ‘industrial 
rationalisation’ kick started the Manchurian industrialisation. This came down well with 
Japanese ultranationalists in the army, who had legalised the possibility of overtaking Japan’s 
economy in the case of war, and were on way to implement this. For them, ‘economic planning 
was explicitly war as a continuation of business by other means’ (Driscoll 2010, 267-268). 
Kishi’s plan was so successful that the heavy industry in Manchuria accounted for up to 90 
percent of Chinese GDP in the postwar decades. 
Kishi was notorious for his racialisation of the Chinese as inhuman and in effect treating 
them as low-cost or unremunerated labour to the point of dehumanisation, or as ‘robot slaves’ 
(Driscoll 2010, 266). Mark W. Driscoll’s study, taking a materialist historical perspective, 
illustrates the bodies of coolies, tenant farmers, opium addicts under the Kishi regime, which 
powered the Japanese wartime economic engine. These economically and politically 
disenfranchised bodies are captured in a machine of necropolitics, and form a shadowy 
counterpoint to Kishi the protagonist. I will discuss this necropolitical aspect in detail later. 
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The historical significance of Manchukuo did not stop when it dissolved. After the war, 
Kishi was imprisoned as a ‘Class A’ war crimes suspect but was never indicted for he was 
believed to be capable of steering the country in a pro-American direction. He made his political 
comeback and became Prime Minister in 1957. His post-war vision for Japan followed the same 
logic of state-led capitalistic economy to make the country’s economy strong, and ultimately, 
to seek rearmament for Japan to achieve true independence from America’s influence, which 
his grandson, Shinzo Abe is committed to. The Korean military dictator Park Chung-Hee, father 
to the impeached Korean president Park Geun-hye, who was trained in Japanese military 
academy in Manchukuo, befriended Kishi in the post-war period and normalised the relation to 
Japan, through which Korea received aids, loans and commercial credits from Japan to kick 
start the economic rebuild (Delury 2015).  
With a dancing skeleton animation in flashy pink light in the background, Ng reveals 
the post-war political DNA of East Asia and Southeast Asia as flashbacks to Kishi in his 
deathbed. The narration goes, 
 
Kishi lay dying on the tatami mat, his wife, children and grandson surrounded him. 
Yoko had married well, and he was proud of his grandson, he had already spoken with 
some of his friends from the wild Manchukuo days and Shinzo’s political career was 
mapped out. (Yoko was the daughter of Nobusuke Kishi and mother of Shinzo Abe) 
[…] By the 1960s every Asian government had come grovelling to Japan and asked for 
expertise and capital to fund their own version of the Japanese developmental state. His 
crowning achievement had been when the Korean President Park Chung-Hee, who he’d 
known in Manchukuo, had agreed to turn over reparations for suffering inflicted during 
colonialism into Japanese foreign direct investment. The wartime plan to create a 
‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’ had come to fruition with the rise of the East 
Asian Tiger Economies who had all learnt from Kishi’s Manchurian experiment. (Ng 
2016) 
 
The implication of Kishi’s policy in office during and after Manchukuo attested to the 
underlying political landscape of East Asia: the death of Manchukuo was the birth of East Asia. 
Duara puts it in a larger political frame as follows, ‘While imperialism was certainly preserved 
in this hegemony, it also dictated relations between center and periphery different from those 
of the older colonies. The new program involved more alliance, autonomy, investment, 
development, identity, and competitiveness. In many ways, Manchukuo prefigured the 
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phenomenon of a junior partner or a client state dominated by hegemonic states such as the 
United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar period’ (Duara 2003, 78). 
Ultimately – though it was implicit in the performance – Kishi’s model is exercised to 
the maximal scale in today’s China, which has become the world’s second largest economy 
within three decades of economic reform. At national and global levels, Chinese capitalism has 
the characteristics of both fully-fledged market economy and strong state intervention with 
state-owned enterprises and state-guided public-private investments in strategic sectors. The 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced in 2013 as a platform for regional multilateral 
cooperation, interlinks China with regions on the ancient Silk Road(s), the trade routes through 
greater Central Asia and the maritime trade routes connecting East Asia to Africa and Europe. 
To date, the BRI has expanded to around 70 countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, 
and Oceania, incorporating one third of global GDP and one quarter of global foreign 
investment flows. The economic policies and specifically, the more favourable and less political 
conditions of investments, lend themselves to an interpretation as alliance and brotherhood, 
while at the same replicating the structural logic of the hegemonic states. This will be 
expounded on in the section on Asian economy. 
 
6.3. Transhistorical Movements: Desiring production 
 
6.3.1. Desire and capitalism 
 
This part takes a historical-materialism-inspired Deleuzian perspective to unpack the operation 
of capitalism and organisation of desire and power in the rapid development of Manchukuo and 
beyond. This meta-level theoretical lens here focuses on the materialist arrangements of labour, 
goods and desire to analyse the operational logic of capitalism and its consequences on the 
human bodies in relation to desire. It offers a theoretical reflection that takes a tangential line 
of flight from the concrete historical, political-economic studies on Manchukuo undertaken 
above, and moves into a field where movements of materialities account for the emergence of 
social phenomena like hentai. This is in turn made tangible by the erotic grotesque aesthetics 
employed in the artistic work. 
In Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of history, a multi-connective desire submerges 
everything. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the precapitalistic society codes desire 
through inscription, the capitalistic machine frees the decoded flow of desire. Inscription entails 
marking bodies (the human, the non-human bodies as well as abstract bodies) so to create 
representations of things and to attribute meanings, and this in turn represses the flux of desire. 
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This process lies underneath the development of the social formation, in other words, desire is 
socialised by coding. There is only desire and the social, for social production is molar and 
consolidated, and desiring-production is molecular, dispersed and unruly (Buchanan 2008, 89). 
In the next stage of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of history, the despot comes in 
and imposes a new alliance system and places himself in direct filiation with the deity. This can 
be observed when there arises a spiritual empire or when a new empire replaces the old one. 
What comes with it is an absolute structure of hierarchy that the blocks of debt become ‘an 
infinite relation in the form of the tribute’ (Buchanan 2008, 194). The despotic state dreads the 
flow of production and exchange and tries to rule by tightening control. Sometimes this takes 
the form of creating an absolutist national identity in order to tame the people, as seen earlier 
in the creation of a multi-ethnic Manchukuo with Japanese taking up the tenmei. Yet what will 
overcome the despot state is the capitalistic machine, which decodes these flows of desire. The 
decoded flows must encounter and form conjunctions: flows of decoded soil sold as private 
property, flows of decoded money that circulates as capital, flows of workers who are now 
deterritorialised to be mere labour in the service of work itself or the capitalistic machine. 
Capital always needs new territories, be it new overseas markets or the once solid entities now 
liquidated, decoded, like the human body in the service of a necropolitical machine. Ultimately, 
capital begets capital, bypassing the production of commodities.  
Working by conjunction to decoded flows of desire and to deterritorialised labour as it 
does, how does the capitalist machine still need the state? The role of the state is not to be 
underestimated because the state widens the limits of the capitalistic economy, especially within 
an order of military expenditures. ‘The role of a politico-military-economic complex is the more 
manifest in that it guarantees the extraction of human surplus value on the periphery and in the 
appropriated zones of the centre, but also because it engenders for its own part an enormous 
machinic surplus value by mobilising the resources of knowledge and information capital, and 
finally because it absorbs the greater part of the surplus value produced’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983, 235). 
As a capitalist machine, Manchukuo was able to absorb forces that may seem to 
otherwise undermine it. Normally what amounts to subversion of the central power is a form of 
nomadic, decentralised organisation. In history, the appropriation of maritime tributary routes 
proves this theory. Out of the official historical tributary system that tied China and its 
neighbouring countries symbolically, and to varying degree politically, emerged what Japanese 
economic historian Takeshi Hamashita calls the ‘inner organicity of Asia’. He highlights the 
offshoot network that thwarts the official tributary system, which, after a long process, had 
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transformed into a private trade system at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Hamashita 
2008). Furthermore, studies suggest that the form of trade activities in Southeast Asia at that 
time included smuggling and arms trafficking. This development signals a ‘breaking out’ of the 
tributary system. Here, the historical development of networks is precisely the result of shifts 
in the existing relations between centre and periphery (Wang 2007, 22). A century later, 
Manchukuo’s governors utilised for their own benefits the connection to the Japanese hustlers 
and traffickers, who had established a local network of intelligence and trade (Driscoll 2010, 
232-233). The network of  traffickers signals the nomadic mode of operation, breaking out of 
the pyramidal power structure and following its own decoded flow of desire with ‘an alternate 
current that disrupts signifying projects’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 257). Exactly this decoded 
flow was deftly appropriated by the Manchukuo state, showing a new stage of power structure 
that Galloway and Thacker call empire: ‘like a network, empire is not reducible to any single 
state power, nor does it follow an architecture of pyramidal hierarchy. Empire is fluid, flexible, 
dynamic, and far-reaching’ (Galloway and Thacker 2007, 27). 
Manchukuo’s ideology-ridden nation-building project was characteristics of a despotic 
state that installs and subjugates its people to an absolute power, yet the economic policy of 
extracting infinite surplus through perpetuating production – and the production itself becoming 
an end and no longer the means, fell closely in line with the capitalistic machine. The primitive, 
despotic and capitalist societies do not follow any teleological or linear, development and the 
‘earlier’ orders may well live in symbiotic relation to a ‘later’ order. Hence Manchukuo 
conflates the despotic and the capitalist machines, making it on the one hand totalising and 
immanent, and on the other conjunctive and expansive, as seen in the unprecedented efficiency 
of postwar Tiger Economies and later in Chinese state capitalism. 
 
6.3.2. Necropolitics: desire, death and erotic-grotesque aesthetics 
 
While Kishi the Vampire makes a compelling revisit to a particular chapter in history, the 
aesthetics that Royce Ng adopts, inspired by the erotic-grotesque culture of Japan and especially 
its visual manifestations from the early 20th century, marks an equally important pathway to 
unpacking the Manchukuo complex in the context of capitalism.  
As analysed in the last chapter on the tiger, the figure of the schizo emerges out of the 
capitalistic stage of decoded desire. Deleuze and Guattari’s study on schizophrenia as 
materialist consequences on the subconscious level of the subject suggests a philosophical 
parallel to understanding the erotic grotesque culture in the Modern period in Japan. 
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Inspired by Mark Driscoll’s study on the connection of capitalism and the erotic-
grotesque in Japan, the marriage of which erodes the nerves and infiltrates into the human 
sensorium, a grim-faced blood-sucking Kishi, bodies of exhausted young girls showered in 
blood, bony opiumnated bodies of Chinese workers loom in the animation in Kishi the Vampire. 
Fetishism around female bodies coupled with hentai – perverted – desires, exemplified by the 
novels of Endogawa Rampo filled with psychotics, perverts and vampires, prevailed the urban 
life of interwar Tokyo.  
Sociologist Akagami Yoshitsuge (1892–1953) theorised this phenomenon in his The 
Face of Erotic-Grotesque Society (Ryōki no shakaisō) published in 1931 as the new ‘immediate 
society’ (chokusetsu shakai) (Driscoll 2010, 140). This is when ‘[h]uman desiring production 
in its neuro-political mode of fascination and enthralled stupefaction is sold to the worker-
consumer for the wage substitutes of pleasure, pleasure which now comes with ideological 
instructions on how to be an obedient purchaser in this new regime’ (Driscoll 2010, 141). The 
fetishism around bodies and sex goes beyond the original stage of Marxist commodity 
fetishisation, which is defined by commodities severed from its production process thereby 
appearing to have a life of its own. The lure of pleasure coincides with the furthering of 
capitalism where bodies are mined for value under the condition of the new mediated 
‘immediate’ that substitutes more authentic, unalienated modes of desire. This heralds what 
would come to be known decades later as affect economy. For what makes these fetish images 
and the actions they provoke desirable goes almost unnoticed in the flow of affect effectuated 
by media, which captivates and invokes emotions before our cognitive registration. This 
continuous modulation, variation and intensification of affective response in real time attests to 
the fact that ‘bodily affect is mined for value,’ (Clough 2008, 16) forming the ever-pervasive 
intimacy between economy and our daily lives. Clough’s comment on the affect economy rings 
true almost 90 years after Akagami’s diagnosis on the production of desire: ‘the circuit from 
affect to emotion is attached to a circulation of images meant to simulate desire-already-
satisfied, demand-already-met, as capital extracts value from affect – around consumer 
confidence, political fears, etc., such that the difference between commodification and labour, 
production and reproduction, are collapsed in the modulation of the capacity to circulate affect’ 
(Clough 2008, 16). 
Further studies in the field of sex and fetish culture point to deeper connections between 
the body, desire and the social. Drawing on medical studies, spearhead of Japanese sexology 
Tanaka Kogai suggested that the erotic drives expressed in hentai, including sadism, masochism 
and fetishism, are but products of modern civilisation and capitalistic material culture, so much 
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so that he ‘called it the height of hypocrisy for modern states to attempt to repress that which 
their advanced capitalism constantly stimulates: new affects and new pleasures’ (Driscoll 2010, 
150). Similarly, the figures around Japanese Psychiatric Association held the view that humans 
expressed aspects of hentai because Japanese and global capitalist society were themselves 
fundamentally hentai. Consequently, they recast crime as multicausal, relative to the 
metropolitan environment that it is embedded in. They even normalised and de-pathologised 
‘split-personality disorder’ as simply ‘multiple personality’ (Driscoll 2010, 157-159).  
This line of argument brilliantly anticipated Deleuze and Guattari's study of the close 
relation between capitalism and schizophrenia in their Anti-Oedipus. Here, as we’ve seen above, 
different stages of history are interwoven through the materialistic analysis of desire and 
desiring production, to arrive at the current world order in which capitalism most effectively 
rides on the flow of decoded desire and appropriates production for the production of capital. 
Deleuze and Guattari identify that the social and political repression permeated by desiring 
production results in schizophrenic, neurotic or perverted behaviours, effectively expanding the 
configuration of the subject beyond the Freudian libidinal drive and linking psychic repression 
with social repression. Deleuze puts it thus in an interview, ‘we have never seen a schizophrenic 
delirium that is not firstly about race, racism, politics, that does not begin in all directions from 
history, that does not involve culture, that does not speak of continents, kingdoms, and so forth’ 
(Guattari 2009, 80) The cure then, in a strange resonance with Tanaka decades earlier, is ‘rather 
an affair of desiring-production, of getting it going and giving it somewhere to go other than 
into the void’ (Buchanan 2008, 30). This is not to diverge into a study on pathology and 
psychoanalysis, but to suggest that there is a material assemblage in capitalism conditioning the 
individual’s behaviours, and that the schizophrenia serves as a conceptual figuration for the 
organisation of self-reproducing desire. 
In the latest stage of the omnipresent capitalist machine, ‘[d]eath is felt rising from 
within and desire itself becomes the death instinct, latency, but it also passes over into these 
flows that carry the seeds of a new life’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 223) In the streets of 
Asakusa, where hentai pleasure was consumed in the interwar period, sociologist and 
ethnographer Gonda Yasunosuke questioned how the purchase price of pleasure in this new 
stage of capitalism seemed to be human life itself (Driscoll 2010, 143). This force of capitalism 
operates not just in tandem with biopolitics that discipline bodies in particular production 
settings or social relations such as the factory or school, but it further incorporates life itself as 
the abstracted site for production. This new necropolitical domination of the racialised, 
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economically and politically disenfranchised bodies keeps them in a form of the living dead 
(Mbembe 2003, 21).  
It is on the level of necropolitics that bodies of the coolies, workers, opium addicts and 
the young girls, whether in Japan or in Manchuria, are implicated. The theorisation of erotics 
and normalisation of borderline fetish behaviours were co-extensive to the wars and violence 
(both sexual and general) in the time of Japanese imperial expansion, which returned to the 
metropolis capital of Tokyo in the form of the erotic grotesque visual culture. For Ng, this 
invokes the parallel in the argument made by the German sociologist Iris Darman that the 
practice of sadomasochism that emerged in in 19th century Europe is a transferal of the 
master/slave dialectic and the mediating disciplinary tool of the whip lashing the bodies of 
slaves from the colonial periphery back to the hegemonic centre (Ng 2017).  
Ng’s own appropriation of the erotic-grotesque aesthetics is productive for it renders the 
perverted desire effectuated by necropolitics tangible. If according to Deleuze and Guattari the 
schizophrenic process manifests how decoded desire works, then such stark visual and 
aggressively sensual presentation following the hentai aesthetics becomes a potent enactment 
of the flow desire that transpired the urban areas of Tokyo and Hsinking (capital of 
Manchukuo), the bodies of factory workers, sex slaves and opium addicts, as well as the 
seemingly endless stream of capital. Ng aligns his motivation behind exploring the erotic 
grotesque to the larger colonial social-economical context and asks ‘whether opium produced 
an aesthetic of ‘erotic-grotesque’ culture based on subjective indigenous responses to the un-
natural economic relations of modernity into which Asian peoples were suddenly implicated’ 
(Ng 2017). Ng further draws on the research of Michael Taussig in The Devil and Commodity 
Fetishism in South America, which analyses the production of magical concepts as a reaction 
to capitalist development in Third World countries (Taussig 1980). Reading the style of Latin 
American ‘magical realism’ as one which expresses ‘the seemingly opposed perspectives of a 
pragmatic, practical and tangible approach to reality and an acceptance of magic and 
superstation’ (Bowers 1994, 24), Ng speculates on an analogous model for the subversive 
culture of the ‘erotic-grotesque’ in Asian art and popular culture.  
In the last scene of Kishi the Vampire, a ghastly skeleton dances to the backdrop of a 
Pan-Asian conference room, with national flags of postwar Asian countries in the background. 
(Fig. 6.4) Ng voices the last line in the performance, ‘Kishi began coughing and savoured the 
taste of blood on his tongue and remembered the stories by Rampo that he read as a young man 
in the 1920s, they weren't tigers, they were monsters, vampires that would suck the life from 
workers, the attention of consumers and even the pleasure from sex to drink of that flowing red 
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blood’ (Ng 2016). 
From the perspective of necropolitics, Ng’s depiction of Kishi as a vampire is a logical 
extension to what he is known as, ‘3' ’, or ‘the Shōwa era monster’. It is no 
coincidence that Deleuze and Guattari render the capital in capitalism as vampire: ‘Capital is 
dead labour, that vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more 
labour it sucks’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 228). Kishi embodies the blood sucker who 
tirelessly extracts surplus value from industrial productions on the one hand and fulfils his 
excessive sexual appetite on the other. Death, or more precisely, death-in-life is produced in 
Kishi’s necropolitical machine. The vampire is hence the perfect variation of the schizo, both 
producing and is being produced by decoded flows of desire set loose by capitalism, looking to 
form new conjunctions and no longer obeying the law of subordination and filiation. In Deleuze 
and Guattari, a pathological schizo wanders through fields of intensities and ‘identifies’ with 
different names in history. In fact, the names don’t signify real people, rather states of 
intensities, and are ‘effects’, for example, ‘God is the feeling of omnipotence, divine fury, 
judgement, and so on, while Napoleon might be the feeling of triumph, persecution, victory, 
defeat and so on’ (Buchanan 2008, 80). In the last moment of Kishi’s life rendered as a state of 
delirium by the artist, Kishi passes the states of intensities and ‘identifies’ with the flow of 
conjunctive capitalism, a force set in place by him in Manchuria later influencing the Four East 
Asian Tiger economies. 
It is important to note here that the comparison of Japanese war machine to the 
conjunctive operations of desire of a capitalist machine is not a way to play down the horror of 
militancy, nor is this likening Kishi to vampire, the latter itself a creature gone awry in the 
schizo capitalistic order, to exonerate Kishi from his wilful decisions. Rather, the vampire is a 
figuration of capitalistic desire, used in a personal and impersonal sense. Similarly, analysing 
living networks, Thacker and Galloway hold that the contemporary capitalistic system we live 
in contains ‘an anonymity, a nonhuman component, which consistently questions common 
notions of action, causality, and control’ (Galloway and Thacker 2007).  
 
6.4. Capitalism today 
 
This section follows from the method of dynamic interpretation and immanent critique 
to examine Manchukuo and its postwar heirs in the context of capitalism and the capitalist 
global order. I will also try to tackle the extent to which the protectionism and state intervention 
can be said as a rupture to the capitalist system. This is done by bringing Manchukuo, Japan, 
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later East Asian players, and most recently China into the picture. The aim is not to write a 
history of capitalism in East Asia, but rather to show the operations of authority sometimes 
working in tandem and sometimes against cultural tropes, so to constitute an immanent critique 
that teases out inherent contradictions and deconstructions. Clearly, this special regard for 
political economy grows out the methodology pertaining to historical materialism, and as such 
offers a chance to bring the discourses from the ‘old’ and ‘new’ materialism together.  
6.4.1. Manchukuo and Confucianism in political economy 
 
As we have seen with Kyoto School’s reworking of Confucian governance, the modernisation 
of Confucianism is not without contest. Here, I will only focus on the economic aspect. The 
history of modern China is intricately associated with debates on tradition and modernity. 
Ideologies ridden, the two often seem to be mutually exclusive, creating conceptual and cultural 
borders. The debate underlies political, social and technological movements since the late 19th 
century, when Western-minded and Western-trained (including Japan) politicians, intellectuals 
and entrepreneurs initiated the process of China’s modernisation. The anti-traditionalist 
movements in China experienced its first heyday in the May Fourth movement in 1919 where 
science and democracy was upheld against traditional, primarily Confucian ideals. 
Communism, following the Soviet political line, drove the country further into modernisation. 
The divisive, dogmatic binary ideology, a stiff version of dialectics of Soviet and Chinese 
Communism, seen in the divide between classes, traditional and modern culture, idealist and 
materialist positioning, prevailed in China, peaking during the Cultural Revolution with a long 
aftermath.  
The vehemently anti-traditionalist ideology based on class-struggle was replaced since 
the 80s and 90s by the ideology of integration and proved to be the driving force behind the 
social and economic reforms. Since then, China has embraced market economy successfully 
practicing a ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. After a period of skill and knowledge 
transfers, China is not shy to pronounce its vision to be a world-leading technology innovator 
in the near future.  
There seems to be delineation between the traditional China and a modern, capitalistic 
and technologised China. Or is there? Contra any clear definition, China’s modern history is 
multi-layered and sometimes irreducible to Western experiences. For some scholars, the 
decisive factor has been the successful if not somewhat dubious marriage between 
traditionalism/Confucianism and capitalism. According to scholar Gan Yang, the 
modernisation of China is a struggle to fuse or communicate Confucianism, socialism, and 
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liberalism (tong santong _G). Crucially, the transition from socialism to capitalism went 
rather smoothly, as opposed to Russia and post-socialist Eastern European countries, because 
decentralisation of power was already in place in Mao’s time so that at the local level people 
could take their own initiatives. (Gan 2007) In this sense, the economic success of China owes 
to remnants of Confucianism with a certain feudalist connotation. Here feudalism should be 
understood not as a backward form of governance but one that rather affirms the distribution of 
power and local rule, at the same time bound by the Confucian concept of da yitong G – 
a common pursuit and respect for unity, effectively creates what can be called Confucian 
capitalism. In parallel, since the 2000s, there has been a revival of traditional Chinese culture. 
As a consequence, renewed efforts have been put into teaching classical Chinese literature and 
public address made by top politicians not infrequently cite classical texts. 
However, what exactly does tradition and Confucianism mean in a modern society? It 
seems that Confucianism becomes a go-to theory to conveniently explain (or not) both 
‘retrograde’ attitude and a ‘progressive’ one depending on where one stands. On the one hand, 
Confucianism is often taken to be the moral backbone and ideology that helped the emperors 
ruled China (and influenced East Asia) for almost two thousand years, based on a purportedly 
rigid differential, hierarchical society. Some have attributed the economic boom of East Asia 
states to the Confucian work ethic, whereby the individual worker is subordinated to the social 
hierarchy and collectivity. On the other hand, Confucianism can also be interpreted as a 
dynamic, non-hierarchical social field based on non-transactional reciprocities and social 
mobility. So, is Confucianism naturally traditionalist in political economy? And do we mean 
protectionist by traditionalist? Scale and context is crucial for an engagement that is neither 
naively anti-(Western-)modern nor self-orientalising, which may be a criterion when revisiting 
the Confucian capitalism and the legacy of Manchukuo today. With this in mind, let’s turn to 
capitalism and East Asian economics. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari provide an excellent exposition on the contradictory way that 
capitalism works on the ruins of the previous orders in tandem with the image of schizophrenia, 
or desire in a free-flow state: 
 
[S]ocial machines make a habit of feeding on the contradictions they give rise to, on the 
crises they provoke, on the anxieties they engender, and on the infernal operations they 
regenerate. Capitalism has learned this, and has ceased doubting itself, while even 
socialists have abandoned belief in the possibility of capitalism’s natural death by 
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attrition. No one has ever died from contradictions. And the more it breaks down, the 
more it schizophrenises, the better it works, the American way. (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983, 151)  
 
Later in the book, they offer a sharp account on the relation between the schizo and 
capitalism: 
 
Hence one can say that schizophrenia is the exterior limit of capitalism itself or the 
conclusion of its deepest tendency, but that capitalism only functions on condition that 
it inhibit this tendency, or that it push it back or displace this limit, by substituting for 
its own immanent relative limits, which it continually reproduces on a widened scale. It 
axiomatises with one hand what it decodes with the other. Such is the way one must 
reinterpret the Marxist law of the counteracting tendency. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 
246)   
 
By identifying the tendency of capitalism which works by substituting its limit with 
schizophrenic free-flow and reproducing the latter to enlarge the scope of its own immanence, 
Deleuze and Guattari exhibit great foresight in unpacking the mutation of capitalism into 
neoliberalism: its ability to contradict itself, to bend, in order not to break. A history of 
protectionism and the neoliberalisation of trade and finances can be approached through this 
model. 
6.4.2. Trade protectionism  
 
The ‘mother country and bastion of modern protectionism’ as the economic historian Paul 
Bairoch called it, is nowhere other than America. In the nineteenth century, it was on way to 
industrialisation and its average tariffs in the late nineteenth century were nearly as high – 45 
per cent – as the steepest ones the Trump administration promises to slap on imported electronic 
goods in 2017. (Mishra 2018) The philosophical father of economic protectionism is, as Mishra 
points out, Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804), the founder of the American financial system who 
proposed a protectionist strategy for national development after America broke free from the 
British control.  
In his ‘Report on the Subject of Manufactures’ submitted to Congress in 1791, Hamilton 
used the potent term ‘infant’ industries to argue for economic protectionism. Hamilton’s father 
was Scottish. Born in the West Indies, then a British colony, Hamilton was keenly aware of 
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how the British practiced protectionism: preventing colonies from competing while selling their 
own goods around the world. In his view, infant nations needed room to manoeuvre before they 
could compete with established industrial powers. The United States embraced many of 
Hamilton’s recommendations; the beneficiaries were, first, the textile and iron industries and 
then steel. […] It was Hamilton’s formula, rather than free trade, that made the United States 
the world’s fastest-growing economy in the 19th century and into the 1920s. And that formula 
was embraced by other nations coming late to international economic competition. (Mishra 
2018) 
Hamilton’s pupils included the Germans, the Japanese and, ultimately, the Chinese. The 
German economist Friedrich List (1789-1846) lived in the United States from 1825 until the 
1830s and observed that young industries must be nurtured first in a protective environment 
before they can excel in a free market. Applying List’s lessons, Germany moved with 
spectacular speed from an agrarian to an industrial economy after its unification in 1871. Japan, 
after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, modernised the nation with Western knowledge and caught 
up with Western industrialisation within a few decades following Germany’s path. (Mishra 
2018) Japan defeated Russia in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, marking the first time in history 
a ‘non-Western’ power winning over a Western powerhouse. Japanese militant nationalists 
quickly moved to an expansionist agenda, as the history of Manchukuo evinces. 
Fast forward to the postwar era. The International Monetary Fund was founded in 1944 
in Bretton Woods as a supranational economic institution to regulate international monetary 
cooperation and to preserve the stability of international financial markets. It stipulated, among 
others, that all currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar, itself convertible into gold. In 1971, 
the U.S. unilaterally terminated the pegging to the gold standard, followed by an era of lifted 
restrictions on capital flows. Now the IMF has drifted away from its original mission, as it is 
committed to globalisation of trade, financialisation of markets and global integration of the 
circuits of production. As Hardt and Negri point out, ‘The IMF is thus charged with developing 
a way to govern the new forms of global social production (which are now post-Fordist, 
postmodern, and defined by the biopolitical condition of the multitude) through financial 
mechanisms. The basic project of the IMF has become forcing states to abandon Keynesian 
social programs and adopt monetarist policies. It dictates for ailing and poor economies a 
neoliberal formula that includes minimal spending on public welfare, privatisation of public 
industry and wealth, and the reduction of public debt’ (Hardt 2004, 173). 
Hardt and Negri identify the connection between dropping the gold standard in 1971, 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 1972, and the first 
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oil crisis in 1973, as they signal a period of great social and economic transformation. 
Importantly, the global order was in the remaking: ‘war itself had begun to be transformed – 
less oriented toward defending against a coherent mega-threat and more focused on 
proliferating mini-threats; less intent on the general destruction of the enemy and more inclined 
toward the transformation or even production of the enemy’ (Hardt 2004, 39). We have seen 
such production of the enemy in the concrete, such as in the Near East, which results in the 
political turmoil of a region serving as background to the work of Abu Hamdan, discussed in 
the second chapter. 
Political interventions continue through financial means. Trade wars and financial 
interventions born out of trade deficits are means of the strong states to their own ends just as 
international institutions are liable to manipulation of strong states. This is where the state-
guided capitalism of Manchukuo, with the continuation of its logical heirs into the present, most 
notably in China.  
6.4.3. Japan’s lost decade and Asian financial crisis 
 
China, though a dedicated member of the World Trade Organisation, offers a potential counter 
point to the model of neo-liberalisation. Since 2017, China has imposed stringent capital 
controls to shield its economy from volatility, a move often rebuked by Western neo-liberal 
institutions. In order to understand how China positions itself, it is important to revisit the 
1991/1992 economic meltdown of Japan and 1997 Asian financial crisis, which in many ways 
has presaged China’s path of development as a latecomer to the game of industrial and 
economic modernisation. As said, the IMF and the capitalist world order go hand in hand. Its 
role in the financial disaster of Southeast Asia comes to the fore, showing that ‘a monetary 
policeman is never neutral and always supports a specific political regime’ (Hardt 2004, 174). 
Japan proved a postwar economic miracle and rose to become the world’s second largest 
economy in the 1970s. In the 1980s, Japanese export of electronic consumer goods and 
automobiles in the U.S. enjoyed sweeping success; at the same time, there was mounting trade 
deficit to Japan. This triggered the Japan Panic in the 1980s, an updated version of the Yellow 
Peril racialism rooted in stereotypes of the mass hordes of Japanese or East Asians, but within 
a new context of global trade and postmodern technological advances. In one infamous instance, 
a Chinese American man named Vincent Chin was beaten to death outside Detroit in 1982 
because a laid-off automobile worker believed he was Japanese and hence responsible for the 
U.S. automobile industry’s plight. At the same time, there is always a sense of awe within the 
fear. As captured in Michael Crichton’s novel Rising Sun, the Japan Panic of the 1980s ‘focused 
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the American gaze toward the postmodern, high-tech, Japan-dominated future’ (McKevitt 
2017, 68). Against the background of sushi’s huge popularity in the U.S., the film adaption of 
Rising Sun tellingly features a scene of nyotaimori, the obscure practice of serving sushi on a 
naked woman’s body. The naked white woman in the film became ‘not just servants but objects 
of servitude’, a token of Japanese culture’s ‘colonisation’ of America (McKevitt 2017, 157).
    
In the face of the ballooning trade deficit, major industrial players in the US lobbied the 
Congress to consider protectionist policies, which led to the Plaza Accord signed in 1985, 
resulting in the depreciation of the US Dollar against the Japanese Yen by 51% from 1985 to 
1987. The strong appreciation of the Yen triggered a recession in Japan and further triggered 
the crash of the asset price bubble in 1991/1992. Japan suffered from an economic stagnation 
for the ensuing two decades – the ‘lost decades’. 
Further ripple effects abound. Japanese investments in the 1980s kickstarted the strong 
economic growth in Southeast Asia. In the 1990s, economic growth rates in Korea, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, hovered above 5% and showed signs of overheating. At 
the time, Japan’s expansion had slowed down to 3.6% in the wake of a recession. The boom of 
Southeast Asian nations started in the late 1980s and early 1990s thanks to textile, food, 
automobile and semiconductor manufacturing industries. Prior to the 1997 crisis, the currencies 
of the Southeast Asian nations were already exposed to the risk of devaluation because of the 
slowdown in export and the risk of debt defaults. They had attracted up to half of global capital 
inflows into developing countries due to high return rates and liberal capital control policies, 
which allowed domestic banks and offices of foreign banks in the region to absorb unrestricted 
foreign credit. Hot money was pouring into Southeast Asian real estate and stock markets and 
bubbles accumulated. There had been growing current account deficits, meaning that countries 
imported more goods, services and capital than they exported. The disproportionally high 
amount of foreign debt added growing pressure on the domestic markets. In late 1996, 
Thailand’s short-term foreign debt amounted to $47.7 billion, while the foreign exchange 
reserves of the country at the time stood at $37.2 billion, making Thailand effectively insolvent 
even before the actual crisis broke out.  
Most of the Southeast Asian currencies were pegged to a basket of currencies, 
predominantly the US dollar. In contrast to floating exchange rate systems based on supply and 
demand compared to other currencies, this requires the national bank of the respective nation 
to intervene in foreign currency purchases in order to balance its own currency. For example, 
when there is a growing interest from global capital to invest in Thailand, the demand for Thai 
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baht increases, and the Thai central bank needs to buy foreign currency with Thai baht to 
increase the supply of the currency in the global market accordingly. This system requires the 
country to sit on substantial foreign currency reserves to adopt to the changing climate of the 
currency market.  
In 1997, when the confidence of lenders dropped in response to a variety of factors 
including a slower growth rate, higher U.S. interest rates and China’s role as an emerging 
manufacturer, it precipitated a mass withdrawal of credit and led to huge capital outflows, 
putting depreciative pressure on the currencies. Speculative assaults on the currencies 
exacerbated the situation. Currency speculators like Soros began heavily shorting the 
currencies. This means that he turned a profit by betting on the devaluation of a currency. On 
July 2, 1997, after the Thai government spent tens of billions of foreign exchange reserves to 
stabilise the baht to no avail, it was forced to float its currency, resulting in the depreciation of 
the baht by 15.59% on the first day. This triggered a ripple effect in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong. In the following months, the Indonesian rupiah lost more 
than 80%, the Malaysian ringgit 45%, the Singapore dollar 20%, the Korean won 50%, and the 
stock market plummeted by 75% in Indonesia, 50% in Malaysia and 30% in Taiwan.  
The consequences were grave and far-reaching. Governments in Indonesia and Thailand 
collapsed. Numerous businesses went bankrupt, millions of workers were laid off, over ten 
thousand committed suicide in Hong Kong, Japan and Korea alone. Not to mention an entire 
generation that would grow up in the shadow of a financial crisis without a perspective. The 
International Monetary Fund stepped in and offered a series of bailout packages, most notably 
to Korea, on condition the recipients continue to liberalise their financial sector and open 
domestic markets. Saskia Sassen interprets the Asian financial crisis as ‘global systemic 
disciplining, even punishment for pursuing their own type of policies aimed at keeping their 
economies under firm control by national capital owners and to some extent the state. Rather 
than seeing the imposition of further “liberalization” and deregulation on their economies made 
possible partly by the “crises” of these economies, as state adaptability to the global era, I would 
interpret these crises and the ensuing liberalisations as an imposed systemic adjustment to the 
current global economic regime’ (Sassen 2006, 227). She identifies the model of ‘participation 
in the global economy’ represented by the United States as the current global economic regime 
(Sassen 2006, 228).  
Sassen firmly stands by a liberal global economic order and attributes the crisis to strong 
national capital controls of the economies. The question remains: How open should emerging 
economies be to global capital? After two decades, perhaps only one strong alternative to this 
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logic has arisen. A surging China has certainly learnt its lessons from the Asian financial crisis. 
At a national and global level, with the world’s biggest middle-class consumer market as its 
base, Chinese capitalism displays characteristics of both a fully-fledged market economy and 
strong state intervention, with state-owned enterprises and public-private investments in 
strategic sectors. Before the Asian crisis, Beijing had considered opening China to international 
capital flows by the 2000s, but ever since, tighter measures against capital outflow were being 
implemented, reaching an apogee in 2017. According to a Financial Times opinion piece, ‘in 
this way China is embracing international capital strictly on its own terms and neutralising the 
power of latter-day Mr Soroses. It is a vision of capitalism in which capital is trussed and bound, 
incapable of punishing those who violate its animating algorithms’ (Kynge 2017). 
The 2008 financial crisis was precipitated by financial deregulation promoted by the 
likes of Alan Greenspan. The core of the crisis, being defaulted sub-prime credits, shares 
similarities to the Asian financial crisis, only that the U.S. banks were ‘too big to fail’ and 
needed to be bailed out. There have been many voices against unfettered liberal capitalism, 
calling for more intrusive regulation, more proactive interference and wishing for a new Bretton 
Woods to control the global flow of capital. The national capital controls of China was born 
exactly as a reaction to this problem (among other political and ideological justifications, 
beyond the scope of my dissertation here). 
Admittedly, the war-economy-politics machine in our current era has taken on new 
characteristics. Yet the underlying logic, if we look at it in a long enough timeline and through 
a lens of abstract machines, has always been the same. Incessant decoding, dislodging, untying 
desire coded and overcoded by the previous regimes, capitalism replaces all the territorialising 
tendencies with the non-limit of schizophrenia itself, that is, it bends, embodies contradictions 
and ruptures, and continues business as usual. It has no exterior limit, but only an interior limit 
that is capital itself and that it does not encounter, but reproduces by always displacing it.  
 
6.5. Terror and Territory: Resonance beyond capitalism? 
 
Kishi the Vampire has come to an end. Yet the ‘aftertaste’ of what the artist calls an ‘economic 
horror story’ can be profound. Beyond the figure of vampire that Kishi embodies, there is a 
sense of horror or terror grumbling underneath, a terror of a systematic kind as we have traced 
in the history of capitalism. Under this light, is it possible to reground ourselves amidst incessant 
motions?  
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6.5.1. Regrounding and the earth 
 
Writing from the present moment of planetary climate change, Latour reflects on how 
geological history has accelerated to the point of non-return as a result of human exploitation. 
He calls for an ‘Earthbound’ becoming, which demands the human to ‘rematerialise our 
belonging to the world,’ or a kind of regrounding that has been highlighted in various 
philosophical propositions as we will see now (Latour 2017). This entails embracing the 
possibility that the Earth may take its tolls on the human. At one moment, Latour comments on 
‘terror’ and ‘territory’: 
 
Geohistory would need a visual representation as good as the old representations of 
geography and history, finally fused. It is as though every limit, every border, every 
boundary marker, every encroachment – in short, every feedback loop – has to be 
simultaneously and collectively recounted, traced, replayed, and ritualised. Each of the 
loops registers the unanticipated actions of some external agent that comes in to 
complicate human action. Owing to this reactivity, what a ‘territory’ signifies has been 
totally disrupted: it is no longer the old pastoral landscape of well-marked fields on 
which harvests ripen slowly and reliably – ‘Et in Arcadia ego.’ Far from being ‘land-
appropriation,’ the Landnahme celebrated by Carl Schmitt, it is rather the violent 
reappropriation of all human claims by the Earth itself – as though ‘territory’ and 
‘terror’ had a common root. (Latour 2017, 276) 
 
As put forward in the chapters concerning the constructions of history, this earth is the 
primary body on which the socius inscribes itself. In the geophilosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, 
the earth is the element that brings together all the elements within a single embrace while using 
one or another of them to deterritorialise territory. On this body, things continue to differentiate, 
or divide, but only onto themselves. Thinking and being, similarly, as seen in the nomadology 
that Deleuze and Guattari put forward, is in the first place immanent to earth (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987). 
The connection between geological movements of earth and politics has a long history 
in anarchist geography. At the height of scientific explorations of Central Asia during the 
second half of the nineteenth century, when cartography serviced the military and designs of 
roads and railways met the interest of capitalists, French anarchist geographer Élisée Reclus 
(1830–1905) saw geology and geography being mined for geopolitical leverage. He attempted 
to write the story of the earth and of humanity as one, or as he terms it, the story of ‘nature 
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becoming self-conscious’. Integral to this history is an account of the forces of domination that 
emerge in human history, only to restrict the future self-realisation of both humanity and nature. 
(Clark 2013, 6) Incidentally, Kropotkin, the Russian founder of anarcho-communism who 
befriended and was influenced by Reclus, was also a geographer before he turned an anarchist. 
Kropotkin’s greatest contribution to geography was working out the main structural lines going 
through Central and Northern Asia. He had also contributed to the study of biology by 
proposing the idea of ‘mutual aid’ instead of the Darwinian ‘survival of the fittest’ as the 
principle underlying evolution, which we have seen earlier. Both anarchist geographers 
explored the parallel territories of geographical movements and social movements and 
attempted to debase social domination by creating self-organised bodies of communities. They 
saw the basic underpinnings are class struggle, the search for equilibrium and the sovereign 
decision of the individual. (Jun and Wahl 2010, 221) 
As John Clark, the translator of Reclus’ seminal texts points out, ‘Reclus would certainly 
recognise the significant differences between human and primate hierarchies, yet he sees the 
use of such terminology as no threat to his anarchist principles or his hopes for humanity. In his 
analysis, such language draws attention to a certain continuity between phenomena in the 
human and natural worlds. Yet from the history of humanity one can learn that social hierarchies 
are contingent, historically developed institutions that may be rejected if human beings choose 
to organise their communities in other ways’ (Clark 2013, 19). On the historical level, the 
contingent character of social hierarchies as a historical formation perfectly anticipated Deleuze 
and Guattari’s idea on the contingency in history. And on the philosophical level, anarchist 
geographers are in line with geophilosophy’s basic underpinning that thinking takes place in 
relation to earth and territory, and before the definite deterritorialisation of concepts, it happens 
immanent to earth and territory. This leads us to the philosophical proposals of the Kyoto 
School, founded in the 1910s and partially concurrent to the events leading to Manchukuo. 
 
6.5.2. The Kyoto School, Confucian cosmotechnics and modernity 
 
To grapple with the desire of the time and shifts in power is exactly what the Kyoto School 
thinkers set out to do. Kitaro Nishida theorised an idea of absolute nothingness inspired both 
by the Buddhism concept of Śūnyatā (emptiness) and Western philosophy. The fundamental 
emptiness lies underneath everything and as such, it is a primary concept and not secondary to 
being. Nishida models the world in such a way that there is not an individual that has the 
experience, but that there is an experience that has the individual. Methodologically, instead of 
establishing a continuum beyond subject and object from the inside-out, Nishida re-casts his 
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method, moving from the outside-in, he hence adopts terms like ‘pure experience’ to talk about 
the anonymous, impersonal quality of experience. (Thacker 2015, 51). 
In his book The Question Concerning Technology in China. An Essay in Cosmotechnics, 
philosopher Yuk Hui traces various modernisation attempts in philosophy by East Asian 
thinkers. He seems to read that the total war serves as an accelerationist strategy and as such, 
provides an answer to the philosophy of negation in the Kyoto School. (Hui 2016, 257) A 
philosophical historical account should use caution when reading history through ideas to 
qualify each other, as in this parallel reading between the Kyoto School and Japan’s war 
engagements. Even though some discourses may have indirectly led to grave consequences, 
following a materialist standpoint, total war is less the cause than the effect of expansive 
capitalism. Eugene Thacker has also worked through the absolute nothingness in the Kyoto 
School, and sees that therein lies the potential of a ‘post-national, global philosophy’ (Thacker 
2015, 49). The ‘single ocean’ rhetoric mentioned earlier may ring true here. This connection to 
a global axis reminds me of Confucian scholars in 19th century Nanjing mentioned in the 
introduction chapter, who believed that ritual and self-cultivation can achieve moral betterment 
that ultimately radiates to the whole empire. They hence promoted virtuous conducts by 
repairing shrines commemorating historical persons and engaged vigorously in compiling local 
gazetteer. The idea of ganying, resonance, was crucial, for all the work done in the self-
nurturing could influence the cosmic harmony of qi, energy, and hence had a direct relation to 
enhancing state power. In this sense ‘local actors could engage in attempts at state building’ 
(Wooldridge 2015). 
 
Ultimately, it comes to the question of cosmotechnics in Yuk Hui’s book. Hui argues 
against the Eurocentric and universal understanding of technics, and that precisely because of 
the cosmological and moral dimension imbedded in Confucianism, technics as such never 
existed in China. He then proposes ‘cosmotechnics’ as ‘the unification between the cosmic 
order and the moral order through technical activities’ in order to overcome the conceptual 
dualism of technics and nature (Hui 2016, 19-20). Cosmotechnics enters in fruitful dialogue 
with philosopher Gilbert Simondon and anthropologist Tim Ingold, who attempt to reground 
the human into the world, thereby reuniting the figure and the ground. The cosmotechnics, in 
this way, can be seen as a reunification of the technics ( Qi, tools) and cosmos ( Dao, the 
way, order). Hui’s own version of cosmotechnics takes the materiality of technics into account 
which pushes the possibility of matter to its limit (Hui 2016, 43).  
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Drawing on Bernard Stiegler, Hui discerns the different approaches to time in the West 
and China. Whereas the concept of time serves as technics enabling exteriorisation of memory 
in the West, traditional China did not develop such a geometric or spatialised concept of time, 
which in turns conditions the impasse to its development of technics in the Western sense. The 
Chinese concept of time could be seen in the unceasing efforts of court historians of interpreting 
ancient texts to give advince to emperors. Hui then makes a plea for regrounding technics into 
the cosmology, following Simondon and Leroi-Gourhan, who have argued that the experience 
of technics is related to and partially conditioned by cosmology, and that technology is a 
bifurcation of magic in the first place (Hui 2016, 203-223). (This aspect of technology seen in 
the direct lineage of magic is pertinent to the chapter on Ho Tzu Nyen.) 
Modern China, in Hui’s account, has shattered the Qi-Dao unity. Hui traces the various 
attempts of integrating Qi and Dao in New Confucian thinkers of 20th century, most notably in 
Mou Zongsan’s idealist proposition, who strove to bridge the ‘phenomenon’ and ‘noumenon,’ 
or what is observable and what is analogous to Dao, which failed to overcome modernity for he 
did not take the question of technology seriously. Yuk Hui highlights the study of Mou 
Zongsan’s idea of ‘the self-negation or self-restriction of liangzhi’ – the cosmic mind or 
righteousness knowledge to be extinguished from the knowing mind of objective knowledge, 
comparable to the intellectual intuition in Kant. The upshot of Mou’s theorisation of 
Confucianism in the 20th century is in his formulation of Confucianism as a moral metaphysics, 
invested in the cosmic knowledge – or intellectual intuition and noumenon that Kant claims to 
only pertain to God and not humans. And this cosmic knowledge is always already moral. The 
modernisation project for Confucianism Mou sees involves a lapse of this liangzhi / cosmic 
mind so that it can transform into a ‘subject of cognition,’ able to carry out cognitive and 
analytical activities and gain objective knowledge in the world of phenomenon. He terms this 
‘one mind opens two gates’.  
This would indeed provide an initial condition for the development of speculative 
reason. Yet, Mou returns to the grand scheme of concentric circles whereby the efforts of an 
individual can be extended to encompass the world. There he proposes not to take the traditional 
way from the self-nurturing of the emperor extending to the well-being of a nation, but by taking 
a detour from outside in. This, may be seen as a counter-movement of the scholars in Nanjing 
one century before him. Yuk Hui summarises Mou’s position as idealist, ‘Qi  is a possibility 
of Dao’, or the technics is a possibility and remains subordinate to the sagely way/intellectual 
intuition.  
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Here’s I’d like to postulate the fundamental problem with this liangzhi, or moral 
metaphysics by bringing in the concept of speculative reason in Whitehead’s process 
philosophy, which is crucial for technological thinking. Confucian philosophy resonates very 
much with process philosophy in revealing the internal dynamism, the constant flux and 
transformation of things. Whitehead famously formulates the exercise of speculative reason as 
follows: ‘The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground 
of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalisation; and it 
again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation’ (Whitehead 
1929, 5). 
This entails three phases of discovery, namely observation, generalisation and renewed 
observation. In the second phase, new data and above all, new conditions unthought-of before 
are recognised, leading to the third phase where the scheme is applied to items that were not 
taken into account in the construction of the scheme itself. Hence speculative reason does not 
conform to conditions set by antecedent circumstances and offers a state of being not 
determined by linear chain of cause and effect. It is an ‘adventure of ideas’, open for novelty 
and experimentation. Luciana Parisi extrapolates this into computation world, and highlights 
the proliferation of what cannot be calculated in the face of the infinite amount of data 
introduced into computation. For her, the incomputable conditions computation today. It means 
that ‘a notion of speculative reason is not concerned with the prediction of the future through 
the data of the past, but with incomputable quantities of data that rather transform initial 
conditions’ (Parisi 2013, 9).  
In contrast, the Confucianism framed quest for knowledge is always at the level of 
communicating the cosmic mind to achieve a man-heaven alignment in the world of 
immanence. To be sure, Confucianism does affirm the creation of something new, something 
that has never existed in the same way before. For example, Confucian philosopher Zhang Zai 
(1020-1077) speaks of this as the wondrous making of change: ‘d2eX.U/4‘`
’fX:/4‘D’fX@@/4‘2’f? Yijing/ I Ching/ Book of Changes] 
speaks of its moving along and proceeding, and therefore it says “the Way;” it speaks of its 
unfathomableness, and therefore it says “the marvelous;” it speaks of its continuously producing 
[things], and therefore it says “Change.” In reality, these are all one thing.’ (Zhang) 
But does it qualify as speculative reason? While it allows for novelty, the idea and action 
of shen, ‘the marvelous’ pertains to the creative cosmic consciousness, to which the human 
aligns himself. Even though this cosmic feeling may not be immediately manifested to humans, 
it is there and can be approached by practice, which is the view held by Mou Zongsan, who 
	 188	
extrapolates it to the Kantian ‘intellectual intuition’. In this sense, after taking the flight and 
coming back to ground, despite the new data and new conditions gained to rectify the scheme, 
the conclusion would pertain to a meta-condition that is always stable. This can be seen in 
tiangong kaiwu, a 17th century Chinese encyclopedia of technology, where confirms the human 
effort of transforming things, yet attributes the making of machines to a resonance in the human 
that emanates from the heaven, and that ultimately it is heaven that lies behind everything. 
The crucial point then becomes, how much dynamism is allowed in this heaven. For 
Alfred North Whitehead, the world of God offers the conceptual experience where the physical, 
temporal world is initially derived and motivated from. But the world of God is neither 
permanent nor perfectly determined. Instead, it also evolves with the world of physical, 
consequent experiences, which feed back into the conceptual realm to its process of completion. 
Normally religions assume a realm of static God, separate from the flux and impermanence, 
which doesn’t explain the interplay between the thing which is static and the things which are 
fluent. Hence such philosophies must include the notion of ‘illusion’ as a 
fundamental principle—the notion of ‘mere appearance.’ This is, for Whitehead, the final 
Platonic problem. (Whitehead 1929, 345-347) 
In essence, the Whiteheadian God factors in the changing world as if in a feedback loop. 
Different from the Chinese system in which everything is under the sway of the creative cosmic 
consciousness, Whitehead is able to work out an image of the world with continual creative 
advance and speculative reason, while the traditional Chinese system, while internally dynamic, 
can be understood as an ‘absolutisation of immanence,’ or in the words of Deleuze and Guattari, 
the figures of Chinese thinking tend infinitely close to concepts of Western philosophy. 
 
To go back to the model of Qi and Dao, for me, the insufficiency of this model lies not 
only in Qi as a mere possibility of Dao, but also – if one follows the materialist history through 
the lens of desire, that the exercise of the negation of liangzhi remains caught in and insofar 
affirmed as it has to direct back at the core of the moral cosmos, resembling a set of concentric 
circles with the perfect alignment of things, humans and the universe. Yet the modernisation of 
China starting in late 19th century marks the transition from precapitalist despotic machine to 
the capitalistic machine, the latter cannot be surmounted by returning to a previous world order. 
In this sense, Kyoto School’s Keiji Nishitani’s theoreisation of a different world history 
and his emphasis on the emptiness may enter into dialogue with Mou Zongsan, roughly 
contemporary to him. Though both attempts are debatable for reasons we will see before. Still, 
for Hui, it is necessary to ‘go back to the question of time and to open up a pluralism which 
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allows a new world history to emerge, but one which is subordinated neither to global capitalism 
and nationalism, nor to an absolute metaphysical ground’ (Hui 2016, 261)  
While Hui is aware that cosmotechnics is not just a return to a cosmology (53), in 
affirming that technics bifurcate from cosmology (as technics from science in Simondon), the 
argument leads to technics needing the same element to which it is born and from which, in 
some cultures, it has not been separated – that is, cosmology. Doubtlessly there are conceptual 
and social-political merits in re-affirming the cosmological dimension in the belief and practice 
of the contemporary man. I do not wish to deny the existence of variegated cosmologies in our 
contemporary society. On the contrary, I acknowledge them all the more precisely because there 
is a reason for their increasing visibility, that is late capitalism (see section on animism and 
Chibber in introduction chapter).  
In modern China, the traditional Confucian alignment was disrupted and in its place, the 
most efficient state-guided capitalism has been installed, which follows the conjunctive 
capitalistic logic and decodes every social strata and entity to turn decoded real or virtual bodies 
and capital for production. Hui’s own understanding of capitalism implicates the mutation of 
capitalism. He writes, ‘capitalism is the contemporary cosmotechnics that dominates the 
planet’, and as a ‘mode of power’, it takes on cosmic dynamics. (Hui 2016, 299)  Ultimately it 
leads him to propose the reappropriation of modern technologies and technological 
consciousness as a way to overcome modernity through modernity itself. This variety of 
cosmotechnics should ‘resist the global time-axis that has been constructed by modernity’ (Hui 
2016, 306). The conjunctive mode of capitalism in its ever-intensive decoding and expanding 
capacity, double-folding the multi-connective desire from primary societies may indeed be said 
to liken cosmic dynamics. Yet to unveil the cosmic dynamics, a closer investigation firmly 
situated both in historical materialism and new materialism(s) is in order. As expounded on 
above, Chinese capitalism, at a national and global scale, has the characteristics of both fully-
fledged market economy and strong state intervention with state-owned enterprises and public-
private investments in strategic sectors. It bends but does not break.  
This is the ultimate strength of capitalism. Capitalism enlists the movement of desire 
from the primitive society, and in contemporary China it conflates capitalism with the despotic 
state. To draw a diagram congenial to this and previous chapters, the despotic state can be 
likened to a set of concentric circles with a defined centre where the power emanates from, be 
it the religious leader or king, or a combined figure. The centrifugal momentum of capitalism 
dislodges bodies, entities, relations from their once set places in the system so to expand into 
new markets, labour and new debt relations. China ticks with both and centrifugal motions of 
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capital and centripetal motions of totalisation. At each location, be it individual persons or 
communities, there are various forces at play. The crucial question here is whether the pure 
experience in Nishitani and the proposal of Mou pertain rather to an order of the man-heaven 
alignment in the despotic regime than is able to effectuate any change in conjunctive capitalism, 
where ‘capital (or the liberation of matters from formed bodies) is the tendency of matter itself’ 
(Colebrook 2009, 8).  
And to go back to the question of cosmotechnics, or the attempt to reinsert technics into 
a ground beyond the dualistic divide, one has to realise the differential scales between the sway 
of capitalism and the scale on which such regrounding can happen, and should not to conflate 
the cosmic dimension as the moral axiological axis, which capitalism incessantly dislodges. Hui 
is aware of the importance of locality, and emphasises how interconnected it is in the global 
capitalism network (Hui 2016, 307).  The local should be taken not just in terms of location but 
also in terms of potential, seen in the creative advance of matter against stratifications, and to 
overspill the capture of capitalism and politics.  
This is where the chapters in the dissertation may demonstrate their respective answers 
to the ‘cosmotechnics’ through their local engagements with technologies, for the technologies 
involved are never taken as a given but layered with cultural meanings and governing structures. 
At the same time, the men-machines assemblage is one embedded in a larger relational network 
beyond the individuals and the machines, and the assemblage, by its immanent configurations, 
allow a kind of agency/desire to emerge. It then invites the question, is the desire desirable (as 
in late capitalism)? Where are its immanent cracks? To unpack these questions, art offers a 
place where we could reground ourselves. Through the enaction of desire and history in Royce 
Ng’s work, we have gained an affective sense of the magnitude and force implicated in the 
question of capitalism and necropolitics. 
 
6.6. Opium Dream and Butterfly Dream 
 
In this spirit, this chapter, instead of providing answers, ends with two fables on dreams. As 
weight and terror in the history of political-economy in East Asia and the world bear down on 
us, dreams may appear unapologetically airy. Yet indeed, Kishi the Vampire is teemed with 
hallucinatory sceneries: over-dimensional skeleton hovering over industrial sites, brothels with 
organismic backdrops, all rendered in screaming colours. The artist intended the atmosphere to 
be dream-like, despite or precisely because of the concrete violence unfolding in it. This lends 
the scenes to a rather counter-intuitive reading: the scenes as opium-induced dreams. At the 
end, we will see how this dream that Royce Ng paints for us not just a nightmare to be buried, 
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nor an alibi for self-numbing passivity, but rather points to the possible critical engagement of 
disidentification. 
 
The hallucinatory effect of opium lends it to a strange relation to dream. Koester 
comments, ‘Opium is the quintessential capitalist raw material - the purchase and sale of dreams 
– and as a commodity it is surrounded by a hallucinatory mysteriousness as if its “real” 
components cannot quite be separated from its effect’ (Koester 2008, 141). 
Thomas De Quincey’s Confessions of an English Opium Eater is one of the earliest and 
the best known first-person account on the effect of opium: his descriptions of his opiate 
ramblings through the streets of London become the inspiration for later psychogeographical 
experiments; a new gateway to the modern city through chemical reveries, the conscious 
derangement of the senses. De Quincey transforms opium from being an anesthetising medicine 
to a portal on to what he calls ‘the secret inscriptions of the mind’, journeys in time to forgotten 
memories, which seem to be carved from the very darkness of sleep – an often dangerous and 
frightening enterprise. (Koester 2008, 141) 
In Confessions of an English Opium Eater, there is a curious scene where a ‘Malay’ 
sailor shows up at De Quincey’s cottage in the Lakes District of Northern England. Without 
linguistic means to communicate, De Quincey presents him a piece of opium, which he 
consumes before pursuing his onward journey. What seems to be a brief encounter between the 
East and West, without the overladen colonial power relations being explicit, turns out to be a 
transcultural delirium later. De Quincey writes, 
 
The Malay has been a fearful enemy for months. Every night through his means, I have 
been transported into Asiatic scenery...in China or Hindustan...I was stared at, hooted 
at, grinned at, chattered at, by monkeys, by paroquets, by cockatoos. I ran into pagodas, 
and was fixed for centuries at the summit, or in secret rooms, I was the idol; I was the 
priest, I was worshipped, I was sacrificed… Thousands of years I lived and was buried 
in stone coffins, with mummies and sphinxes, in narrow chambers at the heart of eternal 
pyramids. I was kissed, with cancerous kisses by crocodiles, and I was laid, confounded 
with unutterable abortions, among reeds and Nilotic mud... Over every form, and threat 
and punishment, and dim sightless incarceration, brooded a killing sense of eternity and 
infinity... The cursed crocodile became for me the object of more horror than all the 
rest... I was compelled to live with him and as was always the case in my dreams for 
centuries. Sometimes I escaped and found myself in Chinese houses. All the feet of the 
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tables and sofas soon because instinct with life. (De Quincey 2003) 
 
If the earlier encounter depicts a scene between East and West featuring the primary 
commodities of exchange between the two civilisations, opium and tea, then the traces of the 
labour embedded in the production of the opium De Quincey smoked exacts revenge through 
opium nightmares which haunt him. This leads Royce Ng to ask how opium and its effects 
become a kind of middle term, much like the butterfly dream in Zhuangzi’s parable that breaks 
down the binaries between reality and dreaming, being and nothingness, East and West, 
consumer and producer relation. He asks potently, did the Malay actually dream of De Quincey? 
(Ng 2017) 
Now, it’s interesting to note how this dream enacts a kind of vengeance by reverting the 
power relation implicated in the opium, that is, the political condition of colonialism and labour 
condition of (semi-)slavery. In the dream, the colonial gaze is cast back at the coloniser, 
coinciding perhaps the worst nightmare of the ‘enlightened’ man – that of the irrational, messy 
other. This is, to be sure, not a real revenge on the part of the Malay, indeed he may be only a 
hallucinatory dream of De Quincey. Note, at the same time, how this monologue reveals the 
multiple states of the writer, not unlike the Nietzsche account analysed in the last chapter, where 
he passes different intensities and assumes different roles and identities. In this sense, De 
Quincey’s account can be said to be an effect of the ever-expansive force of colonial subjugation 
acting on the intimate level of bodies capitulated under its necropolitics. 
Insofar as the dream exists, the affective efficacy of the dream can be affirmed. This is 
where it demands a careful reading of Zhuangzi’s butterfly dream. Full of baffling allegories 
and metaphors, the text of Zhuangzi (369-298 BCE) lays the foundation for Daoist philosophy. 
One of Zhuangzi’s philosophical convicts is b?[ qiwulun, which can be rendered verbatim 
as ‘equalisation or levelling of things,’ or interpreted as ‘equality of things,’ ‘smoothing things 
out,’ and ‘Gleichstellung der Dinge’ in German. The story of the butterfly dream is rendered as 
follows in the English translation: 
 
Once Zhuangzi dreamt he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting and fluttering around, 
happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He didn’t know he was Zhuangzi. Suddenly 
he woke up and there he was, solid and unmistakable Zhuangzi. But he didn’t know if 
he was Zhuangzi who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was 
Zhuangzi. Between Zhuangzi and a butterfly there must be some distinction! This is 
called the Transformation of Things. (Watson 1968, 49) 
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Here I primarily draw on sinologist and philosopher Fabian Heubel’s comparative study 
on the subject matter for the questions he raises regarding transcultural translation has most 
informed my reading on Zhuangzi. I reproduce two translations in Heubel’s study as they 
exemplify different approaches to the original text in classical Chinese (with my own translation 
from German to English), for there is a spectrum of interpretational possibilities when it comes 
to classical Chinese. 
I have engaged with the structure of paradox in the second chapter on language, here 
the challenge is more complex for it involves two seemingly different subjects and perspectives. 
The key, for Heubel, to understand the philosophical challenge of paradox in Zhuangzi, is a de-
subjective understanding of ‘equality,’ or a paradoxical ‘non-identity of the subject with itself’ 
(Heubel 2016, 151). 
Here is Martin Buber’s translation:  
 
Ich, Tschuang-Tse träumte einst, ich sei ein Schmetterling, ein hin und her flatternder, 
in allen Zwecken und Zielen ein Schmetterling. Ich wußte nur, daß ich meinen Launen 
wie ein Schmetterling folgte, und war meines Menschenwesens unbewußt. Plötzlich 
erwachte ich; und da lag ich: wieder ‘ich selbst’. Nun weiß ich nicht: war ich da ein 
Mensch, der träumt, er sei ein Schmetterling, oder bin ich jetzt ein Schmetterling, der 
träumt, er sei ein Mensch? Zwischen Mensch und Schmetterling ist eine Schranke. Sie 
überschreiten ist Wandlung genannt.  
 
(My translation) I, Zhuangzi (in keeping with the pinyin romanisation system, I use 
Zhuangzi instead of Tschuang-Tse), first dreamt that I was a butterfly, fluttering around, 
a butterfly in all its purposes and goals. I knew only that I followed my temper like a 
butterfly and was not aware of my humanness. Suddenly I woke up, and there I lay: 
again ‘myself’. Now I don’t know: there, was I a man who dreams he is a butterfly, or 
a butterfly who dreams that he is a man? Between man and butterfly is a barrier, to 
overcome it is called transformation.  
 
Hans-Georg Möller criticised this translation and offered his own desubjectivised, 
deconstructivist version (Zhuang Zhou is the name of Zhuangzi):  
 
Einst träumte Zhuang Zhou – und wurde ein Schmetterling, ein flatternder 
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Schmetterling, heiter daselbst und seinem Ansinnen eingepasst! Er wusste nichts von 
einem Zhou. Mit einem plötzlichen Erwachen war ein Zhou voll und ganz da. Man weiß 
nicht, ob ein Zhou im Traum zu einem Schmetterling wird oder ein Schmetterling im 
Traum zu einem Zhou. Wo es einen Zhou gibt und einen Schmetterling, da muss es eine 
Unterscheidung dazwischen geben. Diesbezüglich spricht man von der Wandlung der 
Dinge.   
 
(My translation) First Zhuang Zhou dreamt – and became a butterfly, a fluttering 
butterfly, happy and fitting its own requests! It knew nothing of a Zhou. With a sudden 
awaking, a Zhou was fully there. One doesn’t know if a Zhou becomes a butterfly in the 
dream or a butterfly becomes a Zhou in the dream. Where there is a Zhou and a butterfly, 
there must be a difference in between. Regarding this, one speaks of the transformation 
of things.  
 
Heubel analyses the various translations. The commentary from Guo Xiang (?-312) on 
Zhuangzi shows there is no conscious subject that endures, as seen in Buber’s translation. 
Rather, it is about an abrupt break between Zhuangzi and the butterfly, while neither party bears 
semblance to the other. Both states are equally authentic and real. The spontaneous and natural 
transformation of things are only possible because the difference between things are affirmed 
and not transcended as in Buber’s translation (Heubel 2016, 153). In this sense, paradoxical and 
transpositional communication means that a subject neither discards or dissolves the identity of 
his position, nor does he regard the shifting between different positions as a mere imagined play 
where there is an enduring consciousness that never gets jeopardised. The non-identity with the 
self demands that the subject temporarily negates the self-conscious identity in order to pass 
over to a different position. The great challenge is to equalise or level (gleichzustellen) the 
different positions with regards to the grade of their realities - and this is the provocative side 
of Möller’s reading. (Heubel 2016, 154) 
 
Zhuangzi’s non-identity with the self resonates with the notion of multiperspectivism 
analysed in the chapter on Spiess/Strecker’s transgenetic chimera ritual. To reiterate Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro’s idea, non-human agents and humans both perceive the world in the same 
way; what varies is rather the world which they see, effectively redeeming relationality rather 
than substantiality as the primary way of relating to the world (Viveiros de Castro 2004, 471-
472). 
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The butterfly dream can be recast this way: both Zhuangzi and the butterfly perceive 
and their ‘perspectives’ are equally valid. Regarding this comparison, Lind points out, ‘what is 
missing here is the perspective of the other, which is, according to Viveiros de Castro, important 
for the transformation (Viveiros de Castro 2004, 483). Only two ‘I’-perspectives are being 
compared in this tale, but the other, for whom Zhuangzi would be either himself or the butterfly, 
is absent. This could mean that Zhuangzi himself was also the other perspective. This would 
correspond to the role of the shaman in the Amazonian region, for a shaman is able to transform 
and thereby preserve his own perspective’ (Lind 2014, 151) 
Can this be a theoretical lens through which the opium dream of De Quincey can be 
remediated? Without toning down the implication of colonialism, at least from the microscopic 
personal account of the coloniser, we can see that because of the logic of conjunctive capitalist 
desire, his body is the planes on which the desire works its way through by dislodging once 
firm structures of biopolitical control, giving rise to the opium addiction and deranged 
hallucinatory behaviours. Not unlike Kishi, who in the artistic rendering of Ng, passes through 
the states of intensities and ‘identifies’ with the flow of conjunctive capitalism in its most 
perverted forms, the opium eater too enters into a state of non-identity with himself and thereby 
sees the world through the eyes of the Malay. He does not become the Malay who dreams that 
he is De Quincey, but this does not discredit the authenticity of the Malay’s world now 
registered by the opium eater.  
By dint of this passage into the Malay’s world, a process of reflecting on and 
deconstructing colonisation can be initiated, and the writing it becomes a potent critique of the 
colonial economic enterprise.  
To project this into a larger background of decolonisation of the mind (being aware of 
the culturalist pitfalls), Heubel asks if Zhuangzi’s qiwulun fundamentally undermines the 
episteme of the Western culture, as Foucault does when he references the Chinese 
encyclopaedia invented by Jorge Luis Borges. Moreover, he asks if Europe has to realise that it 
is dreaming a dream that it doesn’t know is a dream, in order to come to its own self-
contemplation (Selbstbesinnung). (Heubel 2016, 149-150) In this sense, to effectuate a 
disruption in the global discursive hegemony along with the hegemony on military and 
economic fronts, it might take a schizophrenic non-identification with the self to enter the 
passages of a ‘dream,’ so to come up with different subject positionings and ways of relating to 
the rest of the world. This method, however tentative, echoes the proposition put forward by 
Paul Gladston in the introduction. For Gladston, perspectivism issues from seemingly 
irreconcilable positions, which demand an injection of dynamism in the interpretation of them. 
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In other words, a deconstructive witnessing of deconstruction itself is in good order, to map the 
terrains of non-binary subjectivities and to situate local efficacies where alternative positionings 
break free from dialectical stand-offs. (Gladston 2019)  
This is also the method of speculation put forward by Marina Vishmidt, which poses a 
resistance to these closures of identity by means of speculative thought that always returns to 
the experience of non-identity and thus to the alterity and futurity motivating every practice of 
critique (Vishmidt 2018b). This powerfully undoes abstract identities based on nationality, race, 
sex, age or any other category, as the previous chapters have variably touched on, and instigates 
nomadic or speculative identities. As Simon Jarvis writes, ‘Whereas abstract identity tries to 
get rid of difference and contradiction as mere error, speculative identity is to contain the 
experience of difference and contradiction within itself’ (Jarvis 1998, 169). 
From the disidentification of the opium eater to the disidentification of the West, we 
shall now return to Kishi. The speculative identity here may appear at first sight to be a strange 
call, for it demands, in the case of Kishi the Vampire, that we – temporarily – ‘identify’ with 
Kish, the schizo, or hentai. In other words, it urges us to engage seriously with them to 
understand how incessant self-perpetuating capitalism works on the affective, embodied level. 
Kishi the Vampire, in this sense, is not merely a narration of historical and transhistorical 
events, but more crucially the enactment of this very affectivity, and through which the opening 
of a process of identification-disidentification-non-identification. Herein lies the power of arts, 
however much its ground has been structurally appropriated by capitalism (more on this in the 
concluding chapter). All this leads us to a subject position irreducible to the one-dimensionality 
that capitalism flattens us into, sometimes co-opting forces that once resist it (such as race and 
gender). Now, more than ever, there is an urge to exercise non-identification as a method to 
move forward.  
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
Thinking along with Royce Ng’s Kishi the Vampire, the chapter has interwoven a history of 
Manchukuo with key agents in its politics and economy, as well as a conceptual history 
surrounding Manchukuo and East Asia. The figuration of Kishi and/as vampire in the 
performance marks a departure of the piece from merely a historical/documentarian account. 
Rather, the performance grounds the history in the body by shedding light on bodies under 
necropolitical capture and enacting the erotic-grotesque. Manchukuo provides a case in point 
reflecting the operation of desiring machine from the desire kept at bay in a Confucian order to 
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the desire of self-perpetuating capitalism: on the cultural-discursive level, its making of 
nationalism and multi-ethnic alliance services the semi-colonial rule; on the economic level, it 
heralds the advanced capitalistic stage where production is for the sake of production and war 
serves as the expanded means of production, and where the ‘nomadic’ opium trade is absorbed 
to reinforce the State; and on the necropolitical level of the body, desire embodied by the schizo 
manifests itself as perversion, resulting in the erotic-grotesque visual and material culture. 
While not exonerating economic and military horror, locating desire in war, violence and crime 
is admittedly against the grains of moralist historiography. Yet as the intellectual history co-
extensive to Manchukuo evinces, there are philosophical discussions on being and negation, 
desire and the individual, governance and coexistence that are worthy of revisiting, not least 
because some of the topics are regaining traction in the long aftermath of 20th century history.  
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7. Chapter Seven 
Conclusion: for a materialist and speculative process 
 
The dissertation traverses milieus and space-times. It thinks with performances and tries to 
express how the performances ‘think’, that is, how they reflect the social and historical through 
the lens of expanded of bodies. The expression is not exclusive in language, but pertains to the 
kind, as Artaud sees, which ‘says too much to be born, and says too much in being born’ 
(Massumi 2002a, xxxii). Expression pertaining to the pre-personal immanent world too great 
to be said is exactly what compels me, and many other scholars and practitioners, to turn to 
performances. For in performance, expression takes a body, ‘so as to continue, generating a 
more to reality to absorb the excess’. And when expression is being born, it says too much in 
the moments of carrying over these forces of excess into tangible and intangible relations in the 
world. What it says too much is essentially forces of existence: ‘It disseminates life. It comes 
to be determined, and exceeds its determinations to become’ (Massumi 2002a, xxxii). It is this 
intensity of expression that are enacted in the works, and it is with this intensity of expression 
that the composition of this dissertation gets its initial impetus. Even though a dissertation may 
not convey this force adequately as it works more to illustrate it and thereby stagnating the 
movements, I still hope that this dissertation – at various places – could ride on the flow and 
pass through bodies, societies and histories.  
 My dissertation has come to fruition, and the questions I set out with have been 
thoroughly explored in the previous chapters. They point me to temporary answers, and 
motivate my future research. What I’d like to conclude the project with is a reflection on the 
recursive critical thinking pattern together with a cartography of the interconnections – a tool 
that may prove useful beyond this dissertation project. 
 
Throughout the dissertation, there emerges this correlation between performances and 
the expression or force of life. From the outset, I have embarked on a materialism-informed 
inquiry to explore performances as a form of thinking in itself. This implies locating the material 
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processes embedded or depicted in performances, such as language and biological materials to 
understand the underlying flow of this force of life. At the same time, these material processes 
are implicated in complicated social processes, therefore merging into the world of politics, 
such as identity as belonging to a particular Muslim persuasion, as an East Asian woman, or 
identification between DNA and inheritance. The sense of magic as an alternate attitude to 
history or technology, cast under a new light of multiperspectivism and equally embedded in 
materialist studies, effectuates a kind of dis-identification, which conditions the last two 
chapters in the dissertation to take a more socio-political and historical outlook, and where the 
convergence of new materialism and historical materialism bear fruitful results. The works, in 
their very diverse forms, thematise the processes from codification to decodification, by 
creating an immanent world in the artistic works that both demonstrate in a condensed way such 
contradicting movements, and at the same time, by enacting the consequences of the 
movements, be it the phonetic materiality of language/expression, the bio-engineered chimera 
or the lingering of the tiger/vampire. By so doing, they point both to the positive challenge 
posted by the desire to overcome codifying, signifying and totalising structures, and to the 
potential disruptive force from decodification and destratification. 
Closely examining the diverse artistic practices through the lens of materialism, this 
dissertation has journeyed through a wide time span and over diverse geographical locations. 
Though the trajectories may seem to take plural directions, each question examined transpires 
through different temporal/historical contexts creating a multitude of interconnections or 
parallel readings, and yet stays focused on its own line of argument. In my engagement with 
agency, different scales of critique and action become more and more entangled as the 
dissertation progresses. It becomes more evident that they should be accounted for on multiple 
levels and in negotiation with themselves as much as with the changing context.   
The thinking process, therefore, has followed the method of speculation and immanent 
critique that takes both the motion of deconstruction (in a negative-productive way) and 
dynamic transformation, which entails a recursive process of regress and as such, is open for 
reconsideration revisions. On the conceptual and critical level, it follows a to-and-fro movement, 
though less like a pendulum but rather in an evolving fashion, which means the dissertation 
contradicts in order to affirm on a different level. This is all because there is not such a detached 
position from where to issue the absolute critique. What there is, rather, is a constant negotiation 
and the witnessing of such negotiations. For example, when it comes to the East Asian 
understanding of language, time or social dynamics, it may seem that the dissertation moves 
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between confirming and contradicting differences, for simply affirming ‘indigenous’ thinking 
as postcolonial critique may veil other forms of self-orientalisation and cultural elitism. 
Another set of questions concern agency and/in the arts in the context of new and old 
materialism. What is to be done, as the complexities and opaqueness of our societies grow ever 
larger and as (in)dividuals we feel more disempowered and hopeless? Where can and should 
agency be located and exercised? These are general discussions that artists and social 
practitioners are questing themselves with these days, and they concern the artists I examine in 
the dissertation as well. However, my analysis of the works does not amount to any direct 
answer to these questions. Instead, it hints at critical tools with which we could approach the 
questions locally. 
On the pertinent question of agency: given all the micro and minoritarian practices, it is 
possible, if not fashionable, to resolve to a posthuman world where agency is redistributed to 
things or to networks. While some aspects of this strand of materialist thinking, typified by 
‘thing-agency,’ is not erroneous, I have pointed out especially in the chapter on Geumhyung 
Jeong that it risks exoneration of responsibilities and agency. Just who or what should be held 
accountable in a relational field for certain events? Here, we could zoom out to the level of 
global networks where the focus is placed on relationalities rather than objects, and we could 
easily end up at a place where political power, such as seen in surveillance, is increasingly 
distributed and decentralised. If the anti-establishment politics in the 1960s and 70s, whether in 
student movements or in the militant guerrilla warfare, was a kind of decentralised and nomadic 
counter-power strategy, then since the recent three decades, this decentralised and swarming 
structure has been incorporated by the state to implement what Deleuze has since long 
anticipated as ‘society of control’. No longer based on intuitional discipline, the society of 
control exercises control through continuous modulations from within. (Deleuze 1992) 
Importantly, this decentralisation should not be taken as a new kind of flatness, and it 
especially should not foreclose the possibility of actions. Action is wedded to thinking – this is 
true both in the sense of ‘worlding’ in the artistic works, and in the larger social context. In the 
performance works, we have seen the bringing forth of a world through the bodies of the agents 
– biological bodies, animal and machinic bodies, dividualised human bodies, and how these 
bodies are entangled in social and historical processes with all their complexities and 
contradictions. This is not immediately in the realm of social actions, however, the way they 
enact ‘worlding’ gives creative insights into social processes, even though they do not provide 
one-to-one utilisation or application. The artistic processes and productions act on and influence 
the society through their affective capacities, reclaiming the affective space now occupied by 
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personalised advertising and the culture of influencers. This is coupled with renewed rigour of 
critique, one that does not stop at deconstruction but is open toward dynamic transformations. 
When it comes to actions in the social context, we must recognise that there are 
organised and coordinated actions. Just as important, there are non-intended ones that may or 
may not emerge to challenge a system. One of the critiques of the flat ontology in new 
materialism – taken bluntly – is that there cannot be any ‘point,’ ‘whole,’ or ‘centre’ that one 
could scale, and therefore does not account for the ideology of capitalism’s global hegemony 
or of political economy in general. This leads some scholars to refocus on the human agency 
given the fact of its concrete effects on questions like the climate change. (Leskanich 2018)  
In the face of the impending climate catastrophe, there are certain stances and 
propagations that pertain loosely to new materialism. The fact that it seems easier to perform 
geoengineering rather than to fix the problems of capitalism, as we have observed in many of 
the world’s leaders, private and public alike, should ring alarm bells. Capitalism is 
anthropomorphised, if not sacralised, as a ‘subject’, with its seeming self-perpetuation and self-
realisation suggesting a will often associated with personhood. The Deep Ecology strand of 
thinking, on the other hand, proposes that the ecological catastrophe is rooted in overpopulation 
of the humanity itself, and hence argues for the striking back of nature, or rather nature taking 
its due course, the consequence of which being that humans are limited or eliminated. Both of 
the positions share an underlying belief in the animality or desire of a non-human outside, either 
of capital or of nature, that will exert its power on the world. However, both capitalism and 
nature are fully human, as the previous chapters have argued. The social context for capitalism 
reveals how capital is not as a thing or subject, but a process that exists only in motion. Hence 
it calls for coordinated social interventions to curtail capitalism’s current expansionist motions. 
Similarly, the deep entanglement between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ beyond simple delineations 
presents us with both threats and opportunities that need to be mitigated. For example, in the 
question of genetics expounded in Chapter Three, the ‘nature’ can be intervened on through 
gene-editing technology, but certain interventions, especially at multiple locations on the 
genome, may cause nature to ‘strike back’ with unforeseeable consequences. If we follow the 
view of Dark Ecology, we should perhaps stop all scientific interventions altogether. However, 
with ethical use of the gene-editing technology, it will present the human kind with possibilities 
of curing certain diseases. Once again, the deconstruction and transformation thinking process 
is at play.  
To bring this argument in line with the stratification and destratification processes, the 
destratification of the anthropocentric positions, even in the more nuanced versions, creates a 
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loose network of distributed agencies that may or may not couple with new entities to give rise 
to stratifications. Therefore, it is important to reinsert the self-consciousness understanding for 
the reality (in good old historical materialist tradition) and a demand for responsible actions. In 
this way, it instigates an immanent deconstruction of the readings of new materialism. Such is 
the to and fro motion of thinking – and so is my reading of the artistic projects and the social 
imaginaries they induce and enact.  
 
This recursive movement equally applies to the question of the creativity or desire of 
matter and capitalism. As we have seen in almost all the chapters, the ‘creativity’ of matter 
works both ways. It can point to the materiality beyond cultural construction and reductionism, 
for example, it helps to criticise the reductionism in the instance of language as detached from 
the world and DNA as the code of life, and later it appears to cast the relation between man and 
machine, and man and tiger in a new light. Creativity of matter recasts language in materialist 
and social frames and proposes intensive relationalities. 
At the same time, ‘creativity’ has a flip side. Even though the immanent understanding 
of materials is pitted against reductionism, getting beyond reductionism is not without pitfalls. 
The call for deterritorialisation and destratification, while important for overspilling certain set 
structures, must be handled with caution. There is an acute reminder from Deleuze and Guattari 
regarding this movement in thinking: 
 
You don’t reach the BwO [body without organs], and its plane of consistency, by wildly 
destratifying. ... If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata 
without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane [of consistency] you will 
be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged towards catastrophe. Staying 
stratified – organised, signified, subjected – is not the worst that can happen; the worst 
that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which 
brings them down on us heavier than ever. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 160-161)  
 
This dislodging tendency leading to the co-option of itself in capitalism has been 
addressed in the chapter on DNA, which shows how the multi-connective desire seen in 
biological materials is once again structurally appropriated (through the reduction to bio-
information) by capitalism. Most significantly, this analysis of capitalism underlies the chapters 
on Ho Tzu Nyen and Royce Ng, where the processes of economical expansionism and 
colonisation are examined. The chapter on Royce Ng ends with the Asian financial crisis along 
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other crises, painting a rather dire picture of incessant perpetuation of capital. However, it is 
important to reiterate that – as the financial crisis in 2008 rightly evinces – financial speculation 
cannot be infinitely open-ended, which would always lead to stabilisation on other levels – ten 
years of stagnation in most of the world’s developed economies.  
On a meta-level, the deterritorialised capital self-production leads to view of capitalism 
as a creative force, extending the notion of capital as a subject that Marx already anticipated. 
On this point, Vishmidt insightfully points out there is a shared speculative identity, or a 
structural analogy between art and finance, where the speculative practices of art, premised on 
its creativeness and open-endedness, and financial speculation as an intensification of capital’s 
self-perpetuation of future-oriented growth conjoin and reflect each other structurally. This can 
be seen not just in the replication of the capitalist market logic in the art market but also the 
rising demand for ‘creativity’ in the neoliberal labour market regardless of the nature of the 
work, and in social reproduction – coming up with ‘creative’ means of subsistence – at a time 
when social infrastructure becomes increasingly inadequate. (2018b)  
But this infrastructural critique should not be a pessimistic call to stop engaging with 
the arts. On the contrary, it demands all the more rigour and attention when we conceive, make, 
participate in, experience and reflect on art. In this way, we may enter into new worldings in 
the society through art. The procedural qualities of the artistic works can tap into the ‘unknown 
unknowns’ in the society – instigating unforeseeable relational, social, economic and political 
processes, which technocracy and solutionism may fail to address. As such, it will provide 
invaluable insights toward what I call ‘actionable speculations’. The speculation is made 
productive, and can guide us in navigating complexities. 
To start such a process, a firm understanding of art as both a block of affects and percepts 
intermediating theories and processes of the society and history, such that this dissertation tried 
to argue for, is in good order to kick start the deconstructive and transformative critique. 
Importantly for the deconstruction, art has ‘the power to create new functional assemblages that 
are not predicated on a concept of identity’ (Stephan Zagala 2002, 32). And equally importantly 
for the transformation, art is a ‘speculative cartography’ which ‘constructs coordinates of 
existence at the same time as those coordinates are lived (Guattari, 1993, 240-241). Both 
processes go hand-in-hand.  
In order to go beyond identity, Vishmidt emphasises the labour of speculation, which 
‘poses a resistance to these closures of identity by means of speculative thought which always 
returns to the experience of non-identity and thus to the alterity and futurity motivating 
every practice of critique’ (2018b). Here the identity can be taken as identity of a subject, an 
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issue, or a context. The speculation-labour process can help broaden recent debates around 
identity politics (both the left-wing and the right-wing pushbacks in recent times could be 
attributed to it), which grow from once-emancipatory projects that now favour fragmentations 
where everybody can only speak from and for one’s own subject position. The apt call for and 
engagement with dissimulation and multiplicity of identities in the works of Lawrence Abu 
Hamdan is especially pertinent as a critique to the flattening identity politics. The figures of the 
schizo and vampire in Ho Tzu Nyen’s and Royce Ng’s works point to the serial movements of 
dis-identification of a fixed subject, acting as potent allegory to the elusive and expansive 
motion of capitalism, which in turn produce subjectivities. The dis-identification with the self 
is further manifested in multiperspectivism and Zhuang Zi’s butterfly dream, as a practical 
example of living the speculative cartography of existence.  
Furthermore, just as we dis-identify with the self, the identification of the overall context 
in which the dynamic subjects are situated can also be transformed into an alterity, thereby 
provoking a general motivation for finding momentarily meta-stable states among a force field 
where things are in flux. All these attempts to dis-identify amount to a deconstruction that at 
the same time opens for transformation. This resonates with what Guattari sees as the ethico-
political extensions of the fractalisation of the psyche, which disrupts ‘the destiny of the one-
dimensionality of the capitalistic subjectivation,’ and can ‘cause its own eviction by 
heterogeneous, multicentered, polyphonic, polyvocal approaches, installing itself outside pre-
coded equilibriums’ (Guattari 1987, 85).  
Art provides a place where we can practice in partaking in the force field and assemblage 
of multiple perspectives, to draw our own speculative cartography as we reflect on the 
cartography of the transhistorical movements of society.   
 
Taking art both as inscribed in art history of representation and meaning and also as the 
dynamism of materialities, my research connecting new materialism and historical materialism 
gives indications of how the immanent mode of organisation of matters in new materialism can 
also be implicated in complex political economical processes pertaining to the analysis of 
historical materialism. Hence the relation of production is not just focused on labour in the 
Marxian sense but expanded to how matters are produced and captured, how subjectivities and 
(in)dividuation are produced and desire is managed and modulated, as well as under which 
conditions prefigurative and transfigurative agency can be articulated.   
At the end of the journey, it becomes increasingly clear for me that the changing socio-
political and economic context demands that we constantly re-examine the place and function 
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of art. For the becoming ‘creative’ of everything under neoliberalism should not efface art but 
all the more demand sharpened positioning of the arts. In the dissertation, the question of 
political economy arises not just a subject of study but also assumes or becomes, to some extent, 
a structural element that the works enact.  
Given the changing political economy in general and hence also the changing condition 
of the arts, we need to find renewed practices to reaffirm the power of the arts. Part of the 
dissertation and my undertaking in general is dedicated to the sheer potentiality of the arts in 
enacting an expression in excess of the spoken word. And at the same time, by critically 
engaging with socio-political structures on the level of the affects and then enacting them in the 
performance, it initiates crucial reflections on the social and political processes at large. 
Following the recursive critical analysis, we depart from these works that affect us through their 
critical and affective capacities, and look for a next step, which may be to think how the 
institutional structure of art can reflect the changing conditions in reforming the infrastructure 
of the arts, though I’ll leave it for now as my future task. Art at the interface of the society and 
history can capture the dynamic materialist tendencies and the paradoxical-transformative 
motions of things, and can make a difference. And, I hope, a sustainable one. 
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Fig. 5.4 Ho Tzu Nyen, Ten Thousand Tigers, 2014, The Esplanade Theatre Studio. Photo: Ken Cheong.
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Fig. 6.4 Royce Ng, Kishi the Vampire, 2016, Asia Culture Center, Gwangju, South Korea. Photo: Sun Siwei.
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